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God is not really found until we find not merely One whom we have long sought and
could not find, but One who has all the time been seeking us and whom we have all the
time been attempting to elude. If we seek God and think we cannot find Him, the
question we should put to ourselves is whether, even as we seek, there is not One who is
seeking us and whose solemn demands we are attempting to evade. Then the quest for
God is likely to turn into a quest for that in us which prevents our being found by Him.
—John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage
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ABSTRACT
Scottish Presbyterian theologian John Baillie (1886-1960) was a significant
theologian and scholar who thoughtfully took up throughout his career the questions of
how and why we know God. This dissertation shows that Baillie’s unique contribution to
the theology of revelation in the idea of the mediated immediacy of God’s presence plays
a formative role in the rest of his theology and is valuable for a Reformed theological
engagement of twenty-first century theology.
Throughout his career Baillie made several offerings relevant to this area of study,
most notably Our Knowledge of God (1939), which has been considered Baillie’s most
original work. In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie suggests that revelation is a direct
encounter with the presence of God mediated through the natural world, fellow humans,
the church and, most significantly and clearly, Jesus Christ. The roots of this conception
of revelation as both mediated and immediate can be seen in some of his earlier published
manuscripts as well as his early journal articles. Even after the publication of Our
Knowledge of God, Baillie continued to return to and build upon the theological
perspective he had articulated there. This dissertation uniquely contextualizes Baillie’s
thesis on the nature of divine revelation by examining some of his unpublished course
lectures and private correspondence, only recently publicly available by The Baillie
Project archive at Edinburgh University Library Special Collections Department.
Examination of the large volume of Baillie’s varied writings reveals that his conception
of God’s revealing presence as a mediated immediacy both played a formative role in his

viii

theology and was an idea he labored to articulate in an ever-changing theological and
ecclesiastical context.
Baillie’s theology of revelation remains relevant today. This dissertation
demonstrates Baillie’s relevance by showing the substantial common ground Baillie
shares with contemporary Reformed epistemology by means of a comparison between
Baillie and Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief.

ix

CHAPTER ONE
A Single Pilgrimage: An Introduction to John Baillie’s Life and Thought
Christians through the ages have sought an answer to the question of the nature of
our knowledge of God; they have sought an answer that reflects the teaching of Scripture,
employs the insight of the Christian tradition, and makes sense of human experience.
What is sought in the answer to this question is not only illumination of the nature of our
knowledge of God, but equal illumination as to why some people know God and some do
not, why some people believe and some do not. How is it that an infinite Creator God
makes himself knowable and, in fact, known to his finite creatures? What capacity or
opportunity do humans possess that uniquely enables us to perceive and to know God?
Why is it that some people appear to exercise this capacity while others do not? Are
some people privileged with the opportunity to know God while others are not? Finally,
what is the purpose of our knowing God? In short, we long to know both how and why
we know God.
The twentieth century was a particularly fruitful time of study for the theology of
revelation and epistemological matters in general. Deep and urgent inquiry into the
nature of our knowledge of God was sparked by a variety of factors, most notably
theological liberalism, world war, and the crisis theology it provoked. Though less well
known today than during his lifetime for his work in this area, Scottish Presbyterian
theologian John Baillie should be engaged as a significant theologian and scholar of the
twentieth century who thoughtfully took up throughout his career the questions of how
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and why we know God. This dissertation will show that John Baillie’s unique
contribution to the theology of revelation in the idea of the mediated immediacy of God’s
presence plays a formative role in the rest of his theology and is valuable for a Reformed
theological engagement of twenty-first century theology.
Throughout his career Baillie made several offerings relevant to this area of study,
most notably Our Knowledge of God (1939), which has been considered Baillie’s most
original work, and The Sense of the Presence of God (1962), the undelivered Gifford
Lectures published posthumously. In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie suggests that we
conceive of revelation as a direct encounter with the presence of God mediated through
the natural world, fellow humans, the church and, most significantly and clearly, Christ.
The roots of this conception of revelation as both mediated and immediate can be seen in
some of his earlier published manuscripts, for example, The Roots of Religion in the
Human Soul (1926) and The Interpretation of Religion (1928) as well as his early journal
articles. Even after the publication of Our Knowledge of God in 1939, Baillie continued
to return to and build upon the theological perspective he had articulated there. The large
volume of Baillie’s varied writings reveals that this conception of God’s revealing
presence as a mediated immediacy both played a formative role in his theology and was
an idea he labored to articulate in an ever-changing theological and ecclesiastical context.
Baillie was a professor of theology in several notable academic institutions in
both North America and Scotland. He lectured and published frequently on the
theological issues of his day on both continents and engaged both professionally and
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personally other major players in the twentieth-century theological scene. During his
career, Baillie was a prolific writer of manuscripts, public lectures, devotionals, radio
broadcasts, and divinity courses. This diversity of material offers a broad context for his
thought, providing a rich look at his theology of revelation. 1 Specifically, Baillie’s
divinity lectures give insight into how he integrated, and sometimes later modified, his
theology of revelation with the rest of his theology. Because he writes on the topic of
knowledge of God across several decades, 2 we benefit from the insights gained, modified
and confirmed over time and changing contexts.
In this dissertation, select published works are used to outline Baillie’s theology
of revelation and his perception of his contribution to the Reformed theological tradition
and contemporary church. These published sources function as plotting points in his
reflection on the nature of our knowledge of God and include The Roots of Religion in the
Human Soul (1926), The Interpretation of Religion (1928), Our Knowledge of God
(1939), Invitation to Pilgrimage (1942), The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought
(1956), and The Sense of the Presence of God (1962). Some of Baillie’s devotional
material is also illuminating to this study and is occasionally incorporated.
Special attention is also given to the divinity lectures Baillie gave at New College
School of Divinity in Edinburgh, which are currently archived in Special Collections at
1

Employing these texts in an examination of Baillie’s theology is especially needed now that an
extensive archive of John Baillie’s unpublished lectures, letters, study notes and diaries has been made
available at the University of Edinburgh’s special collections library.
2

decades.

It is worth pointing out that these were politically, socially, and ecclesiologically turbulent
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the University of Edinburgh. Much of what Baillie published was occasional—lecture
series which were later adapted to manuscript form. While this shows that Baillie’s
theology was valued in the scholarly community, an examination of his published
material only can make it difficult to identify the theological framework in which Baillie
was working. Baillie’s divinity lectures help to contextualize his published material,
particularly that related to his theology of revelation. Furthermore, Baillie’s lectures
offer us the insight of a different (and largely overlooked) genre of his theology.
Classroom lectures are prepared for a different audience than public lectures and are
crafted for a different purpose. Public lectures are generally revised for publication, but
once published become a static representation of a person’s thought, whereas classroom
lectures are revisited and often revised each time the professor presents the material and
so tend to be more fluid than publications.
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the scholarship on the theology of
revelation by way of engaging John Baillie’s theology. The question of the nature of our
knowledge of God will be framed in the context of the twentieth-century theological
scene, particularly in the area of the theology of revelation, and will locate Baillie in this
context. Since this dissertation is interested in the value of Baillie’s theology for
contemporary scholarship, it will focus on the secondary source material engaging
Baillie’s thought since his death in 1960. Continued engagement with Baillie’s theology
shows that he remains a relevant contributor to today’s theological and philosophical
discussions of divine revelation and religious epistemology. A survey of current Baillie
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scholarship also exposes the neglect of his theology of revelation as it is expressed in
several key texts spanning his career and contextualized by his unpublished divinity
lectures.

Survey of Scholarship
Despite having contributed to the twentieth-century theological scene for nearly
forty years (including several posthumously published works), John Baillie is today an
inadequately studied figure.3 While scholars have continued to take up his theology of
revelation since his death fifty years ago, a survey of the scholarship shows that this
scholarship has not reached far enough; what is missing is a focused study of the
development, coherence, and theological contextualization of Baillie’s religious
epistemology.
Baillie was a prolific writer and popular lecturer, both in and outside of the
classroom, and much of his writing served his speaking agenda. His classroom lectures
read like manuscripts, and in many cases, became the basis for publication. Meanwhile,
some of his later lecture notes include cut and pasted (literally) sections of his published
works. All of Baillie’s twenty published manuscripts find their root in either classroom
or public lectures. Baillie’s publishing on two continents over the course of several
decades meant that he was a familiar figure on the theological scene. His publications

3

Baillie’s publishing career began in 1912 with the brief article, “The Subliminal Consciousness
as an Aid to the Interpretation of Religious Experience,” Expository Times 24 (1912): 353-358. Four books
were published after his death, including Sense of the Presence of God (1962), Christian Devotion (1963),
A Reasoned Faith (1963) and Baptism and Conversion (1963).
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were regularly reviewed in multiple journals and students of theology began writing their
dissertations on his thought as early in his career as 1933.4 Some of his books enjoyed a
second publication many years later, which confirms that Baillie’s thought continued to
be enjoyed and engaged.5 As one surveys the reviews of Baillie’s publications over the
decades of his career, it is notable that the number of reviews of each publication
increased through his career so that when The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought was
published, no less than thirteen reviews were written in the two years that followed.
Common themes in the reviews of Baillie’s scholarship over the years include
appreciation for his skills of analysis, his clarity in summary and his irenic approach to
theological tangles.6

4

The reviews on Baillie’s publications are extensive, spanning almost forty years. Several
doctoral and master’s theses were written during Baillie’s career. See Allen Russell Stowell, “The Logic of
Faith and the Scientific Method: John Baillie and Henry Nelson Wieman” (master’s thesis, Oberlin
College, 1933); George Alden Cole, “A Presentation and Critique of the Theology of John Baillie”
(master’s thesis, Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1944); William Norman Grandy, “The Problem of
Religious Knowledge as Developed in the Writings of John Baillie” (master’s thesis, Northwestern
University, 1944); James Robert Regan, “The Christology of John Baillie and William Adams Brown”
(master’s thesis, Duke University, 1947); John Walter Murray, “Development in the Thought of John
Baillie Concerning Religious Knowledge” (master’s thesis, Union Theological Seminary, 1948); Allen
Whitman, “Death in the Theology of Nicolas Berdyaev and John Baillie” (master’s thesis, University of
Chicago, 1952); Clifford Lewis Braman, “The Philosophical Theology of John Baillie” (PhD diss., New
York University, 1954); Wayne Perrin Todd, “Contemporary Concepts of Revelation: A Survey of the
Views of Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, William Temple, and John Baillie” (master’s thesis, Union Theological
Seminary, 1957).
5

Our Knowledge of God, first published in 1939 was reprinted twenty years later in 1959.
Invitation to Pilgrimage, first published in 1942 was re-published in 1961. In both cases the re-issuing of
the books occasioned a second journal review. Similarly, Baptism and Conversion was published
postmortem in 1963 at the request of many who had been present at the original lectures in 1955. And, of
course, A Diary of Private Prayer continues today to flourish as a modern spiritual classic.
6

See the bibliography for these reviews.
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Baillie’s retirement from New College in 1956 occasioned the inauguration of
Baillie scholarship in an article written by John Mackay,7 Baillie’s friend and then
President of Princeton Theological Seminary, whose method of appraisal began a trend in
the scholarship that would follow. In fact, the most serious scholarship on Baillie began
after his career. Our Knowledge of God and The Sense of the Presence of God function
almost as bookends to Baillie’s mature thought on revelation and it is these, along with
The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, which most scholars have engaged since
Baillie’s death in 1960.
John Mackay’s 1956 tribute to Baillie is significant for Baillie scholarship for
several reasons. First, in the course of the article, Mackay surveys Baillie the man, the
theologian, the professor and the churchman – four categories of appraisal which have
continued in Baillie scholarship, most notably in David Fergusson’s Christ, Church and
Society and George Newlands’ John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology.
Second, scholars seemed to take seriously Mackay’s insistence that to understand
the person and thought of John Baillie one must take into consideration his roots and
influences.8 Subsequent articles and books on Baillie consistently include reflection on

7

John A. Mackay, “John Baillie: A Lyrical Tribute and Appraisal,” Scottish Journal of Theology 9
(1956): 225-235.
8

Mackay writes, “No one can understand or appreciate either the personality or the writing of the
Principal of New College, Edinburgh, without considering the fact that he belongs to the Celtic race, and
that his spiritual heritage has its roots in the region north of the Grampians.” John A. Mackay, “John
Baillie: A Lyrical Tribute and Appraisal,” Scottish Journal of Theology 9 (1956): 226.
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his life and the influence of his experience on his thought.9 It is likely Mackay took his
cue from Baillie himself: it was common for Baillie to reference his experience and
acknowledge various influences in his writings. In fact, he specifically took up this selfreflective task in the following frequently cited and biographically foundational pieces:
“Confessions of a Transplanted Scot” (1933), “Some Reflections on the Changing
Theological Scene” (1957), and “Looking Before and After” (1958). With these and
other sources, therefore, Baillie scholars have several primary source reflections on
Baillie’s life, as well as evidence that the method Baillie used in his theology took into
serious consideration the revelatory impact of one’s upbringing and culture, that is, of
one’s experience. Thus there is strong precedent for a study of John Baillie’s theology
that attends to his life situation. Abbreviated efforts of this method can also be found in
Klinefelter’s article, “The Theology of John Baillie: A Biographical Introduction,” and
Power’s “John Baillie: A Mediating Theologian.” Even so, little attention has been given
to the shaping influences of his life experience on Baillie’s theology of revelation in

9

See William L. Power, “John Baillie: A Mediating Theologian,” Union Seminary Quarterly
Review 24 (1968): 47-68; Donald S. Klinefelter, “The Theology of John Baillie: A Biographical
Introduction,” Scottish Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 419-436; David Fergusson, ed., Christ, Church and
Society: Essays on John Baillie and Donald Baillie (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1993); and George Newlands,
John and Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002). See also dissertations by
Clifford Lewis Braman, “The Philosophical Theology of John Baillie” (PhD diss., New York University,
1954); Roger William Johnson, “The Concept of Responsible Trust in the Theology of John Baillie” (PhD
diss., Harvard University,1964); William L. Power, “The Knowledge of God, the Nature of God, and the
Function of Theological Language in the Theology of John Baillie” (PhD diss., Emory University, 1965);
Donald S. Klinefelter, “The Theology of John Baillie: An Historical Analysis and Interpretation” (PhD
diss., University of Chicago, 1967); Patricio B. O’Leary, “Revelation and Faith in Our Knowledge of God
according to the Theology of John Baillie” (PhD diss., Gregorian University, 1968); Robert J. Genovese,
“’Religious Man’ in the Thought of John Baillie” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1970); and
James Roy Tozer, “The Concept of God in the Writings of John Baillie” (PhD diss., Northwestern
University, 1970).
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particular.10 The nearest attempt we find is in David Fergusson’s “Orthodox Liberal,”
where he takes a serious look at Baillie’s theological influences in his Edinburgh years as
a preface to an examination of themes that preoccupied Baillie’s study throughout his
career, including the theology of revelation.11
Finally, Mackay’s article is formative to Baillie scholarship in that it is the first to
describe Baillie as a mediating theologian, a descriptor that has continued for decades,
and to evaluate him as such. Mackay writes, “Baillie’s significance as a thinker lies
largely in the fact that he has been a mediating theologian. He has been a bridge-builder,
not only between the religious thought and outlook of two continents, but between the
older Liberalism and the new Dialectical Theology, now commonly called Neoorthodoxy.”12 He goes on to observe that the qualities of Baillie’s character, his ability to
“understand, appreciate and communicate the thought of other people,” enabled him to be
a mediating theologian.13 Mackay’s assessment of Baillie as a mediating theologian is
exactly right and can be viewed as a kind of key to his thought.

10

Donald S. Klinefelter, “The Theology of John Baillie: A Biographical Introduction,” Scottish
Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 419-436; and Donald Klinefelter, “The Theology of John Baillie: A
Biographical Introduction,” Scottish Journal of Theology 22 (December 1969): 419-436.
11

David A. Fergusson, “John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal” in Christ, Church and Society: Essays on
John Baillie and Donald Baillie, ed. David A. Fergusson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 123.
12
13

Mackay, “John Baillie: A Lyrical Tribute,” 229.

Development of the idea of Baillie as a mediating theologian can be found early on in William
Power, “John Baillie: A Mediating Theologian” (1968) and Donald Klinefelter, “The Theology of John
Baillie: A Biographical Introduction” (1969). Klinefelter puts it well: “John Baillie both temperamentally
and professionally served as a mediator and interpreter among competing Continental, British, and
American theologies; between naturalism and supernaturalism; reason and revelation; science and history;
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Baillie’s work of mediation had as its goal the pursuit of truth. For example, in a
1933 reflection, Baillie wrote,
No more during these later years than during the earlier ones has the philosophic
quest, taken narrowly by itself, appeared able to afford me complete mental
satisfaction. My interest in poetry, in the general literature of the few countries
whose language I could command, in history, in various forms of art, as well as in
nature itself, has not lessened but rather increased as the years have gone by. Yet
not one of these varied pursuits has even been followed as a mere pastime. They
have all, in some way, been parts of a single pilgrimage. In all of them I have,
however mistakenly, seemed to myself to be seeking the One True Light, and I
think that my interest in any one of them would have collapsed very suddenly if I
had come to feel that it could in no way advance my central quest.14
Baillie’s commitment to mediation is further demonstrated by the testimony of one
student: “The question in his classes always was ‘what is the truth?—not ‘what does the
Church teach?’ nor ‘what does Calvin say?’ nor even ‘what does the Bible say?’ He was
always trying to show us where nuggets of truth were to be found in a great variety of
sources.”15 And in the preface to Our Knowledge of God, Baillie’s inclination toward
mediation can be clearly observed. Referring to the theology of revelation, Baillie writes,
“At the present time the field is occupied by a number of competing views, each of which
is likely to have something valuable to contribute to our total understanding, yet any two
of which necessarily exclude one another if accepted in the form in which alone they are

empiricism and rationalism; theology and philosophy; morality and religion; orthodoxy and liberalism;
liberalism and neo-orthodoxy, neo-orthodoxy and post-Barthian liberalism; and finally, between the several
Christian (and non-Christian) communions.” Donald Klinefelter, “Theology of John Baillie,” 434.
14

John Baillie. “Confessions of a Transplanted Scot” from Contemporary American Theology, ed.
Vergilius Ferm (New York: Round Table Press,1933), 56-57.
15

John C. Lusk, “John Baillie—as a Student Saw Him” in Christ, Church and Society: Essays on
John Baillie and Donald Baillie, ed. David Fergusson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 263.
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offered to us by their most devoted adherents. My purpose has been the irenic one of
endeavoring to distinguish the true insight within each alternative from that blindness in
it which renders it insensitive to the insight of the other.”16 Baillie’s mediatory approach
to the theology of his day endeared him to his students, colleagues and readership and
provides theologians today with a model for gracious engagement.
Consistent with the reputation Mackay had articulated, T. F. Torrance wrote a
gracious essay in 1960 in Baillie’s memory which celebrated his life and bridge-building
work, observing that “in all his theological work John Baillie sought to lay bare the
mutual dependence and the interlocking of the mind’s understanding of God and the
Christian way of life, that is, of theology and ethics.”17 In the few years after Baillie’s
death, four books of Baillie’s works were published, most notably the Gifford Lectures
he was never able to give along with three compilations of some of his previous
addresses.18
The bulk of the scholarship on Baillie since his death in 1960 has been in the form
of graduate theses. Eleven theses were written on Baillie’s thought in the 1960’s, and six
have been written since 1970. While a couple of dissertations during this time period

16

John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), v.

17

T. F. Torrance, “A Living Sacrifice: In Memoriam of John Baillie,” Religion in Life 30 (19601961): 322.
18

The undelivered Gifford Lectures were published as The Sense of the Presence of God (1962).
The other works included Christian Devotion (1962), Baptism and Conversion (1963) and A Reasoned
Faith (1963).
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focus on secondary issues in Baillie’s theology,19 the majority have examined his
theology of revelation in some way.20 Some of the authors of these dissertations have also
contributed to Baillie scholarship through publication. Both Power and Klinefelter
published a couple of articles on Baillie’s theology following their dissertations and Tuck
and Hood published manuscripts based on their dissertations. The publication of material
since 1970 is relatively modest in volume, but it is substantial enough to indicate that
interest in Baillie has steadily continued.
A decade-long interest in John Baillie and his brother Donald was harnessed in
David Fergusson’s Christ, Church and Society: Essays on John Baillie and Donald

19

See John Mack Stanley, “Church and World: A Critical Evaluation of the Corpus Christianum
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Baillie in 1993. 21 While this collection of essays was a windfall for Baillie scholarship,
only two of the sixteen essays deal directly with John Baillie’s theology. The book
contains biographical information, personal reminiscences on the brothers, and chapters
assessing the theology and impact on the church (both in terms of the Church of Scotland
and the ecumenical movement) and society of both Baillie brothers. David Fergusson’s
essay, “John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal,” is a valuable and frequently cited survey of the
development of Baillie’s theology and critique of his mature thought. George Newlands’
essay, “The Sense of the Presence of God,” looks at Baillie’s ideas presented in the book
of that same title in light of subsequent scholarship and recommends that Baillie be
engaged in contemporary theological discussion.
A more recent contribution was made with the 2002 publication of John and
Donald Baillie: Transatlantic Theology by Newlands. This book makes extensive use of
some of the private diaries and papers of the Baillie brothers in order to construct a more
detailed account of their lives and better contextualize their ministries and scholarship.
While the Baillie brothers’ theology is addressed in this book, Newlands does not aim to
critically engage it, per se. Rather, Newlands is interested in the Baillie brothers more as
a case study in the examination of theology with an eye turned toward the context in
which it was done. One can trace Newlands’ interest in theology’s personal
contextualization to his 1993 essay in Christ, Church and Society. In the end, Newlands
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sees Baillie’s theology as so richly informed by his situation in life that the fruit of
Baillie’s contribution is not to be found so much in his theology itself as in the way he
engaged the theology of his day.
Adam Hood’s, Baillie, Oman and Macmurray: Experience and Religious Belief
(2003), offers a more in-depth critical engagement of Baillie’s theology, though its focus
is more topical. Hood’s interest is in the relationship between what he calls “ordinary
experience” and religious belief, and he finds some useful, shared insights in each of the
approaches of the theologians he examines. Hood’s two-chapter examination of Baillie
does a fine job mining Baillie’s many publications and even a couple of his unpublished
lecture series to conclude that Baillie’s “religious belief is a kind of perceptual belief
which arises out of the experience of perceiving or intuiting universal moral demands.”22
Wilkes’ 2005 dissertation, “Anti-sensationalism and Sensus Divinitatis: An
Inquiry into the Foundations of Christian Belief,” engages Baillie’s understanding of the
sense of the presence of God alongside such widely recognized theologians as Friedrich
Schleiermacher and Karl Rahner. In Wilkes’s defense of including Baillie in such a line
up, he notably cites his appreciation for Baillie’s unique theological contribution, and
also the very gracious, mediating way in which he communicates his position and
navigates the scholarship.23 Wilkes’ dissertation itself follows in the mediating tradition
of Baillie; he proposes that the thought of Schleiermacher, Baillie and Rahner suggests a
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middle ground between modernity’s dogmatic sensationalism and postmodernity’s
subjectivism.
Shifts in the theological landscape over the last forty years have occasioned new
and renewed interest in Baillie’s thought and life and we can conclude that he has
retained his relevance. It would then appear that Mackay’s observation in 1956 that
“mediating theologies tend to be short-lived” cannot be claimed in the case of John
Baillie’s theology.24 Regarding some of Baillie’s works, that is, many of his more
occasional pieces, we can agree with Newlands: “John Baillie’s work does not read like a
timeless Summa. Indeed it could not, because it quite deliberately addresses current
intellectual issues with a sympathetic sensitivity to their own agenda…. Yet its
methodology, of careful dissection of all the relevant concepts, has a classic quality
which makes it a model of its kind.”25 Newlands, like Mackay, maintains that the
occasional nature of Baillie’s work limits its relevance, claiming that the effectiveness of
Baillie’s work “depends on its particularity, and a new examination would require a new
engagement with a new range of issues and studies.”26 It can be argued, however, that
the particularity of Baillie’s work does not limit the contribution and applicability of his
theology to today’s study. Certainly his method of mediation is a welcome model for the
ecumenically minded, but many of the themes found in his theology of revelation
24
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continue to be points of interest and study today. So, for example, Baillie’s theology of
revelation, which was articulated in Our Knowledge of God when Barthianism was newly
dominating the theological scene as a corrective to widespread Protestant Liberalism, can
make a valuable contribution to the recent work being done in the areas of Reformed
epistemology, pneumatology and spiritual formation.27
Many scholars continue today to benefit from Baillie’s survey of the theology of
revelation in The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956); aside from his devotional
work, A Diary of Private Prayer, this seems to be the most broadly used text of
Baillie’s.28 The focus of interest since the 1980s on religious epistemology has renewed
interest in Baillie’s unique theology of revelation and shows promise for further
application of his insights. Indeed, it is of interest to note that engagement of Baillie’s
theology of revelation has been concentrated more recently in the philosophical theology
conducted by those who have come to be identified with Reformed epistemology.29
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A survey of current Baillie scholarship also exposes the neglect of his theology of
revelation particularly as it is contextualized by his unpublished divinity lectures.
Among the recent literature, it appears that only Hood has taken up a meaningful
examination of his divinity lectures as a way of filling in Baillie’s thought. The
assessment of Baillie’s published work as “occasional” is correct.30 This is why his
divinity lectures are so valuable for understanding his thought. As Hood’s work
illustrates, there are connections to be made between Baillie’s published writings and his
lectures. To date, however, no one has seriously examined his lectures to see how they
might enrich our understanding of Baillie’s main theological contribution to the study of
revelation.

A Biographical Sketch
In order to demonstrate that Baillie makes a unique contribution to the theology of
his day, it is useful to provide surveys of Baillie’s life and the theological context in
which his own theology developed and was expressed. The following biographical
sketch shows that religious epistemology was a theme to which he returned again and
again in his career and that his upbringing, education, and professional experiences
fostered his unique perspective. The contextual sketch shows, more broadly, how
Baillie’s interest in matters of revelation was linked very closely to his interest in
addressing and making sense of the theological questions of the day.
30
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There are several additional reasons to give a sketch of Baillie’s life at the outset
of a study of his theology of revelation. First, as mentioned in the survey of scholarship,
much of the Baillie scholarship since his death in 1960 has taken an interest in his
biography. Second, historical contextualization of his education and scholarship will
provide deeper insight into his thought and meaning. Third, Baillie frequently referenced
his own experience in the exposition of this theology, and wrote several pieces reflecting
on his life and the influences of his experiences on his thought; Baillie himself appeared
to believe that locating one’s thought in the experiences and context of one’s life was
vital to deeper understanding.
John Baillie was the firstborn son of a Scottish highlands minister.31 He had two
younger brothers. Donald, just a year younger than John, was his dear friend and also
became a notable theologian and churchman. Peter, the youngest, was a missionary
doctor to India; his untimely death by drowning was a great sorrow for the whole Baillie
family. Baillie’s father died when he was about four years old and his mother, who never
remarried, devoted herself to the raising of her three sons. Baillie understood his
upbringing to have a profound impact on his perspective of God, the Bible, and the
world. He identifies the beginning of his theological training at age five with his learning
the Westminster Shorter Catechism. “Our father’s Calvinism had been of the most
rigorous and uncompromising kind and, true to the memory of a husband with whom she
had lived for only six years, our mother was most anxious that her children’s upbringing
31

Baillie was born March 26, 1886 in Gairloch, Ross-shire, Scotland.

19
should be in the same tradition….It was a very rigid Calvinistic outlook with which we
were indoctrinated in our boyhood’s home.”32
Baillie clearly had enormous respect for his mother: hailing her conversance with
the Westminster standards, he writes, “If her sons later developed any aptitudes of a
philosophic kind, it was undoubtedly by this home training in theological dialectic that
their minds were first sharpened.”33 Baillie’s mother was a strong influence in his life
and her expectations had a profound influence on each of her sons. “When our father
died, our mother resolved that all three of her sons should follow in his footsteps as
ministers of the Church….I cannot remember a time when we did not already know that
this is what lay in store for us, nor was there ever a time when we did not, to say the least,
accept it without demur.”34
The highland community of Baillie’s youth was informed in its theology, sincere
and devoted in its piety, and strictly Calvinistic in its Presbyterianism.35 The community
cultivated a strong awareness of one’s need for regeneration, and though it was not
approving of sensational or over-emotional religion, its twice-yearly celebration of the
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Lord’s Supper took on for Baillie a real sense of the holy.36 Baillie regularly reflected on
these home and church life experiences in his writings and employed his memories to
illustrate points of his theology. For example, he writes in Our Knowledge of God, “My
earliest memories have a definitely religious atmosphere. They are already heavy with
‘the numinous’….I cannot remember a time when I did not already feel, in some dim
way, that I was ‘not my own’ to do with as I pleased, but was claimed by a higher power
which had authority over me….As far back as I can remember anything, I was somehow
aware that my parents lived under the same kind of authority as that which, through them,
was communicated to me. I could see that my parents too behaved as though they, even
they, were not their own.”37 The recollection of this experience, for example, witnessed
to Baillie that to whatever degree we may begin life with a blank slate, it is not an
atheistic slate—there is a sense of the divine in us from the beginning. Mackay, having
known the Baillie family and having shared some of the same history further observed
the shaping impact Baillie’s roots had on the trajectory of his life.
It was natural, too, that a true son of an old Highland manse should be interested
in learning and piety. The fact that to a greater extent than any professional
theologian of our time, John Baillie’s work combines the finest scholarship with a
deep devotional spirit, harks back to Highland religion at its best. The
atmosphere of the old Ross-shire manse, with its family worship morning and
evening, and where the scholarly traits of a devout father and free play, help to
explain that classic of devotional literature, A Diary of Private Prayer, as well as
the profound interest of its author in religious experience. It was the glory of
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religion in the Scottish Highlands in those days that theological orthodoxy and
personal piety were an equal concern. It was no dead orthodoxy that reigned, for
the ultimate criterion of the religious life and a person’s worthiness to become a
church member, and to participate in the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, was his
ability to show that he had been a subject of divine grace and that the roots of the
new life were in him.38
Baillie was schooled as a youth at the Inverness Royal Academy, which was then
at a peak in its distinguished history.39 There Baillie was introduced to classical English
literature and Greek and Latin thinkers, which he immediately took an interest in and
which introduced to him new expressions of truth and experience. The scientific outlook
that marked the intellectual life at the turn of the twentieth century and which surely
characterized his education at the esteemed Royal Academy also had an impact on
Baillie, initiating an early wrestling with his religious instruction. “We were trained at
school,” Baillie recalls, “to develop a fastidious sense for the weighing of historical
evidence, and for distinguishing fact from legend; but our training at home did not allow
us to practice this skill on the Bible stories….We were abruptly introduced to the worldview of modern science, and we could not make it square with the up-and-down, threestorey, geocentric universe of the Biblical writers and of our Catechisms, or with their
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assumptions about the natural history of the human race.”40 Thus, it would seem, the
dissonant perspectives Baillie later sought to mediate were introduced at an early age.
Baillie attended the University of Edinburgh from 1904-1908, where he became
devoted to philosophy. The tensions introduced to his thought during his schooling at
Inverness intensified and philosophy became the catalyst for his questions and disquiet.41
Baillie reflects, “The bleak naturalistic outlook of the last quarter of the previous century
still had much power to persuade….So I descended into the valley of the shadow of the
negative.”42 And in this valley there was no place for religion. “I can remember,” Baillie
writes of his student years in Edinburgh, “walking home one frosty midnight from a
philosophical discussion on the existence of God, and stopping in my walk to gaze up
into the starry sky. Into those deep immensities of space I hurled my despairing question,
but it seemed to hit nothing, and no answer came back.”43 As Baillie later reflected on
this season of doubt and spiritual turmoil, he concluded that his doubt of God was rooted
in what he rejected about the God he knew rather than an insufficient knowledge or
assurance of God’s existence. He explains, “Part of the reason why I could not find God
was that there is that in God which I did not wish to find. Part of the reason why I could
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not (or thought I could not) hear Him speak was that He was saying some things to me
which I did not wish to hear. There was a side of the divine reality which was
unwelcome to me, and some divine commandments the obligatoriness of which I was
most loath to acknowledge.”44 In the end, a combination of philosophical and theological
influences rescued Baillie from this negativity and ushered him into an intellectual space
for religious insight. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, a professor of philosophy at
Edinburgh (1891-1919), played a central role in Baillie’s emergence from his valley of
the negative.45 Into his career, Baillie maintained his agreement with and appreciation of
Pringle-Pattison’s main philosophy, the truth of which was further substantiated by both
Plato and Kant, whom he viewed as the original sources of this thinking, sources which
he described as having “drunk deep and long.”46
After graduating from the honors school of philosophy at Edinburgh, Baillie’s
philosophical interests continued throughout his theological studies at New College in
Edinburgh, which began in 1908. It was at this time that his interest in the psychology of
religion also began. But he was most influenced by his theological studies which, Baillie
writes, “seemed to show me that what was necessary for the solution of my problem was
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rather a deeper insight into religion itself than the successful construction of a lay system
of metaphysics.”47 As Baillie tells it, the most important shift in his thinking occurred
during his New College years: “I think what it amounted to was the gradual realization
that religion is in possession of an insight into reality which is all its own and cannot be
reached at all without its aid. This is the change of mind, of course, which in European
thought is represented in different ways by the two great names of Kant and
Schleiermacher, and it was in close connection with my study of the Critical Philosophy
and of Der christliche Glaube that it was accomplished in my own case.”48 Thus during
these years of study Baillie found new theological insight in Kant, Schleiermacher, and
Ritschl, the influence of whom is seen most transparently in his writings leading up to the
publishing of Our Knowledge of God in 1939. At no time in Baillie’s academic career,
however, could he have been identified with a school of thought following one of these
thinkers. It would appear that Baillie was, from the beginning, an independent thinker
who had an interest in pulling together truth from whatever source it might be found.
Study at New College was complemented by summers spent in Jena and Marburg,
Germany, where he studied under the same professors as Karl Barth. Baillie’s summers
in Germany had a lasting impact on his perspective and career, including providing him
with a strong grounding in the language, which enabled him to engage with the prolific
German theology of the twentieth century. For example, in a retrospective article in
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which Baillie recalls the impact that the post-liberal movement began to have on his own
thought, he tells of translating large portions from Martin Buber and early works of
Brunner and Tillich for his American students. Before the texts of these authors were
translated for publication, Baillie was engaging their ideas and providing his students
with exposure to their thought.49
After his formal studies were completed, Baillie continued his academic pursuits
and in 1913 began working as an assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy at
Edinburgh. He published his first scholarly work and began working on a thesis on
Kant’s ethic which he hoped would earn him a doctorate in philosophy.50 The outbreak
of war in 1914 introduced significant change in Baillie’s life and context. His cousin,
Isobel Forrester, wrote that though many of his friends volunteered for combatant service,
“for John with his grateful memories of study in Germany and his independence of
judgment the issues were not as clearly-cut as they seemed to most of his generation, and
at first he believed it to be his duty to continue his work as a minister.”51 And so Baillie
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joined the YMCA and spent most of the war in France offering lectures to the British
troops; by the end of the war he had become the Assistant Director of Education for the
YMCA. Of his years in France, Baillie reflected that they
were fallow years for me, as for so many others. I hardly read a page either of
divinity or of metaphysic, and I had little time or opportunity for consecutive
thinking. Yet the period brought with it a very great broadening of experience
and, above all, such an understanding of the mind and temper, the spiritual needs
and capacities, of average (perhaps I should rather say of normal) humanity as I at
least had not before possessed….When I turned again to my old pursuits after the
war was over, the khaki figures still seemed to keep their place in the background
of my mind, and in much of what I have written since these days a clairvoyant
reader may find them haunting the margins of the page.52
In fact, in Baillie’s first published manuscript, The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul
(1926), one reads that his army experience is the clearly-stated starting point for his
reflections about the nature of faith and its religious expression.53
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 occasioned both a vocational and
theological alteration in the trajectory Baillie’s life seemed to be taking. His four years of
service in the YMCA during the war should not be viewed as a mere interruption to his
life and scholarship, as if his theology were a bit of knitting he might set down and then
take up again where he had left off. His war experience sensitized him to the status and
plight of the common person’s belief in God and seemed to have cultivated in him a few
foundational theological questions to which he kept returning throughout his academic
German friends meant that not all Scots ministers were ready to embrace the unthinking anti-German
sentiment which engulfed the [Scottish] churches in 1914.” (Newlands, Transatlantic Theology, 53)
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career. The war not only had an impact on Baillie’s own theological perspective and
concerns, but it changed the theological context in which he did his work. This change in
context will be the focus of the next section of this chapter; suffice it to say that the
Protestant liberalism that had flourished in pre-war optimism and progress was judged by
many after the war to be incapable of providing a plausible view of God, humanity and
the world.
Baillie’s work among the British army in France was also the setting in which he
met Jewel Fowler, a nurse who volunteered for service with the YMCA in France. John
and Jewel met in Boulogne in 1916 and married three years later. As his wife, Jewel was
active with her own work when her health allowed for it and was a true companion to
John in his work. Jewel assisted John in his lectures to the army in France, traveled with
him on his lecture tours and played an instrumental role in going through and submitting
some of John’s sermons and lectures for publication after his death. Together they
enjoyed hosting students and colleagues in their home; former students have recorded
fond memories of evenings in their home and their easy hospitality.
Shortly after John and Jewel wed in 1919, Baillie accepted an offer to teach
systematic theology at Auburn Theological Seminary in upstate New York. Baillie lived
in North America for fifteen years, where he held professorships at three institutions and
forged lifelong friendships. He stayed at Auburn Seminary until 1927, when he took a
position at Emmanuel College in Toronto. He stayed in Toronto for three years and then
in 1930 moved to Union Theological Seminary in New York City, where he stayed on for
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four years. By the end of his time in American theological schools, Baillie had earned a
very fine reputation: one reviewer’s praise of Baillie in 1934 confirms this: “The
announcement of a book by Professor Baillie justifies keen anticipation. Two of his
previous books are upon the shelves of most thoughtful clergymen. His classroom at
Union Seminary, his lectures at Northfield and other assemblies, the reflex influence of
his teaching in other countries and his editorial leadership of Religion in Life commend
him as one of the most enriching factors in the religious life in America.”54 And in his
last year in America, Baillie received an Honorary Doctor of Divinity Degree from Yale
University.
In 1934 Baillie took the position of Chair of Divinity in University of Edinburgh;
he was appointed Principal of New College and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity in 1950,
from which he retired in 1956. These years in Edinburgh produced his most wellreceived books: Our Knowledge of God (1939), Invitation to Pilgrimage (1942), The Idea
of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956) and The Sense of the Presence of God (1962).
He also did a great deal of work for the Church of Scotland, serving as the convener of
the “Commission for the Interpretation of God’s Will in the Present Crisis” (1940-1945)
and as the moderator of the General Assembly (1943-1944). Baillie’s ecclesiastical
service also extended to the ecumenical community: in 1954 he was appointed as one of
the six World Presidents of the World Council of Churches. Baillie remained devoted to
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and energized by his work until, after an acute battle with cancer, he died on September
29, 1960. In surveying Baillie’s life we can observe several shaping factors that
influenced his work: his Calvinistic sensibilities, his value of the humanities, his love of
philosophy, and his church-mindedness.

The Twentieth-Century Theological Context
Baillie’s education in British and German universities and his professorships in
North America and Scotland positioned him to have a broad view of the theological
issues of his day, specifically the theology of revelation, to which he was able to make a
uniquely informed contribution. It is helpful to survey the theological climate in which
Baillie was trained and later conducted his scholarly work. Such a survey is critical to
seeing Baillie’s work as a navigation across the theological battle ground on which he
found himself. As previously mentioned, Baillie’s work has been identified as
“occasional,” and indeed it is, which is why some insight into the occasions to which
Baillie was responding deepens our understanding of and appreciation for his thought.
This survey of Baillie’s twentieth-century context focuses roughly on the period from
1910 to 1960.
Nineteenth-century Protestant liberalism55 came roaring into the twentieth century
with all the confidence in progress that was characteristic of that view. It proclaimed the
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immanence of God and maintained an optimism that was fueled by the peace and
progress in the West at the turn of the twentieth century. Assessing liberalism in
theology at the end of his career, Baillie defined Protestant liberalism “as a movement
towards greater freedom from the fixity of traditional beliefs and established dogmas.”56
In the same article he wrote, “Nothing is more characteristic of liberalism than the effort
to distinguish the substance of the received teaching from its accidents, the kernel from
the original or traditional husk, the unchanging truth from its time-conditioned setting.”57
It may be observed in Baillie’s description Protestant liberalism’s confidence in the
unhampered human ability to perceive truth accurately, especially now that the modern
human no longer needed to be tethered to the myths and caging superstitions of the past.
Such a confidence was not accidental to the theology of immanence prevalent at the time.
The understanding of the nearness of God functioned to sanction the capacities and
achievements of a liberated humanity, and the season of progress and increase
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freedom of the individual Christian thinker to criticize and reconstruct traditional beliefs. 3) It focused on
the practical or ethical dimension of Christianity. 4) It generally sought to base its theology on some
foundation other than the absolute authority of the Bible. 5) Perhaps unconsciously, it continued a drift
(begun with Schleiermacher) toward divine immanence at the expense of divine transcendence. See
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experienced in the western world only reinforced the conflation of divine immanence
with human achievement.
The ideal of progress and the confidence in humanity’s capacity to know the truth
and do the good which undergirded Protestant Liberalism in Europe were devastated by
the experience of world war. Devastation gave way to disillusionment and readied
people to engage Barth’s theology of crisis,58 first introduced in his Epistle to the Romans
in 1918. While the war and Barth’s theology formed a catalyst for a postliberal
perspective in European theology, modernism in America had been under attack well
before the country’s introduction to Barth’s theology. In fact, anti-modern protests made
by American Christians, who would come to be known as Fundamentalists, began as
early as the end of the nineteenth century.59
Baillie’s education and career exposed him to the theological personalities of
Scotland, Germany and America and his reflections on his experience are valuable for
fleshing out the context in which his own theology took shape. Reflecting on his
education, Baillie observed geographical distinctives within pre-war liberalism. His
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British and German professors had in common the presuppositions of theological
liberalism. His German professors, however, seemed more ready to depart from a
traditional understanding of the Christian faith in their pursuit of higher criticism than
their British colleagues, who, in their church-mindedness, seemed to be more cautious
with their traditional Christianity.60 Furthermore, “there did not develop in nineteenthcentury Scotland the same gulf between Church and people as appeared in some
continental lands….Its pulpits and theological faculties continued to be influential within
the community at large” and were rooted in the ordinary life of the church in a way that
Baillie did not find among the faculties of continental universities.61 One can detect
Baillie’s approval of his British brethren in his comparison and can also observe his
endorsement of their blending the roles of theologian and churchman in his own life.
Baillie’s first teaching positions were in the United States, where he observed
liberalism, generally referred to as modernism, as having more of a German
characteristic. Baillie connects the influence of German liberalism in the United States
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with the country’s own conflict in the first quarter of the twentieth century between
modernism and fundamentalism. One of the characteristics of Baillie’s work in North
America was to navigate the polemic between modernism and fundamentalism. He
writes, “I was always being asked to which of these parties I belonged, but I found myself
at a loss for an answer. I had scant enough sympathy with the fundamentalists, yet I
found myself very ill at ease with those who were most eager to proclaim themselves as
modernists.”62
The impact of postliberal theology in America was both diluted and delayed.63
Barth’s commentary may have exploded in 1919 like a bombshell on the
theological playground of Europe, but it took many years for the shockwaves to
reach America. For a decade American theologians remained nearly oblivious to
the powerful new movement which was being forged in Europe. While a number
of critical articles devoted to postliberal theology began to appear after 1926, the
first English translation of Barth’s writings did not become available until 1928.
And it is significant that even then Americans were not introduced to Barth’s
commentary on Romans but to The Word of God and The Word of Man, a
collection of addresses originally published in Munich in 1925. The ‘bombshell’
itself was not translated until 1933.64
There are likely a variety of factors that contributed to the late impact of Barth’s
postliberal theology in America. Reasons may range from the fact that America had not
felt the same strain of World War I as had Germany and the rest of Europe and so was
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perhaps less acutely dissatisfied with the prevailing liberalism’s weaknesses to the fact
that “Barth’s own writings were at first found very indigestible,” according to Baillie.65
One might assume that postliberal theology provided theologians on the American
scene with a ready-made middle ground in the modernism-fundamentalism debate, but
this is not the case. Though Baillie would employ its insights, he and others never would
align themselves to Barth’s postliberal theology entirely; they remained appreciative but
critical. A survey of twentieth-century Christianity published in the early 1960s proposed
a category for “former liberals who have tempered and corrected their views in the light
of Barth’s criticisms and emphases, but have not accepted his system as a whole:” postBarthian liberalism.66 John Baillie is suggested as a clear example of post-Barthian
liberalism: “in America, he challenged our too simple forms of liberalism with the
dialectal theology’s judgments; in Scotland, he fought against a too worshipful
acceptance of Barth’s system.”67
As we have said, then, the theological values and presuppositions referred to as
Protestant Liberalism in Europe were more likely to be referred to as modernism in
America in the early twentieth century. And where neo-orthodoxy took hold in Europe
as a reaction to Protestant liberalism, it was Fundamentalism in America that reacted to
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the perceived threat of modernist theology. The orthodoxy that Fundamentalism sought
to defend and preserve, however, was not the orthodoxy that Barth intended to retrieve.
Baillie makes a similar critique of both Fundamentalism and Barthianism. Of
Fundamentalism, which he understood to be defending its Puritan tradition, Baillie
reprimands it for “belligerently repudiating the whole development of modern
documentary criticism and scientific historiography” that had developed since the days of
Puritanism.68 He also critiqued the modernists, who seemed “to be using their new-found
freedom in order to read their own very nineteenth-century predilections and philosophy
of life into the Biblical teaching, and thus corrupting the true and original Christian
message.”69 In both cases Baillie expressed his disapproval of any perspective that
appeared to simply dismiss or avoid both the insights and challenges of an alternative
perspective. Similarly, Baillie was not comfortable with Barthianism because it “had the
effect of moving from the Reformers around the thought of the Enlightenment, especially
Kant and Schleiermacher (despite Barth’s protest that such was not his intention), as if
we had nothing to learn from this period, rather than through it and then beyond it.”70
These critiques make sense when viewed in contrast to Baillie’s own approach to
theology. In both his divinity lectures and his books, Baillie operates with the conviction
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that ideas and beliefs travel through history being shaped by the journey; the various
influences on ideas from their changing contexts should be engaged rather than ignored.
Unity of American fundamentalism and European postliberalism against
Protestant liberalism took the form of a defense and explication of a theology of the Bible
as the word of God. While the theology born of these two movements cannot be
identified with one another, they do share a common concern. And what this shared
ground shows us is that the central point of theological negotiation in the western world
in the first half of the twentieth century was revelation and authority and its implications
for the rest of theology. In this twentieth-century theological tangle Baillie,
characteristically irenic, worked to stay on course in his single pilgrimage toward truth.
In this chapter we have briefly surveyed scholarship on Baillie, noting that some
of the main characterizations of his life and work made in the early stages of this
scholarship have influenced the trajectory of subsequent study. Specifically, we observed
that Baillie’s life has received nearly as much attention as his thought. After our own
review of Baillie’s life, we can see that his upbringing, interests and experiences fostered
the kind of mediation of ideas for which he has become known. In the next chapter we
will take a focused look at how Baillie mediated the Barth-Brunner debate on nature and
grace in arguably his most significant published work, Our Knowledge of God; this
chapter will introduce us to themes central to Baillie’s theology. Chapter 3 will examine
the root of these themes in Baillie’s early articles and select manuscript publications as
well as some of his unpublished divinity lectures. Chapter 4 will continue the
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examination of these themes in Baillie’s mature work following the publication of Our
Knowledge of God. Chapter 5 will compare Baillie’s theology of revelation, as analyzed
in Chapters 2 through 4, with the late twentieth-century emergence of Reformed
epistemology expressed most notably in the work of Alvin Plantinga. Chapter 6 will
provide a brief summary of the dissertation and suggest future avenues of Baillie
scholarship based on the analysis and conclusions of this dissertation.

CHAPTER TWO
A Canticle for the Journey: Baillie’s Mediating Theology,
A Survey and Analysis of Our Knowledge of God
The bulk of John Baillie’s most recognized published scholarship, as was noted in
the Introduction, is taken up with the theology of divine revelation. In this chapter we
will examine what is unique to Baillie’s theology of revelation. As has been stated in the
thesis of this dissertation, Baillie’s unique contribution to the theology of revelation is in
his understanding of the quality of divine self-revelation as both mediated and immediate;
that is, our knowledge of God comes to us “in, with, and under” our experience of the
created world even as it comes to us directly in our encounter with the omnipresent
Creator. While the roots of this thought are observable in earlier books and articles,
Baillie’s first and most systematic expression of this theology is found in Our Knoweldge
of God, published in 1939, five years into his tenure as Chair of Divinity at the University
of Edinburgh.
The previous chapter introduced Baillie as a mediating theologian, concerned
with finding the insight and value of all perspectives and constructing a cohesive position
built from what he understood to be the best expressions of truth. In the case of Our
Knowledge of God, the occasion of the Barth-Brunner debate concerning nature and
grace led to the insights that have come to be celebrated and criticized as Baillie’s
theological legacy. Baillie sought to mediate not only the positions of Barth and Brunner,
but also the Reformed tradition they claimed to champion and the Enlightenment

38

39
tradition they appeared to circumvent. In fact throughout the book, Baillie tenaciously
bridges the insights of modern psychology and the Westminster Standards, of philosophy
and scripture, of a medieval Christian tradition and a twentieth-century Christian scene,
and of personal experience and special revelation.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of the Barth-Brunner debate in order to
introduce the situation which Baillie was most immediately concerned to address. It
should be noted, however, that though the theology of Our Knowledge of God was
articulated in response to this particular situation, the theology in this book was long in
the making and continued to be a focus for Baillie until his death.1 Thus the thought in
this book marks an important stage in the maturity of Baillie’s theology and scholarship.
The main part of this chapter includes a careful survey and assessment of the theology
and argument in Our Knowledge of God. The focus here is to show how Baillie’s
proposal is, in fact, unique and valuable. The chapter closes with an identification of
some key points in the theology expressed in Our Knowledge of God which form the
mapping points to be followed, in the next chapter, through several key published works
as well as some of Baillie’s unpublished divinity lectures.

Summary of the Barth-Brunner Debate
The immediate contemporary theological context Baillie was engaging with his
publication of Our Knowledge of God was the debate between Karl Barth and Emil
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Brunner over the continuity of nature in grace. Specifically, the concern of this debate
was the relationship between human creation, now fallen, and God’s redemptive recreation as it bears on the question of the source of our knowledge of God. Central to
this debate was the nature of revelation, which was a concern reflected in the broader
theological scene, and which has been surveyed in the previous chapter.2 Far from being
simply an obscure theological feud from generations past, the Barth-Brunner debate
crystallized the issues at the heart of the modern struggle over the nature of our
knowledge of God, a struggle that continues today. These issues will be highlighted
below in the summary of the debate. The continued relevance of the issues taken up in
the Barth-Brunner debate is testified to by the fact that theologians still find it useful to
return to the debate as a starting place for fresh inquiry into these old but important
questions.3
Brunner’s essay, first published in 1934, is crafted as a response to a disagreement
with Barth begun several years earlier. We learn from Barth something about the
grounds for their disagreement in his “Angry Introduction.” He writes,
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Ever since about 1916, when I began to recover noticeably from the effects of my
theological studies and influences of the liberal-political pre-war theology, my
opinion concerning the task of our theological generation has been this: we must
learn again to understand revelation as grace and grace as revelation and therefore
turn away from all ‘true’ or ‘false’ theolgia naturalis by ever making new
decisions and being ever controverted anew. When (roughly since 1929) Brunner
suddenly began to proclaim openly ‘the other task of theology,’ the ‘point of
contact,’ etc., I made it known that whatever might happen I could and would not
agree with this.4
Though they shared much common ground, Barth accused Brunner of cultivating
a natural theology that was simply incoherent in a theology that intended to seriously
uphold the solas of the Reformation. Understanding revelation as grace and grace as
revelation, as Barth did, meant that there could be no room for a revelation or grace that
was not imparted solely from God to otherwise blind and deaf sinners.
At the heart of the Barth-Brunner debate is the question of the Anknüpfungspunkt
(point of revelation), that unique capacity of humans by which we perceive the divine.5
For both Barth and Brunner, this point of contact is the image of God; their disagreement
has to do with their understanding of the status of the image. Barth explains his view in a
passage from his Church Dogmatics later targeted by Brunner:
Faith is not one of the various capacities of man, whether native or acquired.
Capacity for the Word of God is not among these. The possibility of faith as it is
given to man in the reality of faith can be understood only as one that is loaned to
man by God, and loaned exclusively for use. There can be no receiving of God’s
Word unless there is something common to the speaking God and hearing man in
4
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this event, a similarity for all the dissimilarity implied by the distinction between
God and man, a point of contact between God and man….This point of contact is
what theological anthropology on the basis of Gen. 1:27 calls the “image of God”
in man.6
Barth understands the image of God in humanity to be annihilated by sin at the fall, so
one will not find a status of receptivity to God’s revelation existing in any human at any
time since the original fall. The capacity to receive God’s self-revelation has been
destroyed. Necessarily, Barth concludes, such a capacity must be given with the
revelation extended by God himself. Since Barth conceives of revelation strictly as an
event based on God’s act and decision to reveal himself in a particular moment to a
particular person, there is no such thing as a static revelatory object or writing that one
might stumble upon and happen to obtain revelation with his retained capacity to receive
revelation.
In the closing paragraph of his essay, Brunner warns, “In the long run the Church
can bear the rejection of theologia naturalis as little as its misuse. It is the task of our
theological generation to find the way back to a true theologia naturalis.”7 For Brunner,
and for Baillie as we will see, the way back requires distance from what is perceived as
Barth’s one-sidedness. Though Baillie did not ultimately share Brunner’s conclusions, he
also desired to move away from extremes and find a mediating perspective. In what
follows, we will summarize the Barth-Brunner debate, focusing on four theological issues
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central to the dispute. This background will lay a helpful foundation as we turn to
examine Baillie’s theology of revelation as it was articulated in Our Knowledge of God.8
Brunner begins his response to Barth in his essay, “Nature and Grace,” by
identifying the theologians’ common ground. At the heart of their shared perspective lay
the concern “that the proclamation of the Church has not two sources and norms, such as
e.g. revelation and reason or the Word of God and history, and that ecclesiastical or
Christian action has not two norms.”9 Doctrines of grace and free mercy, the total
sufficiency of Christ for salvation, justification by faith alone, the total authority of
scripture, and the bondage of the will were reclaimed and formative doctrines.
Brunner then identifies six conclusions which he interprets Barth to have drawn
from their common theology, particularly “the doctrine of sola gratia and the position of
the Bible as the sole ultimate standard of truth.”10 These are conclusions with which
Brunner does not agree. In what follows each of the six conclusions will be identified,
Brunner’s critique of them will be given, and the essence of Barth’s response to Brunner
will be briefly summarized. The value in reviewing these six points of dispute and the
theologians’ engagement with them is that it provides an important context for
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understanding the conversation Baillie steps into in Our Knowledge of God and the
particular points of discussion he takes up.

The Six Points of Dispute and Brunner’s Critique
First, Brunner identifies Barth’s first thesis to state that humans, as sinners, have
absolutely no remnant of the image of God. While sinful humans retain the capacity for
culture and humanity, these contain no traces of the image of God. Brunner agrees that
the image of God has been significantly marred by sin; furthermore, he agrees something
of the image of God has been lost in humans insofar as human total depravity has resulted
in total inability, that is, the bondage of the will that renders one unwilling and incapable
of loving God. But in an effort to make a distinction that will allow retention of the
image in non-salvific terms; he distinguishes between the formal and material image of
God. The formal image refers to that which marks humans as distinct from creation,
namely, their capacity for speech (that is, being subjects, ones with whom others can
speak) and their responsibility. Even as a sinner a person is able to speak and is
responsible. “Formally the imago is not in the least touched—whether sinful or not, man
is a subject and is responsible.”11 Materially, the image is completely lost.
Second, according to Brunner, Barth maintains that because scripture is the sole
norm for our knowledge of God, the suggestion of a general revelation is to be rejected.
There are not two kinds of revelation, only one, that is, the complete revelation in Jesus
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Christ. In contrast, Brunner argues that neither the sufficiency of Christ for revelation
nor the normativity of scripture requires us to deny another form of revelation like
general revelation. Brunner first points out that it is the nature of any creation to display
traces of its creator, and that praise of God through his creation is a biblical concept and
practice. Not only is it reasonable to assume that God would be revealed in what he has
made, but Scripture supports this idea.
Building on his first counter-thesis on the formal image of God in man, Brunner
states that “the reason why men are without excuse is that they will not know the God
who so clearly manifests himself to them.”12 This statement assumes both elements of
the formal image—that man has the capacity for speech (to receive the communication in
creation) and is responsible (for what he has been “told”).13
For Brunner the dispute ought not to be over whether there are two kinds of
revelation, but how the two are related. The revelation in creation is not sufficient for
salvation (although it evidently is for condemnation). We can only recognize the
revelation in creation with the light of revelation that comes through Jesus Christ. In this
way Brunner affirms the idea that there is only complete revelation in Christ, while
allowing for revelation in nature.
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Third, Brunner observes that Barth denies that there are multiple kinds of grace;
given that Christ is the sole saving grace of God, there cannot be a grace of creation and
preservation that is active and apparent. As noted earlier in the introduction to the
debate, Barth insists that we must see grace and revelation as synonymous. That is, grace
is necessarily a saving grace, and if it does not save, it is not a form of grace. Brunner, on
the other hand, is trying to show that holding to the grace in Christ as the sole saving
grace does not need to be held in contradiction to other kinds of grace. For example,
given the vast difference of the divine and human beings, there must be some means by
which God is present to his fallen creatures, and that, says Brunner, is through his
preserving grace. Since preserving grace has a different purpose than abolishing sin, it
does not need to be in conflict with saving grace in Christ. God uses the activity of
humans to preserve his creation amidst its corruption—not in a redeeming way, but only
in a preserving way. Just as it is only possible to see natural revelation in the light of the
revelation in Christ, so preserving grace can only be seen by the light of Christ.
Fourth, according to Brunner, Barth maintains that since there are no ordinances
of preservation, there is no natural law that can be a part of Christian theology. But
Brunner allows for ordinances of preservation on the basis that he allows for preserving
grace. Brunner gives an example: “Matrimony is a ‘natural’ ordinance of the creator
because the possibility of and desire for its realization lies within human nature and
because it is realized to some extent by men who are ignorant of the God revealed in
Christ….But…only by means of faith can their [that is, the ordinances’] significance be
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perfectly understood and therefore is it only by means of faith that they can be realized
according to the will of him who has instituted them.”14 Brunner’s example illustrates
his recurring claim that humans’ retained capacity of God’s image does not undermine
the need for special grace.
Fifth, Brunner observes that Barth denies the point of contact on the basis that it
would lessen the complete grace of Christ in salvation. But Brunner says that the point of
contact exists in the formal image of God retained in all people. He is careful to point
out, in light of Barth’s concerns, that the receptivity to God’s self-revelation created by
the point of contact simply opens up the possibility of a divine address; it has no bearing
on one’s response to the divine address, should it come. Again, this possibility
presupposes man’s responsibility. Here Brunner emphasizes the necessary
epistemological dichotomy of the state of sin: “Without knowledge of God there can be
no sin: sin is always ‘in the sight of God.’ In sin there can be no knowledge of God, for
the true knowledge of God is the abolition of sin.”15 If the point of contact is understood
to be the formal image, then according to Brunner the doctrine of sola gratia is not
endangered.
Sixth, Brunner claims that Barth maintains that the new creation in salvation is
not a perfection of the old, but comes into being through the destruction of the old, which
it replaces. Brunner disagrees. It is not the case that the new self replaces the old; rather,
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there is continuity of subject and self-consciousness in salvation. The Holy Spirit present
in us does not displace our personality but sanctifies it. Scripture speaks of salvation as
repair, and it can be said that a thing is repaired in such a way that it is said to be new,
and this is the sense of it in scripture.
A key point of divergence between Brunner and Barth is their understanding of
the extent and effects of sin. For Barth, sin obliterates the image of God in humanity
such that a person has absolutely no access to knowledge of God, and therefore no access
to salvation, apart from the free, sovereign, electing grace of God that creates a revelatory
experience whereby a person encounters Christ. Brunner argues that humans do retain
the image of God in a way that yet does not allow them to contribute to their own
salvation. Barth denies that what Brunner has outlined in the six points summarized
above is his position because, he explains, “‘natural theology’ does not exist as an entity
capable of becoming a separate subject within what I consider to be real theology—not
even for the sake of being rejected.”16 So Barth takes up his rejection of Brunner by
rejecting the whole of what he has put forth and insisting there is only one way to God
through Christ, and that humans are in no way capable of receiving his revelation apart
from whatever capability Christ creates at the moment of encounter.
Four central theological issues are the focus of the Barth-Brunner debate and are
also significant focal points in Baillie’s Our Knowledge of God. These four doctrines can
be viewed as building blocks for a theology of revelation. First and foundational to the
16
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Barth-Brunner debate is their theology of the extent of sin. How pervasive is sin in
human lives and what effect does it have? Both Brunner and Barth agree that sin extends
into the whole person; this is the Reformed doctrine of total depravity with its
accompanying doctrine of bondage of the will. This common ground Barth and Brunner
share splits as it is applied to their theology of the image of God, the nature of grace and
of revelation.
Given human depravity, the next question must be asked whether or to what
extent humanity retains the image of God in its sin-polluted state. Barth says that sin, as
extensively destructive as it is, obliterates the image of God in humanity. Brunner, on the
other hand, wants to nuance the image of God so that some measure of it is retained,
though he is careful to insist that this remnant of the image does not undo humanity’s
bondage of the will to sin. Related to this matter of the image of God is the question of
continuity between a pre- and post-salvific state. In the case of Barth, grace represents
such a radical confrontation and transformation in the life of a person such that he
understands there to have taken place a literally new creation in which the obliterated
image has now been restored. For Brunner, who maintains there exists a residue of the
formal image in fallen humanity, there is some element of continuity between the two
states.
Another point of divergence in the debate has to do with the doctrine of grace. Is
grace exclusively salvific? In other words, is there a grace that God extends to humanity
that is not also a saving grace? Barth denied that there was; grace is revelation and
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revelation is salvation—there is no grace given that does not also save. Brunner claimed
that God extends a preserving grace that complements and in no way diminishes the
necessity of saving grace, which humans depend upon solely for reconciliation with God.
A closely related doctrine is that of general revelation, which becomes the crux of
the Barth-Brunner debate. Is there any revelation of God in nature, a revelation that does
not necessarily save but does actually illuminate God? Both Barth and Brunner’s
answers to this question are consistent with their understandings of grace. According to
his conviction that grace is revelation, Barth vehemently opposes the idea that God’s selfrevelation exists without the corresponding fruit of belief. Brunner, consistent with his
view of a preserving grace, maintains that there is an objective revelation in which the
creation contains traces of its maker. Based on their positions on these four doctrines,
Brunner builds a natural theology and Barth rejects one. And a natural theology makes
room for a point of contact in the human person for God’s revelation.
This summary of the highlights of the Barth-Brunner debate will provide context
and clarity for what follows as we review Baillie’s engagement with their debate and his
navigation of the issues it raised. In particular, we will draw attention to the four foci
outlined above: 1) the extent of sin, 2) the image of God and the matter of continuity, 3)
the nature of grace and 4) the nature of revelation with its question of the point of contact.
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Summary of Our Knowledge of God
In his brief preface to Our Knowledge of God, Baillie shares his perspective on
the current theological efforts to understand the nature of God’s self-revelation and his
methodological approach to contributing to this situation. He writes,
At the present time the field is occupied by a number of competing views, each of
which is likely to have something valuable to contribute to our total
understanding, yet any two of which necessarily exclude one another if accepted
in the form in which alone they are offered to us by their most devoted adherents.
My purpose has been the irenic one of endeavoring to distinguish the true insight
within each alternative from that blindness in it which renders it insensitive to the
insight from another.17
This statement of method gives us insight not only into Baillie’s approach to the subject
in Our Knowledge of God, but to the theological task in general. We can observe in
Baillie a passion for theological discussion; by this means insight is gathered and truth
moves forward. Though Baillie begins the book by directly interacting with Barth and
Brunner’s thought, the subject takes him into larger spheres of conversation in which he
takes as discussion partners great thinkers like Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Immanuel
Kant, and Martin Buber. Even as Baillie seeks to discern the insightful contributions of
Barth and Brunner, he believes that the truth of the matter cannot be discerned simply by
working within the relatively narrow perimeters of these two thinkers; rather, he does not
feel constrained by the alternatives laid down by Barth and Brunner. Addressing the
issues raised by the Barth-Brunner debate doesn’t simply entail settling their dispute, but
it requires engaging the traditions they represent and to which they react. He exhibits a
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kind of intellectual freedom, where the whole of human history and thought is available
to instruct him.
We gain further insight into the essence of Baillie’s critique of the Barth-Brunner
debate from the Introduction he wrote for the English translation of the essays, published
under the title Natural Theology in 1947.18 He gave this commentary on the common
ground shared by Barth and Brunner:
The idea of the total corruption of human nature, strongly entrenched in orthodox
Protestantism but lately fallen into disrepute, was now not only vigorously
reaffirmed by both writers, but was given an application even more extended than
orthodoxy had usually given it; this total corruption being made to cover the
human reason as to render men incapable of reaching any knowledge of God by
the exercise of their own powers of thought, or even of bringing them to a point in
their thinking such as would enable them to welcome the Christian revelation,
when it came, as answering a question they had already raised or meeting a need
they had already felt….It did, indeed, meet with a response from those elected to
respond to it, but this response was not on the ground of anything already present
in their own souls; rather did the revelation create its own response.19
At the close of the Introduction, Baillie urges his readers to take up the issues put forth by
Brunner and Barth, both in Natural Theology and their subsequent publications, with
these important questions in mind: “Which of them is right? Or, if neither is entirely
right, which of them comes nearer the truth, and where exactly does each go astray? And
may there even be something amiss with the ground they occupy in common?”20 We can
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imagine that these were the very questions Baillie himself brought to his reading of these
essays a decade before.
Chapter One: “Confrontation with God”
The question of the nature of God’s self-revelation is necessarily two-fold: How
does God make contact with us so that he is made knowable and how do we perceive his
contact so that we do, in fact, know him? In the first chapter of Our Knowledge of God,
Baillie introduces his answer to the first question and lays the groundwork for answering
the second.21 The thesis of the first section of the book is that all people of all times and
places have been confronted with God, who has a claim on them. God’s claim is based
on the fact that we are God’s own, made to know him, hear him, and follow him. In our
sinful state we resist this divine claim and seek, through a variety of ways, to avoid the
conflict created by this unwelcome confrontation. The evidence of this confrontation can
be found, Baillie observes, in a common restlessness and discontent that leads to the
formation of religion. And in the West particularly, where history and cultures have been
so profoundly influenced by Christianity, he specifies that people experience the
confrontation of God in Christ.22
In Baillie’s words:
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My contention has been that the only humanity known to us is a humanity which
has already, in some degree at least, been confronted with the reality of God and
disturbed by the challenge of his holy presence, and that it is this fact which
determines the form and conditions the success alike of theological argument and
of religious appeal. That not one of us has been left quite alone by God, that we
have been sought out from the beginning, that from the beginning we have
possessed more light than we have used—this seems to be a necessary part of our
confession of sin.23
It is notable in this passage that Baillie understands our theology of revelation to have a
direct impact on the nature of our ministry of the gospel. Baillie criticizes the assumption
he has observed in recent generations of preachers and teachers that people in the west
have become inoculated to the gospel, which has led to a shift in ministry methodology.
“We have made stammering excuses for our intrusion,” Baillie criticizes, “For the old
direct challenge we have substituted the language of debate. Where our forefathers
would have confronted [a non-believer] with God’s commandments, we have parleyed
with him over God’s existence and over the authenticity of his claims.”24 The weakness
in this approach, for Baillie, lies in the fact that it does not cooperate, so to speak, with
the way in which God confronts humanity. That is, it engages the non-believer as though
God is not confronting all people with himself, as though this is not a reality the minister
can assume and appeal to. In contrast to this trend, Baillie affirms the more direct style
of confrontation taken by Barth and others, though he is wary of the dogmatic assertions
that he sees as characteristic of Barth. Though the communication of the gospel is not
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dependent on a well-reasoned or argued apologetic, Baillie expresses concern that going
too far in the other direction can lead to a dogmatic arrogance that desensitizes one to the
value of articulating the reasonableness of the gospel and the obedient faith to which it
summons us. Thus Baillie is not opposed to the valuable role of reason and
argumentation when it comes to faith, but he does believe it has limits, which he will
explore more in chapter 3 and conclude in chapter 5.
The four central theological issues we distilled from the Barth-Brunner debate are
engaged in the first chapter of Our Knowledge of God and developed in the subsequent
chapters. To review, these four issues include 1) the extent of sin, 2) the image of God
and the matter of continuity, 3) the nature of grace and 4) the nature of revelation with its
question of the point of contact. In this chapter Baillie critiques Barth and Brunner and
formulates his position on these four issues in reference to them. His view on these four
issues, which we have said must be engaged in any theology of revelation, becomes the
foundation for the rest of the book.
Baillie identifies in Barth “a fundamental premiss that no knowledge of God
exists in the world save in the hearts of regenerate Christian believers.”25 Baillie
attributes the root of this position to the Lutheran christocentrism that characterized
Ritschl’s and Herrmann’s theology and which influenced Barth. But Baillie thinks such a
position is “guilty of unduly simplifying the delicate complexity of the spiritual situation
with which we have here to do, and that in [Barth’s] anxiety to recover and conserve one
25
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precious evangelic truth he is going far towards surrendering another.”26 What Barth
preserves (and Baillie is concerned that this preservation takes the doctrine too far) is the
teaching that our sin has slain us; we are dead in sin and we are in need of a resurrection.
Barth offers a corrective to an overly optimistic, even humanistic, natural theology in
which sin and its effects was downplayed, but his corrective goes so far as to deny any
light of God in humanity. As we saw in the overview of the Barth-Brunner debate, Barth
denies any point of contact for divine revelation in the fallen human nature or
consciousness. Sin and its effects are so devastating that there can be no point of contact.
The soul of a Christian is literally and utterly a new creation. There is nothing in fallen
humanity to which revelation makes its appeal—fallen humanity lacks the capacity for
such an appeal to be received or heard, let alone responded to. Baillie is not opposed to
the idea that God can create something totally new, for this is precisely the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo, but he does not think such a doctrine of creation characterizes the
nature of God’s revelation to fallen humanity.
Baillie agrees with Barth that God must work in a person in a miraculous way in
order for that person to receive new life; it is the nature of this miracle and of the person
receiving the miracle which Baillie disputes.

Baillie distinguishes himself from Barth

on the nature of the miracle at work by describing it in terms of a re-creating instead of a
creating. In the case of creation or even birth there is no continuity between the “is” and
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the “is not.” Once angels and dark matter and hydrogen and insects did not exist and now
they do; once there was an egg and sperm separated by two bodies, and from their
joining, there is now a unique human person formed with the capacity to know people
and things and ideas, to communicate with body and voice, to feel emotion and the world
around her. But in the case of re-creation or re-birth, there is continuity between the
“before” and “after;” that is, a continuity of need and remedy. Baillie finds evidence for
this continuity with regard to the image of God in the fact that the preacher’s task of
leading others to saving knowledge of God in Christ certainly is a task that includes
“calling upon God to perform a miracle, but not that miracle [of creating this knowledge
in “stocks and stones”]—and not that miracle precisely for the reason that he is also
calling upon man to do something, namely, to decide for God.”27 The tension of human
participation in God’s miraculous intervention to recreate and renew his image in a
person is one Baillie insists must be maintained.
Baillie describes the theology of new life discontinuity as a rending of the
doctrine of the image of God and the doctrine of revelation and claims, “I cannot believe
that [Barth] is right in thus severing the connexion between the doctrine of the imago dei
and the doctrine of revelation.”28 In other words, for Baillie, the image of God is
organically connected to God’s self-revelation. This connection is exposed in the fact
that our human nature is made known to us as a good thing gone bad. In some way we
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are deeply aware that life is not as it is supposed to be, and this awareness stirs the
restlessness in us that Baillie says is a result of our confrontation with God. It is the
image of God in humanity, then, in which Baillie locates the point of contact for God’s
self-revelation. Specifically, he describes that image in three-fold terms: reason,
conscience, and religion. When encountered by the holiness of God, a sinful person is
challenged and an inner conflict is generated. It is our marred image—our derailed
reason, our wayward conscience and our misguided religion—that God illuminates with
his holiness. We see that what we do and desire is not what it ought to be, and certainly it
isn’t as fulfilling as we long for it to be. For “if it be true that man was first created in the
image and likeness of God, the total obliteration of that image could mean only the total
obliteration of his humanity. For, as Calvin says, ‘the image of God extends to
everything in which the nature of man surpasses that of all other species of animals’.”29
Thus our careful effort to improve ourselves, others and our collective lot along with our
persistent dissatisfaction with some or all of life testifies to some retained image of God
in humanity.
Baillie acknowledges that his position on the continuity of the image of God is
more aligned with Brunner, with whom he shares several points in common opposition to
Barth. Baillie does not agree with Brunner on his absolute distinction between the formal
and material in the image of God. Human receptivity to and addressability by the Word
of God make up for Brunner only the form of the image of God in humanity. Here
29
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Baillie agrees with Barth’s critique of Brunner: you simply cannot draw an absolute
distinction separating form from matter. The following quote is a fine example of
Baillie’s careful navigation between the positions of Barth and Brunner:
The one writer is as fond of making his distinctions absolute as the other is
suspicious of drawing any distinctions at all; and unfortunately neither way is the
way of wisdom. Dr. Barth denies that we have any revelation, any knowledge of
God, any impartation of divine grace, apart from the knowledge of Christ. Dr.
Brunner contends that in some measure we have all three; and there I must agree
with him rather than with his adversary. But he insists on drawing an absolute
distinction between such general revelation, such formal knowledge, such
‘sustaining’ grace, and the special saving revelation and knowledge and grace
which are through Christ alone; and that seems to me as untenable a position as it
does to Dr. Barth.30
In the end, Baillie finds error in Brunner’s assertions both that the form of the image of
God is unreached by total depravity and that the content of the image of God is so utterly
lost to it. He positions himself against Barth and Brunner by rejecting the idea that sin
extends so far as to obliterate either some or all of God’s image in his human creatures.31
Baillie closes his first chapter with his conclusion on the matter of natural
theology. The natural theology Barth was so concerned to reject was rooted in a time
when people maintained that God, at creation, had endowed humans with the power of
reason, and that the exercise of this reason unaided by some special intervention of God
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could yield some knowledge of him. But since the 19th century, Baillie says, both our
conceptions of revelation and of nature have been changing. He writes, “Revelation
consists neither in the dictation of writings nor in the communication of information, but
in personal communion—the self-disclosure of a Personality. So also in the sphere of
morals, what has been revealed to us is not a code of rules which we must obey but a
Person to whom we are constrained to respond.”32 Another way of expressing this shift is
that it is no longer assumed that knowledge of God comes to us through things that are
static. For example, revelation does not occur just because someone has memorized the
propositions of the Apostles’ Creed or has gazed upon the Andes Mountains. What is
revelatory about the Apostles’ Creed and the Andes Mountains is God confronting us in,
with and under them. Revelation is dynamic and personal. So while scripture and nature
(especially human nature) are still viewed as essential forms of revelation, they are no
longer taken to be static forms. Baillie especially focuses on this shift in reference to our
idea of human nature. It had been the assumption that universal elements of human
nature like the seed of religion or the conscience were innate, characteristics that were
just part of the mechanism of humanity. But Baillie suggests, influenced by this more
dynamic view, that such characteristics “are not, strictly speaking, innate either in the
race or in the individual, but have resulted rather from the continuing living communion
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between God’s Spirit and the spirit of man.”33 God reveals himself through things; things
don’t reveal God to us on their own.
The Barth-Brunner debate functioned as a catalyst for Baillie to articulate his
theology of revelation. In the other four chapters of Our Knowledge of God, Baillie
develops and defends the conclusions he has made in this first chapter. This constant
encounter with God is a unique gift given only to humanity and is what maintains the
divine image in humanity. Because this encounter is constant and the image of God is
organically identified with it, it is impossible that the image of God in humanity could be
utterly lost to sin. Sin, to be sure, has marred this image, and this marring Baillie
identifies with the chronic attempt by humanity to act as though God is not in fact present
and making his claim on us, an attempt that leads to restlessness and discontent. The
constant encounter with God means that his self-revelation is just as constant and
universal to all humanity, which in turn means that the point of contact for revelation is
equally constant and universal and is identified with the image of God in humanity. The
retained image of God means also that there is continuity between the pre- and postsalvific states.
Chapter Two: “Ways of Believing”
Baillie sees the view he has outlined in the first chapter as a defense of Romans 1:
18-21:
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The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and
wickedness of human beings who suppress the truth by their wickedness, since
what may be known about God is plain to them, because God made it plain to
them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal
power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what
has been made, so that people are without excuse. For although they knew God,
they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their thinking
became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened.
Thus Baillie’s teaching that God is continuously confronting humanity, all people at all
times and places, is motivated by his serious regard for the biblical text, which teaches
that God reveals himself to humanity in such a way that all people are accountable for
having knowledge of God. Baillie seeks to make sense of how someone can both know
God and not know God, as the Romans 1 passage suggests. If God has revealed himself
to all people, why are there so many who appear, whether by their actions or their
confession, to deny his existence? What motivates people to deny the God they already
have some knowledge of? Baillie’s theology of God’s continuous encounter with all
humanity is pressed by these very questions. In his second chapter, Baillie explores and
articulates a theology of faith that takes into consideration biblical teaching, the
Reformed theological tradition within which he stands and his observation of human
experience, including his own. In other words, he seeks an explanation for why people
don’t believe in God just as much as he wants an explanation for why people do.
If Baillie is right about revelation—that it occurs in the continuous event of God’s
personal presence to all humanity throughout history, then we must conclude that the
existence of atheism, or any agnosticism for that matter, is due only to suppression and
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self-deception. Each person is responsible for the knowledge of God she has received.
While Baillie will later develop the nature of this universal knowledge, he first
emphasizes our accountability in having received it. Thus Baillie denies that the atheists’
claim of having no knowledge or experience of God provides evidence against his thesis
concerning God’s continuous encounter of all humanity.
To counter the atheists’ objection, Baillie introduces an analogy he will return to
again later in his book: the solipsist and the subjective idealist who deny the existence of
external people or realities. Does their denial of these things, Baillie asks, mean that we,
who do believe in the existence of external people and realities, are obliged to concede
that the external world that is present to us in our experience is not also present to them in
their experience?
Why then should we, who believe in God, think it necessary to allow that because
some men, the so-called atheists, deny the existence of God, God cannot therefore
be directly present to their consciousness as he is to ours? We should say that the
solipsists and subjective idealists are as conscious of their neighbors and of the
world about them as we are, but that they have been misled by false and confused
philosophical argumentation into a meaningless (though doubtless quite sincere)
intellectual denial of their existence. We should say that though they deny the
reality of their neighbors and of the world about them with the top of their minds,
they believe in them all the time in the bottom of their hearts. Why then should
we be precluded from occupying the same ground with regard to the so-called
atheists?34
Thus Baillie introduces his distinction between conscious and self-conscious belief—
conscious belief being that which is believed at the bottom of the heart and self-conscious
belief being that which is believed at the top of the mind. “All belief must in some sense
34
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be conscious—unconscious beings cannot entertain beliefs—but not all belief need be
conscious of itself. We may have an awareness of a certain reality without being aware
of that awareness.”35 By this scheme Baillie is able to explain how it can be the case that
God is present to the atheist who denies him. The atheist denies God with the top of her
mind but retains belief in God in the bottom of her heart, a split that is made possible by
the psychologically confirmed capacity of humans to suppress their knowledge and
feelings.
The fact of suppression of religious knowledge prompts Baillie to ask an
important question that targets the nature of unbelief: “If all men have some knowledge
of God and do in some sense believe in him in the bottom of their hearts, what is it that
prompts some of them to deny Him ‘with the top of their minds’?”36 In answer to this
question, Baillie proposes a two-fold explanation. First, sometimes there is a moral root
to our doubt, where we suppress the knowledge of God revealed to us as one who makes
a claim on our life because we don’t want to have to respond to his claim. We don’t find
God because we don’t really want to find him as he is. In other words, we can be
earnestly looking for the God we want to find, but have suppressed our desire to the
claim on our life by the God who is and so have a built-in road block to communion with
him. Baillie personally identifies with the moral root of doubt and substantiates his point
from his own experience. He writes, “Part of the reason why I could not find God was
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that there is that in God which I did not wish to find. Part of the reason why I could not
(or thought I could not) hear Him speak was that He was saying some things to me which
I did not wish to hear. There was a side of the divine reality which was unwelcome to
me, and some divine commandments the obligatoriness of which I was most loath to
acknowledge.”37 Baillie continues,
We seek God ‘carefully with tears.’ But because we are so loath to find Him as
He is, sometimes we cannot find Him at all. We have conceived our own idea of
God, but it is an idea in the formation of which our sloth and selfishness have
played their part; and because there is no God corresponding to our idea, and
because we are looking for none other, we fail to find the God who is really
there….When we turn a deaf ear to His commandments, we cease also to hear His
promises. We cannot be assured of His care if we reject His claim. Before
religion can be known as a sweet communion, it must first be known as an
answered summons.38
Characteristic of the moral root of doubt, then, is the culpable rejection of God as he has
made himself known.
Second, and alternatively, says Baillie, sometimes there is an honest intellectual
root to our doubt, despite otherwise pure moral intentions.39 In such a case it may be that
our idea of God is formed in close association with other beliefs, and as the falsity of
these associated beliefs comes to light, the context upholding the belief in God folds and
we are left with the choice to find another intellectual context in which our belief in God
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makes sense, or we are led to abandon that belief. Another scenario involves people
endorsing a philosophy or some belief system that is essentially hostile to belief in God.
In this case, arguments are made not against the original context of belief in God, but
against belief in God itself. Here Baillie notes that especially in the West in the 19th
century, a number of naturalistic and humanistic philosophies were developed which
“succeeded in persuading us of the truth and importance of some of the positions for
which they have contended. But, not having set out from the reality of God, not only
have they (as indeed we should have expected) failed to arrive at any conviction of His
reality, but they have conducted us towards a conception of universal being from which
God seems to be definitely excluded.”40
Thus, unbelief can be characterized as suppression of the knowledge of God,
whether from moral or honest intellectual motivations. Baillie acknowledges that Paul
only recognized moral culpability, but he is careful to allow the honest intellectual denial
for the reason that he does not want to assume that all people willfully reject God.
Having established the nature of unbelief, Baillie examines the nature of belief, of faith,
maintaining his categories of belief in the bottom of the heart and belief in the top of the
mind.
Baillie asks an important question to test the implications of his premise that there
might be belief in the bottom of the heart: “If men may believe in God without knowing
that they believe in Him, is it then very important that they should know that they believe
40
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in him? If men may have knowledge of him in the bottom of their hearts while denying
him ‘with the top of their minds’, does such denial then very seriously affect their
spiritual life?”41 In other words, what is the value and role of intellectual knowledge of
God on the spiritual life?
Baillie says that we are always and only judged by God on the basis of faith, but
he is eager to broaden his view of faith to include a kind of rudimentary faith which is
weak enough that it is not self-conscious but present enough to be identified as the fruit
of God’s Spirit. Baillie takes seriously and wants to understand the theological
implications of Jesus’ teaching that a bad tree cannot bear good fruit—the fruit indicates
the true identity of the tree.
Just as the intellectual affirmation of God’s existence is not of itself sufficient to
initiate the soul’s communion with God, so the corresponding denial is not of
itself sufficient to destroy that communion. After all, the central thing in religion
is not our hold on God but God’s hold on us; not our choosing him but his
choosing us; not that we should know him but that we should be known of him.
And it would seem that sometimes, even when we deny him both with our lips
and with our minds, he still retains his gracious hold upon us, dwelling within us
as it were incognito and continuing to do his work in and for our souls.42
In contrast to the intellectual denial of God in a person who yet demonstrates fruit of the
Spirit, Baillie outlines the practical denial of God in a person who confesses belief in
God. The practical denial consists of living in a way that destroys or stunts any fruit of
the Spirit. Such hypocrisy renders the confession of belief meaningless. Of the two
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modes of denial, the practical denial warrants greater concern for Baillie as it causes
more spiritual damage.
Baillie is eager to locate his ideas about faith in the context of his theological
tradition. Baillie thinks the role of the covenant community is vital to the life of faith,
because it is in this community that the knowledge of God can be nurtured; otherwise,
one is left with a stunted spiritual life. “A man may be in some way putting his trust in
God without realizing that he is doing so, and may be held of God without knowing that
he is so held; yet cannot, while this condition lasts, lead any but a very impoverished
spiritual life.”43 Baillie identifies this teaching with early Protestant theology, which
distinguished between fides directa (direct faith) and fides reflexa (reflective faith).44 He
observes that his tradition
more than amply allows for the authenticity of a faith that is not conscious of
itself, but it seems to allow this only, or mainly, with regard to one element in
faith, namely the element of personal trust and reliance. Three elements have
been distinguished in faith by the theologians, notitia, assensus, and fiducia—
information, assent, and trust. The Westminster Confession boldly asserts that
there may be a faith in which the fiducia is not reflexa or conscious of itself; but
does it allow the possibility of a faith in which the element of assent is not
conscious of itself? The answer is that it does allow this with regard to children
and imbeciles, but not with regard to those who have attained intellectual
maturity.45
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Baillie criticizes the Westminster’s inability to conceive of an assent that is not conscious
of itself as a consequence of their being “too intellectualistic in their in their
interpretation of Christian faith, too much in love with creedal orthodoxy, too ready to
understand revelation as consisting in communicated information.”46 And to this Baillie
warns that there is a pharisaical tendency to become too overconfident in one’s
orthodoxy, and that right living should be just as important as right belief. Essentially,
Baillie wants to be able to expand and extend the distinction of direct and reflexive faith
to the faith element of assent as well as to the faith element of trust.
Up to this point, Baillie has taken pains to delineate one kind of faith in God,
namely, the belief in God that all people have, which the preacher assumes in his hearers,
which is revelation’s point of contact, and which is identified with the image of God. It
is this faith that is retained when knowledge of God is suppressed through either moral or
honest intellectual doubt. In closing his study of the ways that we believe in God, Baillie
examines saving faith, which is a belief in God that not all people have, a belief that God
summons people to through the preaching of the gospel. This is a belief that confesses
itself in community. Baillie asks whether these two ways of believing are different kinds
of belief altogether or simply different degrees of the same kind of belief. The issue that
lies at the heart of this question is the relationship of nature and grace, and this is Baillie’s
chief concern in examining the nature of faith. “Since those who possess saving faith are
said to be in a state of grace, and those who possess it not are said to be in a state of
46
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nature, this is the same as to ask, Is there a clean cut between the state of nature and the
state of grace?”47 Baillie again takes up his position on the continuity of nature and
grace. The image of God and the “bottom of the heart” belief associated with the image
lead to the conclusion of there being some kind of continuity. As Baillie states several
times throughout Our Knowledge of God, the theologian and preacher alike are tasked to
bring belief in God to a consciousness of itself.48
Chapter Three: “Is Our Knowledge of God’s Existence Inferential?”
One of Baillie’s practical concerns in his construction of a theology of revelation
is its implications for the preacher. If, as he has stated, the preacher’s task is to bring
belief in God to self-awareness, the question remains how this is to be done. In his third
chapter, Baillie investigates whether preachers should get tactical training in apologetics;
that is, he questions whether our knowledge of God is inferential. This particular
question regarding the nature of belief arises on account of a strong Christian tradition
employing theistic proofs as evidence for belief in God.49 This tradition, Baillie says, is
built upon the assumption that our knowledge of God is inferential; it is this assumption
he questions in chapter three.
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Baillie traces the root of the assumption that our knowledge of God is inferential
to the epistemology of medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas,
Baillie observes, the five senses engaging the natural (physical) world are the only means
we have of experiencing direct knowledge of any existence. This means that our
knowledge of non-sensible realities is necessarily indirect and discursive, “reached by
inference from the things we see and touch.”50 Thus, according to our natural knowledge
of God, that is, according to our reason, we can know that God is and what he is not.
In addition to the natural knowledge of God, Aquinas acknowledges that we also
have a supernatural knowledge of God available to us through faith in the biblical
revelation. Baillie observes in Aquinas that the knowledge available through faith can be
uniquely characterized by “a direct persuasion of its truth in the heart of the believer, and
here St. Thomas approaches very near to the Reformation doctrine of the testimonium
internum spiritus sancti.”51 As for the relationship between these two modes of knowing
(reason and faith), one can believe in God’s existence based on argument or on the
testimony of scripture, although the basis of argument and reason is superior in terms of a
ground for belief. Aquinas distinguishes the superiority of reason in terms of its ability to
provide evidence versus its ability to provide certitude. Faith as a mode of knowing is
superior with regard to certainty. The knowledge we have by faith is still knowledge of
God through his effects, but it is a broader knowledge by which we are made aware of
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more of his effects. Thus, Baillie observes, Aquinas’ ascending order of knowing (with
regard to evidence) is faith, then reason, and finally vision. Vision, as a mode of direct,
immediate knowing, is something that will come to the saints who are separated from
their sinful mortality, according to Aquinas. This mode is therefore impossible to receive
while we are “on the way,” this side of immortality. 52 Baillie’s whole survey of Aquinas
intends to show that Aquinas utilizes the rational argument for the existence of God in his
theology and endorses it as the superior mode of knowing God’s existence. In addition,
Aquinas introduces, with sweeping influence, the tradition that we do not and cannot
have direct knowledge of God (vision), that it is something that only comes with
immortality.
Baillie goes on to examine whether or not a tradition of arguments for God’s
existence is found in the biblical narrative. He describes the “atheism” depicted in the
Old Testament as having more to do with the “sinful evasion” of God than with
intellectual denial. He writes, “All through the Old Testament it is assumed that the
knowledge of God rests, not on cosmological speculation, but on the revelation of
Himself which He has vouchsafed—on the theophanies of Mount Sinai, on the laws He
gave to Moses, on the words He spoke to the prophets.”53 The Old Testament doesn’t
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question whether God exists, but rather assumes that he does and then discusses how God
is known and what he is known to be.54
Baillie observes continuity between the Old and New Testaments with regard to
their perspectives of unbelief. Jesus frequently spoke of the problem of unbelief, but,
Baillie notes, “the unbelief which He so bitterly deplored was not an intellectual
persuasion of God’s non-existence but rather something that was wont to consort with the
most undoubting intellectual persuasion of His reality. Those whom He rebuked for their
lack of faith were not men who denied God with the top of their minds, but men who,
while apparently incapable of doubting Him with the top of their minds, lived as though
He did not exist.”55 The Epistles, like the Gospels, presume people’s intellectual
recognition of God’s existence. Of the Romans 1:20 passage so often used as a prooftext
for the teleological argument, Baillie writes, “What is said is not that the works of God’s
hands prove His existence but that they reveal certain aspects of his nature.”56 Baillie
concludes from his brief survey of the biblical material that knowledge of God is neither
elusive or inferential. “God is One who is directly known in His approach to the human
soul. He is not an inference but a Presence.”57 God is knowable and known, and this was
assumed in the biblical text. Baillie concludes from this that we, too, ought to share the
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biblical assumptions that people have some kind of knowledge of God and that unbelief
is exhibited in the way one’s life is lived.
Baillie links the common understanding of the distinction between natural and
revealed knowledge to the distinction between the Greek philosophical way of arguing
for the existence of God versus the revelation found in scripture to be accepted by faith.
He observes that these two modes of knowledge have been assumed and joined in both
the Thomistic tradition and the Reformed tradition (on this point he cites Hodge). Baillie
is uncomfortable with the marriage of these two modes of knowledge and insists that we
must choose between the two. He has been arguing that our knowledge of God is not
inferential; however, the assumption that our knowledge of God is inferential underlies
the apologetic or proselytizing use of arguments for the existence of God. Therefore, in
opposition to the traditions that make room for a way of knowing God inferentially,
Baillie aligns himself with the contemporary trend of objections to arguments for the
existence of God as providing a way to belief, a trend he identifies with Schleiermacher,
Ritschl, Herrmann, Sabatier, Barth and Heim. Baillie clearly states his position on the
traditional distinction between natural and revealed theology:
We are rejecting logical argument of any kind as the first chapter of our theology
or as representing the process by which God comes to be known. We are holding
that our knowledge of God rests rather on the revelation of His personal Presence
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. We are thus directly challenging St. Thomas’s
doctrine that we have no knowledge of God per se but only per ea quae facta
sunt—through His effects in the world of nature, and are allying ourselves rather
with the strain in medieval thought, which was opposed by St. Thomas and about
which more will have to be said in the next chapter—the doctrine presented by St.
Bonaventure’s dictum that God is present to the soul itself. Of such a Presence it
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must be true that to those who have never been confronted with it argument is
useless, while to those who have it is superfluous.58
It should be emphasized that the basis for Baillie’s rejection of arguments for God’s
existence has to do with how they function in our epistemology. What he is rejecting
specifically is their use as a means by which God may be known. Baillie points out that
philosophical arguments for the existence of God function for believers more as
“afterthoughts, subsequent to their belief in Him rather than the cause of it;” they are “not
so much reasons as rationalizations.”59 Of the thinkers who have put forth such
arguments (and here he takes as examples Plato, interestingly, along with Berkely, Paley,
and Spinoza), he writes: “These great men were not ignorant of God before they lighted
upon these proofs of Him, nor would they, if these proofs had failed them, have kept their
minds quite open to his non-existence until they had lighted on other and better ones.”60
Baillie will take up the rightful place of theistic argument at the end of the final chapter.
At this point in his argument, he intends mainly to show that such arguments never
function as the basis for belief in God; they are never proofs that convince an otherwise
agnostic disposition.
Baillie rejects not only a posteriori arguments for the existence of God (e.g., the
cosmological, teleological and moral arguments), but also the a priori ontological
argument classically put forth by Anselm. What Baillie values in Anselm is the
58

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 132.

59

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 132.

60

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 133.

76
distinctive fact that his formulation of the ontological argument is not put forth as a
means of knowing God, but as a way of faith seeking to understand itself. Baillie ends up
distancing himself from Anselm, however, in an effort to distance himself from the idea
that there is any inference whatsoever involved in coming to faith, even inference drawn
from prior knowledge of God. In his treatment of Aquinas, Baillie already denied that
there is explicit inference from argument to faith. And Anselm, who admittedly puts
forth a different kind of argument—not arguing from prior knowledge of the world to
knowledge of God—still seems to be arguing that there is an implicit inference that takes
place from prior knowledge. Anselm’s argument, Baillie claims, regards “the knowledge
of God as itself a priori, finding in God Himself the premiss from which His existence
must be deduced.”61 Baillie means to radically reject inference as a means of coming to
knowledge of God; God’s existence, Baillie insists, is not deduced from any prior
knowledge, whether gained by a posteriori or a priori reason. Baillie states it strongly:
“It is not the result of an inference of any kind, whether explicit or implicit, whether
laboriously excogitated or swiftly intuited, that the knowledge of God’s reality comes to
us. It comes rather through our direct personal encounter with Him in the Person of Jesus
Christ His Son our Lord.”62 Thus, arguments for the existence of God are insufficient—
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not because there is a superior argument yet to be articulated, but for the reason that they
are just the wrong sort of means by which to know God.63
Chapter Four: “The Urgent Presence”
Having defended his position that our knowledge of God is not inferential and
that therefore any approach to God by means of argumentation is misguided, Baillie
further develops his thesis that the presence of God himself is the source of our
knowledge of him. It is helpful to note that throughout the book Baillie has assumed that
the starting point for the contemporary Christian epistemology of inference, rooted in the
division between natural and special knowledge of God, can be found in Aquinas’
theology. The tradition of the division of modes of knowledge of God has continued, but
Baillie is attempting to show in these two middle chapters (three and four) that we are not
bound to accept this tradition as infallible in light of the biblical testimony, alternative
Christian perspectives, or modern philosophical insight.
In this chapter Baillie begins by breaking down the implications of his claim that
our knowledge of God is not inferential. To infer something is to reach a conclusion
about a reality by means of argument; that is, we “deduce this reality from some other
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reality which is already known to us.”64 But unless we want to commit the fallacy of
infinite regress, we cannot claim that all our knowledge is built from argument; there
must be some reality that is more direct, more immediate, something not inferred:
There must be some reality by which we are directly confronted—some reality
which we know, not because we know something else first, but rather as itself the
ground of our knowledge of other things. This does not mean that this prime
reality either originally was or conceivably could be known to us in isolation from
all other realities—for there is nothing that can be known by us out of relation to
all other things; it means only that in being known together with other things it is
known and recognized as their ground.65
If we must have a prime reality, as Baillie puts it, then what is it? One answer is the
natural world (e.g., Aquinas, who said that we know all things, directly or indirectly,
through the senses). Modern philosophy, influenced by Descartes, however, moves away
from viewing the material world as a reliable starting point for knowledge; Descartes
finds ultimate certainty in himself. Baillie finds in the Cartesian revolution both a gain
and a loss. First, there is gain in that God is seen as a more direct reality than the senses,
but the loss is that Descartes puts the self as more directly known than God. Specifically
what is lost in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is epistemological objectivity. Descartes’
mistake, Baillie observes, is “in supposing that the consciousness of the self preceded the
consciousness of the not-self, or could remain after the consciousness of the not-self had
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disappeared. The truth is that only in the knowledge of what is other than myself am I
able to rise to the knowledge of my own existence at all.”66
Baillie also finds support for his thesis in the thought of Kant. Baillie connects
the fact of God’s omnipresence with God’s unwavering claim on us, confronting and
challenging us at all times and places. There is no other reality that is nearer to us than
God himself. Baillie observes that though we often try to avoid or deny the claim made
upon us by God, “in the bottom of our hearts we have never been able to doubt its right.
We have always known that there is no other sovereign right but this, and no other
‘totalitarian’ authority. We are surrounded by many glaring realities that occupy the
foreground of our consciousness and make all sorts of claims on our attention and
allegiance; but we have always known that the only one obligation is absolute and one
imperative categorical.”67 The significance of a Kantian influence on Baillie’s thought
can be observed in his depiction of the inescapable sense of moral obligation laid upon us
that leads us to knowledge of God. But again, for Baillie, the existence of God is not
inferred; rather are we confronted with God’s existence in and with the moral sense of
obligation.
The Kantian revolution, following the Cartesian one, makes a valuable recovery
of an important truth related to Baillie’s position. Baillie observes,
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Kant’s great rediscovery was that of the Primacy of the Practical Reason, as he
called it. It is not in the realm of sense, he believed, that we are all really in touch
with absolute objective reality, and certainly not in the realm of the supersensible
objects of scientific and metaphysical speculation, but only in the realm of the
practical claim that is made upon our wills by the Good. Ultimate reality meets
us, not in the form of an object that invites our speculation, but in the form of a
demand that is made upon our obedience….There is here, as it seems to me, most
precious and deeply Christian insight.68
This insight, however, was limited by what Baillie calls Kant’s “bondage to the
humanistic tradition.” Baillie criticizes Kant because he does not take his insight far
enough, that it only yielded in Kant a respect for the law and that the religion of Kant is
too narrow for the reality of God.
As an example of the limitations of Kant’s philosophy, Baillie notes that prayer,
conversation with God, becomes an absurdity for Kant. Baillie’s response on this point is
illuminative of his view of God, in his personal presence, as the source of all our
knowledge of him. Baillie writes,
It seems to me that it is precisely such a sense of converse with the Living God as
Kant thus clearly saw to be excluded by his own system that lies at the root of all
our spiritual life. That life finds its only beginning in the revelation to our finite
minds of One whose transcendent perfection constitutes upon our lives a claim so
sovereign that the least attempt to deny it awakens in us a sense of sin and shame;
and thus is initiated the sequence, ever extending itself as the revelation of the
divine nature becomes deeper and fuller, of confession, repentance, forgiveness,
reconciliation, and the new life of fellowship. There is no other spiritual
sequence than this.69
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Despite Kant’s problems and limitations, says Baillie, we ought “to see in Kant’s
philosophy a most valuable recovery of the fundamental truth that Absolute Reality,
instead of being reached speculatively by means of deduction from the data of sense, is
revealed to us directly in the form of an Absolute Obligation. This means that what is
revealed to us is not theoretical knowledge but practical guidance, and that what is asked
of us in return is not intellectual assent but willing obedience.”70 Despite his earlier
critique in chapter two of the kind of favoritism given to intellectual assent in faith, as
expressed in the Westminster Confession, Baillie is careful at this point to maintain a link
between intellectual assent and obedience. For, he writes, “It is only by knowledge that
we can be guided… [since] we cannot obey what we do not understand. In the obligation
that is revealed to us some element of knowledge must be implicitly contained.”71
Baillie ultimately and fundamentally opposes Kant:
Where he erred was in his understanding of the relation of faith [our mode of
knowledge of God] to the guidance. He taught, as we have seen, that the
guidance is originally revealed to us in the form of a self-evidencing law—a mere
obligation detached, as it were, from Him who lays the obligation upon us; and
that the knowledge of him who thus obliges us is afterwards reached as an
inference from the felt nature of the obligation. We, on the other hand, have
argued that the Source of the obligation is Himself directly revealed to us and that
it is in this vision of His glory and His holiness that our sense of obligation is
born. It is His perfection that rebukes us; it is His love that constrains us. Hence
it is no mere law that is revealed to us, but a living Person, and what we call the
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moral law is but an abstraction which our limited and limiting minds make from
the concreteness of the living Glory that is revealed.72
Another way Baillie distances himself from Kant is in his effort to qualify the Kantian
language of “demand.” When confronted with God, who is omnipresent and therefore
always confronting us at every turn, we experience a demand made of us, but Baillie
wants to describe this demand as a gift that we should accept. “We are asked, not to do
anything in our own strength, but to let God do something for us. We are summoned, not
to save ourselves, but to accept Christ’s salvation.”73
Baillie states that “It is not enough, then, to acknowledge God as the most real of
all realities. We must acknowledge Him also to be, of all realities, that by which we are
most directly and intimately confronted.”74 Baillie goes on to say that because of this
real and immediate presence and therefore awareness of God, it is entirely inappropriate
to indulge in theoretical discussions about whether or not God exists. He concludes,
The unreality and impropriety of the theistic arguments lie in the fact that they all
start from a possible atheism. They start from a situation in which God is not yet.
But there is no such situation, if it be true that in every moment I am called upon
to obey His holy will—and that I have been called upon from the beginning.
Atheism is not a prior situation which theism must presuppose, but a situation
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which itself presupposes the theism of a world already challenged by the
revelation of God in Christ.75
This intimate confrontation with God is the reason why, for Baillie, Aquinas’ religious
epistemology (and all those subsequently built from it) must be mistaken, for it does not
connect God’s immediate presence with our knowledge of him. Thus Baillie claims that
God is not only the ground of all being, an assumption shared by most Christians, but that
he is also the ground of all knowing.76
Baillie confesses he is uneasy with being at odds with the strong Thomistic
theological tradition, but finds this uneasiness settled by the fact that Aquinas’ religious
epistemology is rooted in Aristotelian epistemology and a neo-Platonic view of God’s
hiddenness.77 He suggests that if one does not share Aquinas’ presuppositions, then there
is no reason why one must feel beholden to his conclusion that our knowledge of God is
inferential and analogical. There is an alternative strain of medieval neo-Platonism,
however, in which Baillie’s thought finds some resonance. This alternative strain, found
in Bonaventure and Anselm, allows for some vision of God in this life apart from special
miracle. Baillie claims this alternative tradition for his own position. About Bonaventure
Baillie writes,
He holds not only that the ecstatic experience of God is the crown of the religious
life on earth, but also that some direct knowledge of God is native to every human
soul prior to the construction of all arguments to prove His existence. Such
75
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arguments, he explains, may indeed be constructed, but they are never the real
point of departure. God is indeed knowable to us through the things which He has
made (per creaturas), but He is still more clearly known to us through His
presence (per praesentium) and in Himself (quantum est de se). He is ‘most truly
present to the very soul of man and is in that fact already knowable’. He is indeed
far enough removed from us in the order of being, yet He is directly present to us
in the order of knowledge.78
Baillie contrasts Bonaventure with Aquinas. Both, he acknowledges, affirm that there is
a difference between the knowledge we have on earth and that which we have in heaven,
but Bonaventure doesn’t insist that this difference involves two different kinds of
knowledge or vision.
Most of Baillie’s focus in the first four chapters of Our Knowledge of God has
been in making the case that we do, in fact, have direct, immediate knowledge of God.
And though he has made a strong effort to show that God is not known through inference
of the world known by the senses, Baillie does want to reconnect knowledge of God with
knowledge of the world under a different model.
We do not know God through the world, but we know Him with the world; and in
knowing Him with the world, we know Him as its ground. Nature is not an
argument for God, but it is a sacrament of Him. Just as in the sacrament of Holy
Communion the Real Presence of Christ is given (if the Lutheran phrase may here
be used without prejudice) ‘in, with and under’ the bread and wine, so in a wider
sense the whole corporeal world may become sacramental to us of the presence of
the Triune God. The conception of a sacramental universe thus expresses the
truth that lay behind St. Thomas’ natural theology, while being free from the
errors in which the latter became involved.79
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And here is the basis for Baillie’s unique understanding of our knowledge of God: “The
knowledge of God which we have on earth is of a kind that we cannot conceive to exist
apart from some knowledge of things.”80 For Baillie, then, the knowledge we have of the
material world is a means to knowledge of God, but this means is not by way of
inference. He reconstructs how we should view the role of our knowledge of the world
such that the world is the means by which God’s actual presence comes to us and is made
known to us. “God does not present Himself to us except in conjunction with the
presence of our fellows and of the corporeal world.”81 This reconfiguring of the
mediating role of our knowledge of the world produces Baillie’s unique contribution to
the theology of revelation. In other words, Baillie is not denying that our knowledge of
God is mediated by creation, but he wants to uniquely construct how we think about this
mediation: “The immediacy of God’s presence to our souls is a mediated immediacy.”82
An epistemology of the mediated immediacy of knowledge of God has several
important implications for how we view and engage the world; it means that we take
seriously our reflection on personal experience and on the community of which we are a
part. Both are means of God’s self-revelation. Baillie frequently looks back to his own
upbringing to see where God was reaching him through his parents and his childhood
experiences. In fact throughout the book, and particularly here where he is explaining
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what he means by a mediated and immediate knowledge of God, Baillie reflects on his
life to illustrate his theology of revelation. He identifies this first knowledge with an
awareness that he was not his own. He says this awareness came to him from the
spiritual environment of his home. Baillie’s parents lived in such a way as to
communicate to him that there was an authority, a demand, placed on them as well as on
their children. Their parenting pointed back to the authority they lived under. Speaking
of his mother, Baillie recalls, “I knew that she had a right to ask of me what she did;
which is the same as to say that I knew that what she asked of me was right and that my
contrary desire was wrong. I knew, therefore, that my mother’s will was not the ultimate
source of the authority which she exercised over me.”83 He also says that he was aware
that his family was part of a wider community also under this authority, an authority that
he knew was somehow connected to a larger story: “I knew that that story was somehow
the source of the authority with which I was confronted. I could not hear a Bible story
read without being aware that in it I was somehow being confronted with a solemn
presence that had in it both sweetness and rebuke. Nor do I remember a day when I did
not already dimly know that this presence was God.”84
Baillie includes reflection of his experience because growing up in a Christian
home and community and hearing the story of the bible were media through which God
first revealed himself to him. Baillie recalls the awareness not simply that God had
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revealed himself to the characters in scripture he heard about growing up, but that God
revealed himself in the stories of these people’s lives. He remembers, “As I read of his
calling and commanding them [i.e., the biblical characters], I at the same time found Him
calling and commanding me.”85 Baillie says, though, that it is not only the biblical
characters that mediated God to Baillie, but other stories had this effect, too. Baillie feels
comfortable broadening out the scope of the kinds of stories in which he finds the
presence of God because of his view of history. Regardless of its chronology, all stories
are either “BC” or “AD,” depending on how they relate to the center of history: Christ
himself. Thus Baillie finds the media for God’s self-revelation in people, past and
present, relationships and stories, whether fact or fiction. In short, all things under the
sun can mediate the direct presence of God.
As we have seen at several points by now, though Baillie distances himself from
one thread of Christian tradition, he is eager to show how his perspective harmonizes
with other threads in the tradition and the contemporary theological context. For
example, Baillie wants to see how his doctrine of mediated immediacy fits with Luther’s
teaching on mediation as taken up by Ritschlian and Barthian theologians, both also
deeply influenced by Kant. Baillie finds in Luther a kinship with Kant in that they both
warn against the attempt to know God through speculation. Luther states it differently,
though, calling such speculation a work contrary to faith. It is faith in Christ that yields
knowledge of God. Baillie writes:
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Christ is the Mediator not only of our reconciliation with God but also of our
knowledge of Him; though indeed the two are one, since the only knowledge of
God offered us is a reconciling, a saving, knowledge. A speculative knowledge of
God as He is in His naked majesty would not and could not save, but would rather
terrify and destroy. A saving knowledge, a knowledge that meets our situation as
regards conscience and justification and reconciliation, must be a veiled
knowledge. Such a veiled knowledge is given us in Christ.86
Here Baillie makes an important connection between soteriology and epistemology,
between knowledge of God as redeemer and knowledge of God at all. This connection is
strengthened by his agreement with Augustine and Luther that it is human sinfulness that
clouds our vision of God. In contrast, Baillie observes that Aquinas linked the very
nature of humanity itself to the limitation it has of seeing God, “so that even an unfallen
human knowledge of God must have been only inferential in character.”87 Therefore
Baillie makes the following observation about the most significant mediation of God’s
presence to us—Christ himself:
When Luther affirms that Christ is the Mediator of the knowledge of God, he does
not mean that we argue from Christ to God; he means that it is in Christ that we
see God. We see Him veiled and humiliated, but it is nevertheless God that we
see. The kind of directness for which we have contended in our knowledge of
God is thus not at all interfered with, but is rather implemented, by the fact of
Christ’s mediatorship. This is what I have tried to express in the conception of a
mediated immediacy. In Christ we know God not by argument but by personal
acquaintance. In Christ God comes to us directly.88
Baillie’s position on the knowledge of God mediated through Christ is defendable from
scripture. For example, John 14:5-14 records Jesus assuring his disciples that in him they
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have seen and know God the Father. Jesus said, “Anyone who has seen me has seen the
Father.”89 Just as God become a human in order to illuminate himself to his wayward
creation, so Baillie understands that God’s presence in, with and under all of creation,
though fallen, is still mediated through what he has made.
Finally, Baillie defends the use of “vision” to express the directness of our
knowledge of God. First, we are permitted the language of vision because it is language
that scripture uses (here he cites John 10:30; 14:11; 12:45; 14: 7-9). Second, we need not
feel beholden to Aquinas’ classification of two kinds of seeing that cannot intermingle;
instead, we can affirm the route that Bonaventure suggests—that there is one kind of
seeing that we now experience in a diminished way. Third, Baillie affirms what was at
his time the new movement in eschatology affirming a realized eschaton. To be sure, we
still await the time when the veil will be lifted and we will see God clearly, but even now
we are able to enjoy the deposit of this promise that has been made.90
Chapter Five: “The Other Who Is Most Near”
In the scholarship regarding the nature of our knowledge of the other, relatively
recent in his day, Baillie finds some helpful parallels and insights to the study of the
nature of our knowledge of the divine other. There are three trends in this contemporary
epistemological movement that Baillie focuses on and in which we can see
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commonalities with his own religious epistemology. First, the older view that our
knowledge of others comes solely through inference is challenged by this new
epistemology. No longer is it assumed, based on my knowledge of myself and my
observation of external bodies that appear to function as I do, that I infer that these bodies
are subjects like me. Second, the element of directness or immediacy that exists in our
knowledge of others is logically, though not chronologically, a priori in nature. We do
not gain knowledge of otherness prior to an encounter with an other; rather, it is in the
encounter with the other that we possess this concept. That is, the knowledge comes with
the experience. Third, the immediacy of our apprehension of others shows that there is
an innate social dimension in our consciousness. In other words, we have the requisite
epistemic apparatus to make sense of the encounter we have with others.
Baillie takes these trends in epistemology and utilizes them in his understanding
of our knowledge of God.91 While there are many comparisons to be made in our
knowledge of human others and the divine other, a significant point of difference that
necessarily qualifies our encounter with God versus our encounter with human others is
the fact that God is omnipresent. For Baillie, there are several epistemological
consequences to God’s omnipresence. First, just as God’s presence continually confronts
us, so his claim on us continually confronts us. Baillie puts it this way, “Again, just
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because God is the omnipresent Knower, His knowledge of us precedes all our
knowledge of Him, and His address to us precedes and conditions our address to Him,
which is therefore always in the nature of a response.”92 A second implication of God’s
omnipresence is that all things may be used by God to mediate his presence to us;
anything can be revelatory. Third, Baillie draws out from God’s omnipresence that it is
never wholly appropriate to speak about God in the third person as if he were not here
with us.93 A final implication of God’s omnipresence that Baillie urges us to take into
consideration is that atheism is an “artificial academic hypothesis” which has no place
when God is present to all people, and if it were to be the case that God is not at all
present to some, then arguments for God wouldn’t work anyway, as they would have no
grounding or basis in experience.
Having established that the omnipresence of God has significant epistemological
implications, Baillie examines the nature of the otherness of God. He observes that
Barth, Brunner and others have taken the route of Rudolf Otto—that God is wholly other.
Baillie identifies two ways by which we can express the otherness of something or
someone: something can be wholly other on the basis of numeric distinction or
qualitative resemblance.94 Baillie opposes contemporary theologians who would insist
that God is wholly other than us in a qualitative way, for this would require that sin
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would have entirely annihilated the image of God in humanity. As we saw earlier in the
book, Baillie opposes such a radical notion of total depravity. Baillie agrees that God is
wholly other in that he is wholly distinct from humanity. “Though not wholly unlike me,
He may yet be wholly distinct from me, wholly over against me, confronting me wholly
from without myself.”95 The image of God retained in humanity even after the fall means
that there is a likeness retained between humanity and God, but this shared likeness does
not mean there is also shared identity. Baillie cannot be accused of panentheism.
Baillie appreciates the effort of contemporary theologians who teach the absolute
otherness of God to correct the “excesses of nineteenth-century immanentism” by
returning to a proper understanding of God’s transcendence: “The question is whether the
situation can be righted only by taking refuge in the opposite extreme and denying that
there is any truth whatever in the thought of divine immanence. Is the relation between
God and the soul of man to be understood as an external relation merely? Is God in no
sense in the soul, but only presents Himself to the soul; just as you, my fellow man, are
not in me but only present yourself to me?”96 Again, Baillie appeals to humans as image
bearers in order to defend his thesis that God is not simply present to us externally, as
another person is. We were created from the stuff of the earth, which was created from
nothing—this testifies to our separateness, distinctness and otherness from God. But God
infused his human creatures with a soul and created us to bear his image. Baillie notes
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that this has typically been understood by Aquinas and others to mean that we imitate
God in his nature but do not participate in his nature at all.97 Baillie is concerned that this
perhaps does not take into account the omnipresence of God. He writes, “The reason
why it is difficult to regard the relation of man to God as merely a relationship between
two beings who stand over against each other (and are in that sense wholly other) is that
God appears in some sort to be present on both sides of the relationship. When I respond
to God’s call, the call is God’s and the response is mine; and yet the response is God’s,
too; for not only does He call me in His grace, but also by His grace brings the response
to birth within my soul. His Holy Spirit is the real author and originator, not only of His
address to me, but of my address to Him.”98 Baillie illustrates his point with further
appeal to his experience and prayer life.
Nearly all the blessings of which I have been the unworthy recipient—have come
to me through the free will of my fellow men, through my mother’s self-sacrifice
for my sake, through the kindness and generosity of a host of men and women,
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some teachers, some lifelong friends, some casual acquaintances and ‘ships that
pass in the night’. I thank them all, but I thank God too. For the same deed I
thank them both; and not for different parts or shares of it, as say the Synergists
and Molinists with their talk of concursus simultaneus; but I thank God for the
whole of it, and under God I thank them for the whole of it too. Moreover, what
is true of grace is true of inspiration. In the Bible it is God who speaks to us, yet
every word we read in it was also spoken—and thought and written—by man.99
In other words, God works in, with and under history, including its people and
relationships, to extend his grace to his people.
Baillie closes Our Knowledge of God by returning to the question of the proper
place of argument in religious epistemology. He has labored to show that we cannot
prove to others or ourselves that God exists, but we “may do something to persuade both
ourselves and others that we already believe in Him.”100 In fact, Baillie states that “it is
to this end that the whole argument of this book has been directed, and I must try now to
bring the matter to a head.”101 What follows is Baillie’s proposal, built on the premises
he has defended throughout the book, that the function of argument is to bring to selfawareness the knowledge of God one already has on account of the mediated presence of
God.

99

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 235.

100

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 240.

101

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 240.

95
According to Baillie, there is much to be commended in recent theology that
suggests the route to knowledge of God is found in our sense of the holy.102 Baillie
affirms that we do indeed share a universal experience of the holy, but he critiques any
development of this idea that would divorce a true sense of the holy from a sense of
moral obligation. Baillie claims that we all recognize something as holy, which we
revere and that a true sense of holiness is necessarily connected to a sense of duty or
expectation: “That which is truly holy to us all, and which calls forth reverence in us, is
always some loyalty, some standard, some principle, some ideal….Where we meet the
holy thing is always in some holy demand that is made upon our lives. What is holy to us
somehow resides in what we know we ought to be. Something is being asked of us,
expected of us, and it is at the source of that expectation that holiness lies.”103
At this point of intersection between holiness and morality, Baillie suggests what he
considers to be the only place for argument against atheistic positions. Such an argument
is designed to appeal to universal experience and common sense. The point of the
argument is to demonstrate that any recognition of an unconditional or absolute
obligation carries with it the necessary recognition that a holy God lies at the source of
the obligation.104 An argument toward this end would require two propositions: 1) “No
obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute,” and 2) “Since
102

From several theologians who have developed their epistemology around the idea of the holy,
Baillie takes Rudolf Otto to be representative and it is on him that he focuses his critique.
103

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 243.

104

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 244.

96
morality is essentially a function of personality, we can feel no moral obligation to an
Absolute who is not apprehended by us as a personal being.”105
Baillie further analyzes this sense of the holy and the reverence we feel in
response to it to signify our awareness that the claim being made on us is for our own
good. He writes, “For I believe that even those who think they do not believe in God do
nevertheless in some degree posses the knowledge, not only that something is being
demanded of them, and that this demand is fundamentally a demand that they should
accept something that is being offered them, but also that here is something for which it
behoves them to be thankful.”106 Baillie goes on, “The sentiment of gratitude implicitly
contains in itself the recognition of some being who has benefited us: and equally clear
that this being is implicitly recognized to be personal in nature.”107 This feeling of the
rightness of giving thanks is a strong indicator for Baillie that a person truly believes in
God in the bottom of her heart though such belief may be denied or uncertain with the top
of her mind. Thus we see clearly that when Baillie speaks about a belief at the bottom of
one’s heart, he means minimally the belief that there is a being who is both personal and
absolute who has made a claim on us for our own good and to whom we sense the
obligation to submit.
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All moral knowledge, then, is “a fruit of the vision of God,” according to
Baillie.108 Moral ideals reach us in our experience of the holy, and these ideals (for
example, justice, goodness, love) come to us not as observations of the actual but as
confrontation with the ideal. This means, contra Aquinas, that we do not reach such
ideals via eminentiae. We have these notions of the good and the just not because we
elevate and magnify something from our own experience, but because we have
encountered God.
Baillie writes, “All these conceptions we do certainly possess, yet it is clear that
we do not find them in ourselves or anywhere in the created world. Rather do we and all
creation stand condemned by being brought into the light of them. It must be then that
we have some direct knowledge of Another who is Uncreated and in whom these
qualities inhere. Such qualities are known, not a posteriori but a priori; which is to say,
being interpreted, that they are first seen not on earth but in heaven.”109 Baillie is critical
of the idea that one can mount up our finitude and brokenness and reach the conception
of infinite perfection. “To say that we gain the conception of perfect being by
‘comparing less perfect beings with more perfect’ is to forget that such a comparison
cannot itself be instated save by the aid of an already apprehended standard of perfection.
How can we say that this is more perfect than that unless we already know what

108

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 250.

109

Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 251.

98
perfection is? Surely there can be no reason for the adoption of so difficult a view apart
from the prior refusal to contemplate the possibility of direct knowledge of God.”110
In the beginning of Our Knowledge of God, Baillie set out to make sense of the
Apostle Paul’s claim that all people have some basic knowledge of God and are therefore
accountable for their response to him. Baillie saw that it was problematic to uphold this
biblical claim in the light of the theology of revelation expressed in the Barth-Brunner
debate. Using the Barth-Brunner debate as a starting point to address an influential trend
in contemporary theology of revelation, Baillie argued that the preacher can and must
assume a point of contact in any person to which the gospel message might take hold. He
built his case employing a moderate theology of depravity and defending the continuity
of the image of God in humanity even after the fall. He claimed that the retained divine
image means that there is a kind of knowledge or belief that all people have regarding
God, a belief visible in the fruit of people’s lives even when they deny such belief. The
retention of the image and its corresponding knowledge of God, Baillie argued, is made
possible by the fact that God stands in constant relation to each person by way of his
immediate, intimate presence mediated to us in the tapestry of our experience. Thus the
preacher’s gospel appeal ought not to take the form of argument by inference, as we see
in classical arguments for the existence of God, but by an appeal to one’s own experience
which, when reflected upon, ought to show that one already lives as though God exists.
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Assessment of Our Knowledge of God
The previous summary is intended to depict not only what Baillie argued in Our
Knowledge of God, but also how he argued it. The assessment of Our Knowledge of God
will include observations about some of the distinguishing features of his method,
highlight and comment on some of the unique ideas included in his argument, and distill
Baillie’s own view on the four theological issues identified as central to the BarthBrunner debate.
At this point, one of Baillie’s main goals in writing the book may be recalled, that
is, “to distinguish the true insight within each alternative from that blindness in it which
renders it insensitive to the insight of the other.”111 As stated earlier, this goal rightly
depicts not only Baillie’s approach to the Barth-Brunner debate, but also his engagement
with the whole history of theology, philosophy and religion. Thus the reward of a careful
summary of Baillie is the clarity to see how he both aligns himself with and departs from
various threads within the Christian tradition and which philosophical insights he utilizes
in support of his argument. It is interesting to observe what sources Baillie appeals to in
order to substantiate or give weight to his position.
For example, in the fourth chapter in which he introduces the idea of God’s
mediated immediacy, Baillie finds common ground in both Descartes and Kant that he
claims in defense of his view—that is, the directness of the knowability of God. Baillie
repeatedly takes up his critique of Aquinas as the father of inferential religious
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epistemology. Baillie says something interesting in the second chapter in his discussion
of nature and grace that can illuminate for us why he feels comfortable mining modern
philosophy to defend his position against a Christian tradition begun in a medieval era.
He claims “that everywhere there is some truth; that this truth comes originally from
God; and that this truth, great or little, is usually mediated to the soul, neither by a
spiritual miracle nor by the sheer efforts of individuals, but by traditions, schools, and
churches.”112 In other words, truth can be found anywhere among anyone. This is why
Baillie appeals to sources from a variety of disciplines and times throughout his book.
Baillie is aware, however, that taking on an established tradition is not inconsequential.
He takes this step with care. Chapter four highlights a tension Baillie maintains in his
approach to orthodoxy. On the one hand he takes the Christian tradition seriously and
confesses he is uneasy with being at odds with orthodoxy. But, on the other hand, he
finds this uneasiness eased when he is able to understand the reasoning or context behind
a position. He writes, “Now I am not myself so anti-Roman in sentiment that it can ever
be an entirely easy thing for me to find myself at variance with an important tenet of
medieval orthodoxy. Yet it sometimes happens that, if only I am able to discover what
were the influences leading to the adoption of such a tenet, the measure of its authority
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seems to be very palpably lessened.”113 In other words, ideas have pedigrees—and the
lineage of some ideas lessens their status.
Baillie even turns to his own experience to help illuminate or illustrate his
theology. Multiple times throughout the book, Baillie uses his experience to corroborate
a point he is making. We can assume he does this in part because he believes truth can be
found anywhere, and this would include oneself. We can also discern in this practice an
important value at work, namely, that our theology must make sense in light of our
experience. At several points throughout the book, as our summary shows, Baillie cites
his own story of growing up, encountering God and coming to faith to illustrate a point
he has made.
Baillie’s employment of different sources might cause some speculation about
how authoritative a role Scripture plays in his theology and argument. One might suggest
that only a hopeless relativism can be expected for our religious epistemology when such
an appeal to broad expressions of truth and personal experience are elevated and used.
But scripture plays a significant guiding role in the development of his theology and
argument. For example, Baillie describes his entire first chapter as being “concerned to
defend the view…that all men ‘are without excuse; because, though knowing God, they
have not glorified him as God nor given him thanks.’”114 Baillie seeks to defend this idea
that one is culpable for rejecting the known God against the theology of Barth. In other
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words, he is holding up other theology to the light of scripture. Another example is found
in chapter three in which he briefly surveys the epistemological assumptions in the Old
and New Testaments in contrast to Aquinas’. Baillie concludes, as already noted, “For
the New Testament as for the Old, God is One who is directly known in His approach to
the human soul.”115 These examples do not prove that Baillie held Scripture as an
authority above all others, but they minimally show that he looked to scripture as a
valued authority.
Several important ideas developed in Our Knowledge of God will be useful to
highlight in this brief assessment of Baillie’s work. These ideas will be examined, not in
the order that they are introduced in the book, but in an order showing the construction of
Baillie’s idea of the revelatory significance of the mediated immediacy of God’s
presence.
The omnipresence of God is a fact essential to Baillie’s theology of revelation and
he insightfully assumes that there must be an epistemological consequence to God’s
presence. If God is everywhere, then one’s opportunity to encounter him is just as
boundless as he is. Baillie’s idea of the continuous confrontation of God is grounded in
God’s omnipresence. If it is God’s nature to be present in all places, then it follows that
God is present always in all places. His presence is not, however, a passive presence.
God’s presence is not like a sleeping cat in the corner of a room, whose presence one may
or may not take notice of. God’s presence demands notice because it is conveyed to us in
115
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the manner of an expectation placed upon us. It is a presence waiting for a response, a
conversation not yet finished.
Another idea grounded in the omnipresence of God is Baillie’s thesis that we have
direct knowledge of God. God’s self-revelation is a personal encounter and is not instead
a propositional conclusion we draw based on logical inference. This directness is not
only rooted in God’s nature, but in human nature as well. Baillie identifies human nature
with the image of God it bears, and he understands this image to be shaped by the
continuous presence of God. In other words, we are made to know God and have the
capacity to perceive him—a capacity sufficient enough to both perceive him and then
reject him. Baillie’s insistence on immediacy in our knowledge of God should not be
misunderstood as rejection of mediation. Baillie affirms that our knowledge of God is a
mediated knowledge, but he wants to qualify the nature of this mediation. Our
knowledge is not mediated by inference, that is, the mediation with which we have to do
here is not rooted in our capacities for logical inference, for rightly perceiving and
piecing together the clues to God in creation. On the contrary, the mediation of God’s
immediate presence is rooted in God’s ability to utilize anything in any place and at any
moment for revelatory impact.
Another important implication of God’s omnipresence and the mediated
immediacy of his self-revelation is that God is not only present to us but is in fact present
in us. God not only works in, with and under things outside of ourselves to reveal
himself, but he works in, with and under us, too. God is on both sides of the revelation
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equation, that is, he is on both the transmission and reception sides. The insight of
Baillie’s doctrine of the mediated immediacy of God’s self-revelation and its relevance
for today’s theology will be the focus of chapter five of this dissertation, in which
Baillie’s theology of revelation will be assessed and utilized.
Two interesting points which have come to characterize Baillie’s theology
developed out of his defense of the mediated immediacy of God’s self-revelation. First,
as a result of articulating the continuous confrontation with God to all people at all times,
Baillie had to develop a theology of faith that would make sense of how it is that people
could both have a knowledge of God they are held accountable for and suppress such
knowledge to the degree that they experience ignorance of God. To this problem Baillie
developed the memorable and somewhat complicated distinction of believing God at the
top of one’s head and believing him at the bottom of one’s heart.116 Belief at the bottom
of one’s heart refers to the knowledge of God that all people have. It is the most
primitive knowledge of God that consists mainly of the belief that God is, that he is
personal and that he has a rightful claim to one’s life. This is the knowledge people are
universally held accountable to and it is this divine claim that people reject. This
knowledge characterizes us as human beings and part of being an image bearer of God.
Baillie’s distinction between belief at the bottom of the heart and top of the head is
important to him because he asserts that many people live in a way that affirms the belief
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in their hearts but who then articulate their beliefs in ways that deny God. In many cases
this denial is moral and therefore a culpable denial of God, although Baillie wants to
leave room for the “honest intellectual doubt” that may exist without a rebellious motive.
Thus Baillie’s theology of faith takes seriously the fruit born, that is, the life lived in
addition to the commitments made. For Baillie, nothing is more offensive than the
hypocrisy of the person who denies God in the bottom of her heart while committing to
him with the top of her head.
A second point of Baillie’s theology, which was developed in his defense of the
mediated immediacy of God’s self-revelation, is his strong argument against the tradition
of inferential knowledge of God. In the end, the character of the knowledge of God
Baillie argues for has the quality of innate knowledge in that it is something that is part of
the experience of being human, but he distances himself from this description. He finds
in both inferential and innate knowledge theories a static rather than dynamic view of
God’s self-revelation. Baillie spends much of his time showing the deficiencies of the
inferential view because he clearly felt this was the prevailing view and the context into
which he was positing his view.
Finally, we will briefly summarize Baillie’s own view on the four theological
issues identified as central to the Barth-Brunner debate. The position one takes on these
four issues significantly impacts the direction one’s theology of revelation takes.
Baillie’s view on some of these topics will continue in the next chapter as we examine his
theology of revelation as expressed in Our Knowledge of God in light of other published
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works and various unpublished divinity lectures. On the question of the extent of sin,
Baillie takes a less radical view than Barth and Brunner. He describes sin as it targets the
image of God, specifically the human conscience, which he describes as being deformed
by sin.117 Sin does not obliterate the image of God in humanity but disfigures it. With
the image of God still intact, though damaged, Baillie says that what God does with it in
salvation is not creation ex nihilo but a re-creation, which suggests that there is continuity
between the old and new natures. If there is continuity between the pre- and postsalvation states of people, then there exists a revelatory point of contact in the fallen state.
That is, there is some residue of the image of God remaining in people to which the
gospel makes its appeal. And as Baillie identifies the image of God with the human
capacities of conscience, reason and religion, it is in these three broken areas of sinful
humanity that the gospel message ought to be directed to make the most of the continuity
that exists. In his rejection of absolute depravity, Baillie likewise rejects the absolute
severance between nature and grace. This means that when the gospel is embraced by an
unbeliever the knowledge that was once buried at the bottom of the heart, perhaps, under
different belief at the top of the mind surfaces and is embraced—it “comes home,” as
Baillie puts it.
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Conclusion
This chapter has contextualized and examined John Baillie’s theology of
revelation in Our Knowledge of God. Special note has been made of his method of
mediation between various positions and sources, and several important building blocks
in his theology of revelation have been identified along with his position on some central
doctrines involved in the Barth-Brunner debate. The next chapter will trace the trajectory
of Baillie’s thought through some key published manuscripts spanning over thirty years
and examine how his theology of revelation plays a formative role in some other key
points of theology, as articulated in his unpublished divinity lectures.

CHAPTER THREE
The Early Years of the Journey: A Study of Baillie’s Theology of Revelation
Leading up to the Publication of Our Knowledge of God
This chapter will identify the more outstanding points of continuity and
discontinuity which will further illuminate Baillie’s theology of revelation. Examination
of Baillie’s thought expressed in the unpublished course lectures, published articles and
manuscripts predating the publication of Our Knowledge of God will be mined and
analyzed in order to frame a context for his mature thought on revelation. This
contextualization provides a long view of the continuity and discontinuity in Baillie’s
own thinking about the topics he addresses in Our Knowledge of God.

There are at least

four major points in Baillie’s thought which can be identified and traced through his early
writing and teaching prior to the publication of Our Knowledge of God: 1) the revelatory
presence of God, 2) the universal human moral experience as the context for faith, 3) the
defensible logic of faith, and 4) the revelation of God in, with, and under human
experience of the world and others.
A careful reading of his written corpus reveals that the germ of many ideas (and
sometimes even specific phrasing) expressed in Our Knowledge of God is already found
in his thought a decade, sometimes two, prior. A wide reading of Baillie’s work also
reveals a common practice of his to engage his own past writing by taking note of where
he has elsewhere discussed a particular idea and admitting when he has departed from his
previous expression of it. Both these elements of continuity and discontinuity strongly
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suggest that Baillie wrote with his own corpus in mind and that he critically reflected on
it. In some cases, such a striking similarity of thought, sequence or expression can be
found between different documents that it can only be concluded that he utilized the
earlier writing in the drafting of the later. The cases where this similarity is found
confirm that there are some ideas Baillie unwaveringly maintained throughout his career,
both in substance and expression. The most helpful piece about the contextualization of
Baillie’s thought comes from seeing the building blocks of his theology constructed and
configured in a variety of ways intended for a variety of audiences and serving a variety
of theses.

Early Journal Articles, 1912 - 1926
Baillie’s publishing career began before he took his first teaching post at Auburn
Theological Seminary in New York in 1919. In this section the six articles Baillie
published prior to the publication of The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul are briefly
examined for their contribution to his general theology of revelation. Specific attention is
paid to how each article addresses some of the themes found in Our Knowledge of God.
Decades before he would respond to the Barth-Brunner debate and specifically to
Barth’s denial of a point of contact for revelation, Baillie published a brief article
responding to the psychology of the subliminal consciousness made popular in the
theology of religious experience by William James and others. In his first article, “The
Subliminal Consciousness as an Aid to the Interpretation of Religious Experience”
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(1912), Baillie rejects the idea that there is any gain in relegating God’s presence and
revelatory work to the subliminal aspect of human experience. In his response we
observe several things that deepen our understanding of what Baillie presented in Our
Knowledge of God. First, it is notable that at this early date Baillie is critical of the
notion of a single point of contact, which suggests both a narrow human function or
capacity along with a narrow time frame by which God reveals himself to a person;
instead, he advocates for the idea of a “continuous, omnipresent indwelling” of God in
the whole person.1
The whole soul is God’s house, and if He dwells in any part of it rather than
another, it is not in its underground crypts and cellars, but in its loftiest and
clearest chamber. It is never anything but confusion that makes us seek for God
in the occult and the unfamiliar and the exceptional, instead of in the open spaces
of our everyday ethical and spiritual life. And there is nothing in the nature of the
sense of the presence of God, which should tempt us to locate its springs in a
subliminal region. It may take a subtle psychology to analyze it completely, but it
should be obvious that it [i.e., the sense of the presence of God] is from beginning
to end ethical; that it is with us most in our clearest moments; and that it takes its
rise, not in dim, instinctive, semi-cerebral psychoses, but in the fullest light of
human intelligence.2
Baillie’s position in this article shows that, from a very early point in his career, he 1)
connected the continuous presence of God with the divine self-revelation, 2) understood
this presence not as something cryptic but as exposed and commonplace such that
revelation is woven into the fabric of the everyday, and 3) associated the moral realm of
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John Baillie, “The Subliminal Consciousness as an Aid to the Interpretation of Religious
Experience,” Expository Times 24 (1912): 355.
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life, in particular, with divine revelation. It will be shown that these three points,
articulated already in 1912, are found to be affirmed, although continually nuanced, as
Baillie’s thought progresses.
In a 1915 article, “Belief as an Element in Religion,” Baillie addresses a widely
held conception concerning the nature of religion.3 This article was published during the
time when Baillie had joined the YMCA and was stationed with the British armies in
France. Though the post-war studies of the common person’s religion had not yet been
published (these started to be published around 1918), the article does reflect his
exposure to and observation of the kind of attitude toward Christianity and confessional
religion in general that was later documented.4 Baillie summarizes the common person’s
view of religion:
For the ordinary man religion is not so much a matter of belief as a matter of
practice. A man’s religion, and therefore his worth in God’s eyes, depend, not on
what things he believes, still less on what things he says he believes or thinks he
believes, but entirely on what things he does and on the spirit in which he does
them. To give full assent to all the articles of a creed is not religion; but to go
through life, as Jesus went through life, in a spirit of unselfishness and brotherly
kindness, in devotion to the highest ends, in willingness to learn the discipline of
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One of the subjects of study Baillie takes up in his articles, manuscripts and lectures is the study
of religion. Here he engages the study of religion as distinct from the study of Christianity and even of
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sorrow, in repentance and perseverance, in the love of simple and noble things—
that is pure religion and the only true essence of Christian piety.5
This position developed, Baillie asserts, in reaction to a situation in which creedal
affirmation was viewed as coterminous with true religion. Baillie concedes that the role
of belief, and orthodoxy in particular, has been mismanaged in the past, but he is not
willing to demote its function in religion altogether. Particular belief is what makes
religion distinct from morality. There are some beliefs that are essential to true religion;
for example, “there is no absurdity in saying that a belief in the moral government of the
world is a necessary condition of man’s highest spiritual welfare.”6 In fact, since people
were interested in emulating the life of Jesus, Baillie points out that it was Jesus who
taught a particular view of God and the world and that he actually supported this view by
means of argument. Baillie gives a couple of examples of Jesus making his case using an
argument from analogy in, for example, the parable of the prodigal son: “The argument
rests upon the idea that our surest clue to the nature of God is to be found in the highest
region of our own experience. And the object of the story is to bring home to the minds
of Jesus’ hearers that there is nothing nobler in human life than a father’s unconditional
forgiveness and undying love; and so to press home the conclusion that it is in terms of
such love and such forgiveness that we must think of God.”7 Notice again the
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assumption of God’s self-revealing presence being made known through the moral
experience or observation of a human father’s unconditional love.
Baillie describes the arena of God’s self-revelation in terms of “the loftiest and
clearest chamber”8 of the human soul and “the highest region of our experience.”9 These
expressions can be understood to refer to the everyday experiences of human life and
relationship on which we are able to reflect. In so doing, he insists belief plays a
necessary role in religion. Here, though, belief is not understood as mere intellectual
assent to doctrinal propositions. To be sure, belief has content, but it is seen to arise out
of meaningful, memorable experience and not simply dogmatic tradition. He makes this
case particularly in contrast to the Schleiermachian promotion of an inarticulate feeling as
the seat of religion; Baillie continues to develop his idea of religion with appreciation for
but ultimately in contrast to Schleiermacher’s religious feeling of absolute dependence.
Specifically, it is in his publications, The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and
The Interpretation of Religion (1928) that Baillie delineates his view of religion as a
mediation between rationalism and romanticism.10
In 1920 Baillie delivered the inaugural address at Auburn Theological Seminary,
where he had newly accepted the Chair of Christian Theology. He took this opportunity
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to survey “the present tendencies of theological enquiry” and offer a glimpse of his
teaching task.11 Using material that can be found, in recognizable form, in some of his
lectures, Baillie begins his address with a brief summary of the origins of theological
inquiry. Baillie understands the systematic approach to theology to be rooted in Greek
philosophy. Medieval theology attempted to synthesize Christian theology and Greek
philosophy. Though the Reformation introduced many changes to the church and its
theology, Baillie says, it still upheld the authority of Scripture and the church’s tradition.
A new time of theological inquiry, in which Baillie saw himself living, came through the
contributions of Schleiermacher and Kant. He explains the distinctiveness of this new era
in terms of “the changed attitude towards ecclesiastical and scriptural tradition.”12
According to Baillie, a common ground between the old and new eras is the affirmation
that knowledge of God comes through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the human
heart. The difference lies in what the Spirit is testifying to. In the past, it was understood
that the Spirit testified to the authority of scripture and/or the church. “Thus, for all
practical purposes, the sole source of religious knowledge became for the Protestant the
ipsissima verba of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, and for the Roman Catholic the
excathedral utterances of the Roman Pontiff. And the whole modern impulse to the study
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of religion comes from the breaking up of these two external authorities: in other words,
from our regained conviction that the testimony of the Spirit of God in the heart of man is
granted not to the Pope alone but to all men, and bears witness to more and other things
than the inerrancy of our sacred books.”13 What are these “more and other things” to
which the Spirit testifies? Those things found in the realm of human experience.
Furthermore, according to Baillie, when reliance on the historical narrative
provided by an authoritative scripture or tradition gave way, theology turned to
philosophy and psychology to discern the source of knowledge of God. Baillie’s
criticism of philosophical theology as an alternative source is that “it [philosophical
theology] has thought it possible to proceed from nature to God, as if the divine in nature,
instead of being discoverable only to the man who had already found the divine in his
own soul, could itself be the premiss from a consideration of which one is first able to
rise to a sure knowledge of God.”14 This early criticism of philosophical theology set the
stage for Baillie’s rebuke in Our Knowledge of God of the ministerial reliance on logical
arguments for the existence of God for the purpose of engendering faith.
As Baillie’s thought advances, he writes more narrowly about the kind of human
experience in which God is revealed, though the idea of religion’s root in morality had
been part of his theology since he began to study philosophy. Baillie more deeply
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develops the revelatory association between religion and morality in “The True Ground
of Theistic Belief” (1922). Here he claims that the origin of religion lies in the human
conscience. Baillie contends that it is moral conscience that has been at the root of
religious belief for all people of all ages. He writes, “The reason why man believes in
God is that he cannot think out the meaning of life along the lines of the clue given him
in his sense of moral value without supposing God’s existence. In this way the human
conscience seems inevitably to create for itself a cosmic setting or context. Our
contention is that this is the real and fundamental source of all truly religious belief in
God.”15 Baillie develops this relationship of moral conscience with the root of religion
further in The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul and The Interpretation of Religion in
what he calls the “logic of faith.” An early expression of this logic of faith, however, is
found in “The True Ground of Theistic Belief.” Baillie writes, “That a completely cogent
logical connection [between morality and religion] exists and may be discovered and
stated, it seems impossible to doubt. That by the mere statement of it we should ever be
able to persuade men to believe in God, it seems vain to hope. Vain, and surely also
wrong-headed; for nobody who is wise thinks that men can be argued into religion.”16
Here, as later, Baillie insists that there is a logic to faith, and therefore an argument may
be made in defense of faith. But Baillie is careful here to emphasize the point, as he does
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elsewhere and throughout his career, that the logical basis or even defense for belief does
not itself become a source of belief. This same point is articulated and argued in Our
Knowledge of God.
At the close of his article on the ground of belief, Baillie employs an illuminating
analogy to illustrate his point that logical arguments cannot function as the origin of
belief. “Reasons can be given by the musical theorist why a Symphony of Beethoven is
more beautiful than some orchestral ‘Selection’ from the latest musical comedy,” Baillie
writes, “Yet if someone tells us that, having heard both, he prefers the musical comedy,
we know that it is hopeless to try to convert him by setting before him what we take to be
the true laws of melody and counterpoint, and arguing from these. We can only hope that
a longer and wider musical experience will lead him to understand.”17 This analogy
suggests several interesting points. First, it is claimed that Beethoven is more beautiful
than the orchestral piece, regardless of what one’s opinion of the matter is; similarly,
though Baillie roots religion in the subject’s experience, he still maintains that there is an
objective reality to religion. Second, it is claimed that a person likes the music that she
likes, apart from reason or argument—she simply receives certain music as pleasing;
similarly, Baillie suggests that belief is immediate and intuitive, as opposed to something
that can be argued into place. Third, one must “hear” the music differently on his own,
Baillie claims, and this change comes about through greater musical exposure and

17

Baillie, “True Ground of Theistic Belief,” 52.

118
training; similarly, because belief is not grounded in argument in the first place, it is not
through mere argument that one’s belief can be altered.
In other words, Baillie suggests by his analogy that the beauty of Beethoven can
be compared to the truth of God’s self-revelation. Beethoven is intrinsically, objectively
and arguably beautiful, says Baillie, though it may not necessarily be experienced as such
when one has not the means (training, exposure, etc.) of perceiving it. So, for Baillie,
God’s truth of self-revelation is a reality, an encounter-creating experience, in which one
will either embrace or reject the God encountered. One’s response can be shaped in some
sense by her context and exposure (which Baillie understands to be both humanly and
divinely shaped). But just as one cannot be persuaded to find beauty in music when it
simply is not experienced, so one cannot feel the weight of truth in God’s self-revelation
if is not perceived by her as such. These implications drawn from Baillie’s music
analogy creatively express his thought well and can be observed in his theology over the
course of his career.
It is helpful to take advantage of the perspectives Baillie sometimes expressed
regarding the function of both a theological education and the theological educator as
well as the task of the minister in the modern world.18 Just a few years into his first
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position as Chair of Christian Theology at Auburn Theological Seminary in New York,
Baillie wrote an article on “The Fundamental Task of the Theological Seminary.”19 In
this article his analysis of how the church and its gospel ministry are positioned in the
west informs his idea of how the modern minister should be prepared. Baillie identifies
two groups, which he refers to as the “intellectual class” and “the masses,” that have been
alienated from the church. In his assessment, the intellectual class has distanced itself
from the church, in significant part, because the church is no longer among the leadership
of the intellectual community; it is assumed that “the ministers who represent the Church
in their city are second-rate men with second-rate minds.”20 The masses, too, have an
intellectual skepticism that has estranged them from the church.21 Baillie observes that
the masses are doing their own thinking and are unconvinced that the Church provides
meaningful answers to the great questions and problems of life.22 Between what might
be called the snobbery of the intellectual elite and the skepticism of the common person,
Baillie concludes that the church is facing a critical situation.
19
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Given the situation, Baillie asks, should the theological seminary prepare men to
be priests or scholars? 23 That is, should their education have a vocational or intellectual
emphasis? Baillie answers “yes”: “If history has taught us anything, it has taught us that
within Western civilization the priest is not likely to be effective, if he is not a scholar
too.”24 He does not deny the value of vocational training, but observes the supreme need
for intellectual training.
I believe that what the men of today are looking to the Church to provide is above
all things guidance—not comfort, not good-fellowship, not even religious
exaltation or inspiration, and certainly not either oratorical thrills or social
evenings, but light on the great puzzle of life. And I believe that if the Church
will but realize in a really enterprising way her role as teacher, she has a
magnificent future before her in our own generation.25
Baillie includes himself among the ministers he gently admonishes,
We ministers are far too apt to assume that the criticism passed upon us by the
society in which we live reflects rather the spiritual blindness of that society than
any shortcoming in ourselves. If the present age rejects our message, let us not be
content to mourn its loss of interest in the things of the soul, let us also ask
ourselves whether the food we are offering is suited—both in the manner and the
matter of it—to meet its real hunger.26
Baillie’s conviction that the minister’s task includes a diagnostic function manifests itself
throughout Baillie’s work. For him the gospel is relevant and it is the work of the
Christian minister to assess the shape of the contemporary need and craft the gospel

23

Baillie speaks exclusively of men as the recipients of theological education and the language of
the survey of this article reflects that exclusivity.
24

Baillie, “Fundamental Task,” 267.

25

Baillie, “Fundamental Task,” 272.

26

Baillie, “Fundamental Task,” 268.

121
message to fit the need. “We may hold that the gospel of Christ must meet every man’s
need, but that is not to say that our presentation of it must do so.”27 The unchanging
gospel must nevertheless be meaningfully expressed in a changing epistemic climate.
This understanding of the work of the minister leads Baillie to think carefully through the
good news that saves, the nature of the faith that takes hold of it, and the stumbling
blocks that prevent modern people from embracing it.
In this brief survey of Baillie’s early articles, several themes emerge and are
revisited indicating a focus and solidification in Baillie’s thought. In summary, the
articles show that Baillie long linked the presence of God with his self-revelation and
linked this revelation with the universal human experience of morality. From these
fundamental ideas emerged other ideas characteristic of Baillie’s thought. On the one
hand, because experience is the context in which faith arises, Baillie claims, no logical
argument for belief in God can be expected to function as a source of faith. On the other
hand, claiming experience as the context for the birth of belief does not negate there
being necessary and fixed content to belief. Baillie understood the moral experience,
universal to all humanity, likewise able to produce a universally conforming but simple
belief about a personal God and his love. Baillie described this connection between
moral experience and belief in God as “the logic of faith.” He makes is clearest and most
detailed argument for the logic of faith in his 1928 manuscript The Interpretation of
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Religion.28 This argument can also be found in an interesting article he wrote exploring
the nature of orthodox belief two years earlier.
In “The Idea of Orthodoxy” (1926), Baillie explores the root and development of
orthodoxy in Christian history: “At what period do we first discover any explicit
recognition of a duty to believe alongside the duty to serve and to worship and to obey?
When does the concern for purity of doctrine begin to take its equal place beside, or in
any degree to take the place of, concern for purity of worship and conduct?”29 Baillie
observes in Jesus, according to the gospels, a deep and abiding concern for righteousness
– in some cases this concern for righteousness appears even to trump a concern for right
belief about God. In support of this, Baillie cites two passages that emerge elsewhere in
his writings: Matthew 7:21 and Luke 6:43-45.30 But he insists that Jesus’ teaching
uniquely introduces into the history of religion a concern for orthodoxy, for right belief.
It is faith in God that alone saves and heals. And how should this right belief be
understood? In an important passage Baillie writes,
When, however, we inquire what exactly it is which Jesus has in mind when He
thus speaks of faith or belief, we are compelled to allow that for Him the primary
meaning of the word is not credence, but reliance: not assent to propositions, but
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trust in a personal Power. When He says, “Have faith in God,” His primary
meaning is clearly not that we should believe more about God, but that we should
put more trust in Him. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that in this
practical reliance upon God certain intellectual beliefs about Him are definitely
implied, and that Jesus was fully conscious of this implication. “The man that
draws near to God,” we read in Hebrews, “must believe that He exists and that He
does reward those who seek Him.” But Jesus would have said, no doubt, that
such utter self-surrendering trust as He demanded of men required a little more
theology still, namely belief, not merely in God’s existence and accessibility to
prayer, but also in His Fatherlikeness and Love.
The importance of this passage is that it clarifies, early on, Baillie’s affirmation of saving
belief as having propositions. But these propositions do not themselves have saving
power, as if by assenting to them one is saved; rather, these propositions are descriptors
which must be believed of the God who may be trusted to save.
Contrary to the liberal Protestant agenda of his day, Baillie asserts that there is
more to life and salvation than purity of heart. In fact, he says there are “truths which we
should think shame not to believe, truths which (as has been said) we have no right to
doubt.”31 The reason all people are constrained to believe certain truths is because such
truths are rooted in and derived from our universal human experience. In an abbreviated
form, Baillie argues for the logic of faith.
Religious faith begins in the conviction that, in doing my duty, I am doing what is
in the nature of things expected of me, filling a place that has been somehow
appointed me to fill, and so putting myself in line with the Eternal Purpose of
things. This sense of appointment or of vocation cannot, however, support itself
apart from the belief that the universe is not only alive, but also, at the heart of it,
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good; and thus the sense of duty rises through the sense of vocation to the sense of
the presence of God in our lives.32
While in this article Baillie makes a case for orthodoxy as opposed to mere
experientialism, he remains critical of the dominating role orthodoxy has come to have in
some Christian traditions. Baillie protests any tradition where faith has become a mere
exercise of the intellect, an “abstraction from its practical roots.”33

First Manuscripts: The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and The
Interpretation of Religion (1928)
Baillie’s first two manuscript publications indicate an early commitment to
addressing the questions and problems he takes up later in Our Knowledge of God and
even into the twilight of his scholarship. These two publications, The Roots of Religion
in the Human Soul (1926)34 and The Interpretation of Religion (1928)35 can be introduced
in tandem because they are so similar in content. The thinking that went into the
preparation of Interpretation of Religion occurred between Fall 1922 and Spring 1925
during Baillie’s professorship at Auburn Theological Seminary in New York.36 Roots of
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Religion was a compilation of five lectures delivered at the Midsummer Conference for
Ministers and Religious Workers at Union Theological Seminary in 1925.37 He
published the lectures the next year at the urging of others, making only a few changes to
the manuscript. Regarding his minimal editing of Roots of Religion for publication,
Baillie explains, “One reason which has kept me from attempting to recast and expand
the whole is that I have for some time been contemplating the publication, possibly at no
very distant date, of a larger work in which I hope to deal with some of the same
problems, as well as with some other problems, in a more detailed and technical
matter.”38 The larger work referred to here is, of course, what was published as
Interpretation of Religion. So these two books represent Baillie’s thought in his early
years at Auburn.
The main difference Baillie himself identifies between the two works is that one
is written at a more popular level and the other at a more technical level. In fact, Baillie
refers the reader, in his preface to Interpretation of Religion, to take up Roots of Religion
as a less labor-intensive alternative to the content found in Interpretation of Religion.
Without a doubt, Interpretation of Religion is Baillie’s longest and perhaps his most
technical work. Despite their commonalities, Roots of Religion should not be viewed as a
mere compendium of Interpretation of Religion. While they both take up to the same
of Theology,” one can find portions from almost every paragraph of the lecture in Roots and especially
Interpretation. See Appendix I for this lecture.
37
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subject, they reflect Baillie’s thought with different expression as they speak to different
audiences. Roots of Religion uniquely provides a clear view of the impact World War I
had on Baillie’s perspective of the context in which he was taking up the task of
theology.
The biographical survey in the first chapter of Roots of Religion noted that
Baillie’s experience in World War I had a significant impact on his life and thought.
While some of his very early work reviewed above shows that Baillie was thinking about
matters of revelation and the role of morality in religion during his pre-war years,
certainly his wide and extended exposure to people whose thoughts and religion were not
formed by the academy had a significant and formative impact on his thinking. The First
World War provided a unique occasion for Baillie and many others to witness the status
of religion in the life of the common person. “Not only was the army’s religion the
religion of the nation’s prime manhood, but it was the religion of that manhood when
face to face with the most searching and testing experience that had come to it for long
centuries.”39
Baillie concluded from this unique opportunity for observation that, for the
common army person (both British and American), the church and its absorption with
doctrine was viewed as antiquated and irrelevant. The cultural disinterest in the church,
however, did not appear to leave the population in a moral vacuum. In fact, there
appeared to be a conscientious cultivation of virtues that could be described as
39
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characteristically Christian, though not intentionally rooted in the Christian faith. On this
subject we can see in Baillie’s quotation of Neville Talbot’s Thoughts on Religion at the
Front what might well be an early expression of some ideas that have come to be
characteristic of Baillie’s own theology.
“Deep in the men’s hearts,” he says, “is the great trust and faith in God. It is an
inarticulate faith expressed in deeds. The top levels, as it were, of their
consciousness are much filled with grumbling and foul language and physical
occupations; but beneath lie the deep spiritual springs, whence issue their
cheerfulness, stubbornness, patience, generosity, humility and willingness to die.
They declare by what they are and do that there is a worth-whileness in effort and
sacrifice.” What the men are dumbly aware of,” he says again, “is that there is
something going on in the world which demands primary allegiance, and the
putting second of every self-interest. At the Front men hardly know what it is….
They only know—a wonderful majority of them—that something great and
righteous wants them and requires of them their help.”40
In this quotation Talbot makes a distinction between the conscious attitude toward faith,
God, and the church and the practical expression (if perhaps unintentional) of one’s
values and commitments. Specifically, what is observed is a kind of practical faith that
harmonizes with the life of Christian obedience, despite a conscious abandonment of the
Christian religion. Talbot also identifies these distinctions with the “top” versus the
“deep” parts of one’s conscious beliefs and intentions. This, of course, sounds very much
like Baillie’s language for faith at the top of the head and the bottom of the heart and
perhaps is the source of that expression.
Baillie is sympathetic with the notion found among the army that Christianity is
irrelevant due to its complexity.
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What our generation needs, in truth, is not to have the old religion replaced but to
have it re-interpreted. Religion, as we know it in the world, is a thing of infinite
variety, of endless ramification, of exceeding intricacy. Even Christianity may
seem to be the name, not of a simple view of life, but of a vast and complex
historical development; and there are many who have lost their way in its maze of
doctrines and sects. That is the real root of our trouble and I believe there is only
one way of meeting it—we must find our way back to the fountainhead. We must
make re-discovery, of the true centre of gravity in this accumulated mass of
tradition. We must dig down afresh to its deep foundations in human
experience.41
In response to this observation, Baillie targets Roots of Religion to address what religion
is, and specifically, to identify “where in the human soul lies the ever bubbling fountain
from which it springs.”42 This same task is taken up in Interpretation of Religion, but on
a much larger scale.
Interestingly, Baillie discusses the idea of “a special religious sense” under his
treatment of common misunderstandings of the nature of religion: “There are some
among us who, instead of using the language of feeling to explain religion, would use the
language of perception. Religion they would tell us, is, in essence, neither thought nor
feeling so much as immediate vision. It is possible, they say, to attain to a direct
perception of God’s presence, and that is surely all the foundation that religion needs.”43
Baillie is wary of this perception language used in reference to God and he concludes that
the language of perception ultimately misleads us into wrong notions of the nature of our
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knowledge of God. He allows that there is a way in which we perceive God, but
emphasizes that this perception is not sensual but spiritual in nature. In religion, we see
by the light of faith—and this marks an important point in Baillie’s theology in which he
links soteriology with epistemology, as is depicted in the following passage of Roots of
Religion.
Where the religious man differs from the non-religious man is not, if we speak
accurately, that he has seen something the other has not. God is not merely a
stark fact that we may or may not have happened to notice, or that may or may not
have happened to come our way; nor are there any objects present to the saint’s
perception which are not part of the common experience of us all. What is true is
rather that what the saint has seen means something different to him, something
immeasurably more. And why? The answer is tremendously significant…. It is
that he has a purer heart. “The pure in heart shall see God.”44
In his early writing, then, we see the fundamental commitment Baillie has to the
immediacy of God’s presence (God is present to all people, including those who perceive
him and those who do not), but he is yet wrestling with how to express this idea of
immediacy. This wariness of sensory perception language softened over the years;
Baillie’s final work was titled The Sense of the Presence of God. While Baillie always
wanted to make clear that God was not perceived through the five senses, he defends the
language of perception in The Sense of the Presence of God as a meaningful and close
analogy illuminating the nature of our faculty to receive and perceive God’s selfrevelation. Perhaps Baillie was uncomfortable with the language of senses to describe
God’s self-revelation because he didn’t want to suggest that in the same way that one can
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see a person who is before her when he is present and can no longer see him when he is
absent, so God is sometimes present to and absent from his creatures. Given that he
clearly stresses the importance of maintaining the omnipresence of God in our
discussions of the nature of our knowledge of God (as demonstrated in his 1912 article,
“The Subliminal Consciousness”), Baillie would be wary of language that might suggest
that one either does or does not know God depending on whether God shows up.
Having denied that perception of God is of a literally physically nature, Baillie
also navigates between a purely cognitive or affective understanding of the human
perception of the divine. In both Roots of Religion and Interpretation of Religion, Baillie
critiques rationalism and romanticism as opposing proposals of the origin and faculty of
religion. His assessment of rationalism and romanticism is very similar in both books,
with the assessment in Interpretation of Religion being much more technical. In Roots of
Religion he writes, “Rationalism seems to have been right in insisting that religion is
grounded in intelligent insight, but wrong as to the sources of that insight. Romanticism
seems to have been right in seeking a foundation for religion which should render it
independent of scientific and metaphysical speculation, but wrong in thinking to find
such a foundation in some region of the mind that lies below the level of reflective
thought.”45 The scientific method and metaphysical speculation are not the source of
religious knowledge and insight any more than mystical feeling or subconscious
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awareness. Mediating between these two proposals, Baillie suggests an alternative rooted
in an awareness of the relationship between reality and value, that is, the assurance that
even as we do our duty, we are aligning ourselves with God.46 This awareness is
cultivated when we commit ourselves to virtues like love and honor and courage; in such
commitment we sense that we are “striking the rock-bottom of reality and are lighting
upon the real key to the meaning and purpose of life.”47 It is our values, Baillie proposes,
that reveal God to us.
Baillie is careful to protect himself from the accusation that he is merely equating
morality with religion; while they are organically related to one another, they are not
identified with each other. How are they different? Morality has to do with values—that
sense we have of what is expected of us, of what is right, of what is dutiful. Religion
perceives from the fact of our moral consciousness, namely, that there is a reality that
expects something of us, that calls us to do what it right. This view of religion as a
relation of value and reality centers itself, Baillie writes in Interpretation of Religion, “in
the trustful assurance that our values are securely grounded in the real nature of things.”48
Conscience is the source of our moral ideals, but it provides no assurance that our
morality is not relative and insubstantial. For Baillie, it is a simple truth, verified by the
post World War I scholarship on religion, “that there is nothing of which man is more
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certain than of his primary moral values. Loyalty and love and honour, truthfulness and
purity and unselfishness—there is no knowledge of which I am surer…than that these
things are infinitely well worth seeking and that there is laid upon me an absolute
obligation to seek them.”49 Faith grounds morality in reality, in the “trustful assurance”
that morality is absolute and is formed in us out of a relationship to an absolute, moral
and personal being.
In linking religion with morality instead of identifying it with an intellectual
assent to religious propositions, rooting it in values and conscience instead of tradition
and teaching, Baillie universalizes religion. It is identified with our humanness, our
nature as moral beings. Faith provides assurance of things unseen, but morality is a firm
foundation, a certainty. Baillie puts it this way:
It may often seem impossible to know what to believe, but there is always
something which is worth doing, and which we know to be worth doing with an
assurance that constitutes an imperative practical claim upon our wills. The
search for the truth about the system of things of which we form a part is a long
and arduous one and it may have its moments of utter despair; but even when the
night of doubt and confusion is at its blackest, the values of right and noble
conduct still stand firm. No night of doubt can ever make it doubtful to the
earnest soul that it is right to be pure of mind and stout of heart, and, above all,
that it is right to help one’s fellow traveler out of the ditch.50
A strong Kantian influence can be identified in this line of thinking. By his own
testimony, Baillie’s thought was greatly shaped by his study of Kant. Specifically, the
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idea expressed in the quote above echoes a 1926 article in which Baillie defends the
Kantian ethic.
Our immediate duty is usually (Kant, with all the eighteenth century,
unfortunately said always) clear to us, or at least it is clearer to us than anything
else in life. No other certitude granted to mortals is as solid and firm as the
certitude of our immediate judgments of duty. On the other hand our ultimate
ideas, our views as to the ultimate nature of the summum bonum, are always
highly speculative and usually, no doubt, far enough from the truth. Here then is
an ethical fact of the first order of importance – that we may be utterly unable to
say what end we are living for, and yet in almost all concrete situations we are
clear enough as to where our duty lies. We do not deduce our working moral
code of duties and abstinences from a clearly conceived aim in life, but we try
rather to guess what the aim of life is from a consideration of what we know, by
more immediate means, to be right and wrong in various situations.51
Notice Baillie’s appeal here to what may be immediately known, namely, moral
obligation. It is in the immediacy of moral perception that Baillie identifies the
immediacy of God’s presence and our knowledge of him. Thus Baillie distinguishes
between a true and universal core of religion (this immediate perception) and its
historical trappings—the religious systems of belief and traditions.52
The value of conceiving religion in terms of moral experience, in contrast to
orthodoxy (right believing), is that the religious nature of all people is recognized. Baillie
disagrees with those who would suggest that persuasive argument can sow the seed of
religion in anyone. The seed of religion is present in our human make-up, in our moral
being. And as such, there is a point of contact (though he does not use this term until
51
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later) for religion. An appeal can be made to the experience people are already having in
their lives now, for Baillie understands there to be logical and necessary implications for
the fact of our moral experience. In Interpretation of Religion Baillie calls these steps of
thinking “the logic of faith;”53 the argument is as follows:
What faith, when squarely interrogated, seems centrally to insist upon is that in
our consciousness of duty, or of ultimate values, there is contained an authentic
intimation of the nature of the system to which we belong; and hence the only
proper apologetic for religion is that which sets out the logic of this insistence.
Perhaps there is no better way of setting it out than the very simple one of asking
what else it can mean to say that I ‘must’ do this or this, except that the nature of
things demands that I do it. Can any possible meaning be attached to absolute
obligation, or to ultimate value, if these are conceived as having no sanction in the
all-enclosing system? If I am right in feeling that it is absolutely demanded of me
that I be pure in heart, and just and honorable in all my dealings, then can this
mean less than that reality demands these things of me? And if reality demands
these things of me, then reality must be interested in moral value; it must have a
stake in the moral issue; it must be on the side of the good and against the
unworthy and the evil. But that is to say that it is a moral Being itself, not
indifferent to moral distinctions but, on the contrary, supremely sensitive to them,
and really and deeply caring whether good or evil prevails. The ultimate reality
must thus be One Who loves the Good.54
There are two important assumptions supporting this logic. First, Baillie believes there
are universal values that reflect an absolute obligation. Second, Baillie believes that the
weight behind that absolute obligation is the weight of reality – the existence of some real
thing that has the capacity to place such an obligation on another; on other words, God.
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As he puts it, “No obligation can be absolute which does not derive from the Absolute.”55
The fact that Baillie defends faith’s logic could lead one to think that he is attempting to
put forth a proof for God’s existence, but we must recognize that this is not at all his
intent. To this end, Baillie writes,
It is at least plain that such proof as there can be is no more than a drawing out
into more consciously deductive and syllogistic form of the thought-process that
is always present in religion itself. We can in no sense substitute, as the authors
of the old theistic proofs seemed to think themselves able to substitute, for the
train of reflection by which faith comes to birth in the soul another and different
train of reflection. On the contrary, the most we can do is to bring religion’s own
logic into sharper detail, with each successive step in it showing up more clearly,
than is commonly found necessary in religion itself.56
Religion has a logic, but that logic is not itself the seed of religion in all people; it is not
even the point of persuasion for belief in God. For Baillie, knowledge of God is an
awareness made possible by the immediate moral claim of God on all people. This
awareness can be brought into focus and defended by logical argument, but it cannot be
artificially manufactured.
Baillie understood early on in his career that there was a seed of religion in all
people, which he identified with the moral capacity of human beings. He likewise
understood that our moral capacity was not something static in us, but something that was
created by being confronted by the “moral Being” of the universe, that is, God. All
people have a conscience by which they experience moral obligation. God is the one
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behind this demand and to him all must respond and do respond by either doing the right
or rejecting it. All people are therefore in relationship to God, whether the relationship is
acknowledged or not. And while there is a logical argument that can demonstrate the
reasonableness of God, Baillie does not look to it as having any faith-forming capacity in
itself. Again, in Interpretation of Religion he explains,
Some sense of duty we all have, and therefore it is perhaps true to say that we are
none of us without the germ of faith in God; but it is in proportion as our sense of
duty becomes deepened and refined by the experience of life and by the practice
of progressive obedience to its behests that its fuller and diviner meaning comes
home to us with compelling power, and faith becomes triumphantly definite and
secure. The mere passive contemplation of the moral law never led any man to a
realisation of its deeper meaning, but only an active surrender to its everdeveloping demands. Argument is therefore here at its far-reaching disadvantage,
that it carries conviction only in proportion to the depth of each man’s moral
consciousness, and that in that same proportion it is likely to have been already
anticipated by the swifter processes of the intuitive understanding. For after all it
is not as if the logic of religion were a very elaborate process of deduction
requiring a clear head to follow it.57
Roots of Religion and Interpretation of Religion are undoubtedly Baillie’s most
Kantian publications, in terms of their expression. As the 1926 article shows, Baillie was
defending Kant at this point as having the superior, though still flawed, perspective on
ethics and religion. In these early books Baillie much more commonly uses the Kantian
terminology of morality than the religious language of sin and obedience. A shift in
expression toward the more religious can already be observed in Our Knowledge of God.
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Further, as chapter two of this dissertation describes, Baillie provides an extensive
critique of the limitations of Kant, though he retains his appreciation for what Kant
defended, namely, the thesis that what is known by faith cannot be made known by
scientific investigation.

The Interpretation of Religion in Retrospect
Among the many documents available for examination in the Baillie Papers there
is an interesting correspondence between David Cairns and Baillie beginning in the late
summer of 1930.58 Baillie’s private letters and published acknowledgements show that
he had a steady correspondence with friends and colleagues, and especially with his
brother Donald, regarding the public lectures and manuscripts in which he was investing
at any given time.59 In this 1930 correspondence between Cairns and Baillie, Cairns had
read Interpretation of Religion and was now giving his feedback to Baillie. Cairns
writes, “I go with you about all the way,” and then offers criticism, the substance of
which is evident in Baillie’s remarks. Baillie’s response to Cairns, in which he critically
reflects on his own writing and thoughtfully responds to Cairns’ critique, provides a
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priceless view into the development and progression of Baillie’s theology. There are
several points of interest to note from Baillie’s response which will bring into focus some
continuities and discontinuities of Baillie’s thought.
Baillie begins by admitting to Cairns that his thought has “moved on” since the
publication of Interpretation of Religion. The question is in what way his thought has
changed. It seems clear from this letter Baillie believes the substance of his thought
remains the same, though it has shifted in emphasis. Were he to write the book again
(and perhaps it can be said that he does, in some sense, take up this subject again in both
Our Knowledge of God and The Sense of the Presence of God), he would engage the
subject somewhat differently. Baillie puts it this way:
I am sure that a great deal of what you say in criticism is justified. As I have
stated in the Preface, the last words of the book were written 5 ½ years ago in
March 1925: so that although the book did not appear until the end of 1928, it
really represents the thinking of my first years in Auburn. My thought has moved
on since then, and I feel (it is no doubt a feeling which most authors have) that I
could make the book very much better, were I to begin to write it now afresh. Yet
I think the difference would be more in method of approach and in presentation
than in fundamental view—though many emphases would no doubt be changed.
But what I feel is that by using a different method of approach, and avoiding
certain false emphases, and bringing out certain aspects of truth which I had
previously rather neglected, I could make my central position and contention (to
which I still fully adhere) much more acceptable than I have actually succeeded in
making it.60
According to Baillie, five and a half years after writing Interpretation of Religion, he still
maintains his central position, though he would now state it differently. Later in the letter
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he admits to having expressed himself in “too Kantian a way,” and it is perhaps this
narrow form of expression that has led him to “certain false emphases.” And what is this
misplaced emphasis? In defending the logic of faith, he admits that it may have appeared
he was arguing that “we merely reached God at the end of an argument which started
from our moral experiences.”61 This linking of human morality with the seed of religion
lies at the heart of Cairns’ critique, which Baillie summarizes: “Your first doubt is
whether I am right in making ‘our consciousness of moral obligation the one spring of
religion,’ – whether in the constellation of faith there are not other elements, especially
‘the immediate awareness of God and of Christ of which the story of Christian biography
is so full.’”
Baillie answers Cairns by saying that he has “never for a moment held that
morality was the whole of religion.”62 If this misunderstanding has occurred because of
the way he argues for the logic of religion in Interpretation of Religion, then Baillie
admits he must not have balanced his argument well enough. Even so, he defends his
reason for the focus on morality.
When a corroding unbelief threatens to destroy the religious outlook in which we
have grown up, it is always upon our moral certainties that we are thrown back, as
upon our spirit’s last entrenchment. Our moral certainty we cannot doubt, even if
we doubt all else. This is really why I begin from our consciousness of moral
obligation – because, as a matter of fact it is the only point where many of my
students will let me begin, the only thing they will accept as a prime and initial
certainty on which further certainties may be built. There are many senses in
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which it would be false to speak of morality as the one spring of religion. In the
deepest sense – in the ordo essendi – rather is religion the one spring of morality.
That is, it is only because God is in our hearts that we have a moral
consciousness. But the main sense in which it would be true to say that morality
is the one spring of religion, is that it is the one unshaken πού στω from which ,
upon which, a disturbed faith may be rebuilt. To me, morality is not a thing
separate from religion, but a part of it.63
According to Baillie, then, there is such a corrosion of religious certainty, at least in the
American culture in which he has been teaching that he finds it necessary to make his
case for a more robust faith in God starting with a narrower slice of common ground than
he would like.
Baillie pushes against Cairns’ suggestion that one’s consciousness of moral
obligation is somehow distanced from an immediate awareness of God. For Baillie,
moral consciousness, despite the fact that some would identify it as separate from
religion, is actually a deeply religious experience. Baillie writes, “To me (as I put it on p.
462 of my book) ‘In the experience of moral obligation there is contained and given a
knowledge, not only of a Beyond, but of a Beyond that is in some sort actively striving to
make itself known to us and to claim us for its own.’ Of course the experience of
obligation is not the only moral experience in which I find the direct impingement of the
Spirit of God upon my own spirit.”64 Baillie goes on to identify other moral experiences
by which God makes himself known: the sense of guilt, the impulse to repent and confess
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wrongdoing, the attraction to goodness, purity and honorable self-sacrifice. Each of these
is a moral experience, Baillie says, and they are
but gratia irresistibilis dei making itself felt within our souls…. These, to me, are
all personal experiences. And when you ask whether besides the moral
experiences there are not in the constellation of faith other elements, notably “an
immediate awareness” of God, I reply that the awareness which I have here, and
the touch with God which I have here, is to me as immediate and direct and even
personal as any that can be conceived. If you want an awareness of God more
immediate than this one, you are (I should feel) doing less than justice to the
immediacy of this one.65
So Baillie clarifies, in light of Cairns’ critique, that the experience of moral obligation is
the experience of God’s grace at work in people’s lives. “My real position,” Baillie
explains, “has always been rather that God is actually and immediately present to us in
our moral experience.”66 This is an important thesis in Baillie’s thought that is made
more explicitly in Our Knowledge of God, and which is perhaps somewhat shrouded in
Interpretation of Religion by its notably Kantian expression and strong argument for the
logic of faith.
Though Baillie does not maintain that morality is the whole of religion (as Cairns
wonders), he does argue that religion is the whole of morality. He says, “Our moral
experience is but a name for the presence of God in our souls and the touch of God in our
lives.” In fact, he locates morality so squarely in the realm of religion, he claims that
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Baillie says he does, in fact, insist on this point in The Interpretation of Religion: “For it is not
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our world.” Baillie, Interpretation, 470.
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there is no part of religion “that has (as it were) a separate door of entrance into our
souls.” He goes on, saying
But although no part of religion is independent of morality, of course religion
goes beyond morality. The moral outlook, or what is usually called such, is not
enough. Heart’s desire is not satisfied until we are lifted out of that coil of rights
and duties, of commandments and prohibitions, of continual striving to be that
which we are not. Perhaps in my book I have (in my anxiety to get the other point
home) not sufficiently stressed the all-important respects in which religion goes
beyond morality—though that is really nearer to my own heart. Still I have
stressed it—e.g. pp. 331 foot – 332.67 There is a deep sense in which religion
carries us beyond the opposition of good and evil (which is the heart of morality)
and a sense in which it is this release that is the secret of religious joy and peace.
We escape from the continual straining after what ought to be to a satisfied resting
in what eternally is. The “merely moral” point of view is transcended and all its
categories left behind. Now this can only be true, if the presence of God in our
souls is from the beginning something ampler and larger than a mere
“consciousness of obligation”. The “consciousness of obligation” is rather the
plainly-visible fringe (though to many secular moralists the only reality) of a far
richer and more mysterious cohabitation of the Divine Person with our own
human personalities. Yet what I feel so strongly is that there is no presence of
God in the soul which is alongside our sense of obligation as something separate
from it, and independent of it.
In Interpretation of Religion, in a passage following the one referenced in the quote
above, Baillie provides a clarifying description of the relationship between religion and
morality. He writes, “The relation of religious faith to our moral experience is thus seen
to be in some sort a double one. First faith emerges out of the moral consciousness and
then, having emerged, it quickens that consciousness. First it is born of moral desire and
67
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then, being born, it reveals itself as the only means whereby that desire may be
fulfilled.”68 Again, this passage depicts morality as the entrance to religion; the two are
necessarily linked, but not identical. Religious faith awakens one to the real context of
morality, a relationship with God, in which obligation is transformed into desire.
Cairns challenges Baillie’s position that moral experience is the gateway to true
religion. Cairns writes, “Is not the point that religion’s advance is always through prior
moral development overstressed? It seems to me that if communion with God is real,
God must be able immediately to communicate new and creative moral and religious
ideals in a human spirit. I would hesitate to say that the road here is closed.” Baillie’s
response to this is interesting and precipitates the kind of argument he later makes in Our
Knowledge of God and The Sense of the Presence of God. Essentially, he says that the
only limitation he makes for the nature of God’s revelation is the idea that God would
reveal himself in some way apart from human experience.
The only road I close is the road by which (for example) a race of men could
receive the insight that God was fatherly before they had received the insight that
fatherliness is a high, the highest, value in the interrelationship of persons—a
view which, it seems to me would be contrary to all our experience of the way in
which insights come and of the self-impartation of the Divine Spirit to the spirit of
man. Of course the source of all human insights is God. When we realise the
appeal and charm and claim of any high good, it is because the goodness of God
is pressing in upon our souls. But this pressure is first consciously realised by us
as a demand made upon us, consequently as a moral insight in that sense. The
conscious realization that the demand comes from God and is thus revelatory of
God’s nature, so that our existing ideas of God must be revised in the light of it—
that seems to me usually to come somewhat later.
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Two points Baillie makes in his letter to Cairns here are worth noting. First, despite
Baillie’s case for the logic of faith made in Interpretation of Religion, he does not mean
by it that knowledge of God is inferential. Here he confirms his position, which could
have been more strongly stated in his book, that knowledge of God comes from God. As
he states, “The source of all human insights is God.” The draw, the sense of truth, the
impulse of obligation comes to people because God is “pressing in upon our souls.”
Though this encounter is experienced as a moral experience, it is not merely moral in
nature; it is a divine revelation.
Second, despite the more cerebral nature of his argument for God, Baillie insists
divine revelation comes in, with and under the universal experience of human
relationships. He puts it this way, “What my view amounts to then is simply that it is in
the context of human interrelationships (and not abstractly and out of context with such
relationships) that God more and more reveals himself to us. Our new discoveries of the
Eternal Goodness are made by us, not apropos de rien, but through our human loves—as
the greatest of all new discoveries about the Eternal Love was made through the human
love of Jesus Christ our Lord.”
These two points, that knowledge of God is not inferential but that it comes in,
with, and under human relationships and experience, are central to Baillie’s argument in
Our Knowledge of God. The fact that Baillie brings up these ideas in response to Cairns
show that they were already part of his theology and suggests that the fullness of his
theology was, in some way, shrouded by his deeply Kantian expression. Thus, despite
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wanting to change the method and emphasis by which he presented his ideas, Baillie says
that he still adheres to his “central position and contention.” It can be surmised that his
central position includes these three elements: 1) that God is immediately present, 2) that
he is the source of our knowledge of him (that is, it is not a derived knowledge), and 3)
that God reveals himself to us in, with, and under (as he will later often describe it) our
experience, particularly our experience of moral obligation and personal relationship.
These three elements represent the heart and continuity of Baillie’s theology of
revelation.
Baillie does not abandon the work he did in The Interpretation of Religion; he
references it later in Our Knowledge of God and throughout his course lectures. As has
already been observed in the previous chapter, Baillie describes Our Knowledge of God
as a journey into familiar territory. He views Our Knowledge of God as “a not unnatural
development of my findings twelve or fifteen years ago,” though he also acknowledges
that “the agreement between the two is far from complete.”69 There are four occasions in
Our Knowledge of God when Baillie references Interpretation of Religion. In the first
case, he directly quotes a passage he also quotes in his letter to Cairns: “For it is not
merely that through our values we reach God or that from them we infer Him, but rather
that in them we find Him.”70 He uses this passage from Interpretation of Religion to
make a point that is central to Our Knowledge of God, a point in which he clearly
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understands himself to have maintained a consistent stance; he writes, “We are rejecting
logical argument of any kind as the first chapter of our theology or as representing the
process by which God comes to be known.”71
In the second reference to Interpretation of Religion in Our Knowledge of God,
Baillie extensively quotes himself in a footnote to show that his criticism of deduction as
a means for knowledge of God goes back to his earlier thought. His note begins, “I quote
this from Mr. Collingwood; but that his statement does but clarify for me something that
had long been in my own mind will be seen from the following sentences taken from the
section entitled ‘The Limits of Deductive Proof’ in my Interpretation of Religion,
published five years before Mr. Collingwood’s book.”72
On a third occasion, Baillie references the careful analysis and criticism he has
already made of Rudolf Otto in Interpretation of Religion.73 And in the fourth and final
reference, Baillie again points the reader to what he has said before in his earlier book,
which demonstrates a continuity of thought, but this time acknowledges that “in the
context of these passages [in Interpretation of Religion] there is much that I would not
now express as I expressed it then.”74 This comment reflects the admission made to
Cairns, namely, that his position was initially somewhat shrouded by his Kantian
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language. The section here referred to is the proposal Baillie makes for what he calls
“the logic of faith.” The same basic argument made in Interpretation of Religion is
summarized, using different and less Kantian language, in Our Knowledge of God.
The only argument with which we can properly meet those atheistic
representations is therefore one which consists in the demonstration that the
recognition of such an unconditional obligation does in fact contain in itself the
recognition of a holy God who is its source. This argument would, as I conceive
it, consist in the defense of two propositions; first, that no obligation can be
absolute which does not derive from the Absolute…; and second, that, since
morality is essentially a function of personality, we can feel no moral obligation
to an Absolute who is not apprehended by us as a personal being.75
This argument is essentially identical to the one in Interpretation of Religion; the only
real change Baillie makes to it is the way he expresses it.

Reflections on Pedagogy and Ministry
Earlier in the chapter, in the review of articles Baillie wrote leading up to his first
manuscript publications, Baillie’s first article on pedagogical reflection was examined.76
The purpose of including a special examination of Baillie’s pedagogical reflections is
twofold. First, it provides insight into Baillie’s perspective on the world in which he took
up the theological task. Second, it provides insight into Baillie’s perspective of his
lecture preparation in order to equip students for ministry. Our examination of some of
Baillie’s significant course lectures later in the chapter will benefit from this introduction
to his view on theological education.
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Almost a decade later after this first pedagogical reflection was published, Baillie
published a similar reflection, “The Young Minister and the Modern Situation” (1931),77
in which he reflects on both the changing and unchanging nature of the human soul and
its need to which the young minister is called to bring an everlasting word of salvation.
At the time of this second pedagogical publication Baillie was still in America, although
at another institution,78 and he presents his perspective as a corrective to the view that the
experience of the modern person is significantly and fundamentally incongruous to that
of generations before. On the contrary,
If our human nature has not changed, and if our human situation has not changed,
then our essential need has not changed, since the days when the world was
young. Men still need God. They need him every whit as much as their fathers
did. They need him in just the same way, for just the same reasons, and at just the
same points in their lives. This is one of the things which the young minister will
soon discover as he gains more practical experience in the cure of souls. He will
learn that most of the changes that make each generation look so unlike its
predecessor are only surface changes, like fashions in dress.79
The testimony of Baillie’s view of the essential nature of humanity is helpful given his
more frequent discussions of the need to contextualize or accommodate the gospel to the
modern situation. Despite the confirmation that the deepest part of a person remains the
same through the ages, Baillie also affirms that some changes penetrate the surface.
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“What, then, are the most important respects in which the plain man—the ordinary
parishioner—has changed during the last generation?” Baillie asks. “No doubt the most
revolutionary change of all is that he has been educated. No other single cause has had
such momentous consequences for organized religion in Europe and America as the
decision of the various governments to provide free education and the passing of
Compulsory Education Acts in a large number of countries.”80 It is worth noting here
that Baillie has focused his attention on “the plain man.” In “The Fundamental Task,”
previously surveyed, he was interested to make a distinction between the intellectuals and
the masses. Instead of excluding the intellectuals from this discussion, Baillie seems to
have conflated the two groups in this later assessment; now he speaks of the educated
plain folk, or the intellectual masses. Additionally, Baillie’s return to the insights
regarding the religion of the common person based on war time observation of British
and American troops is notable.
The most significant change in the contemporary landscape which Baillie
connects to the spread of education, particularly the advance of modern scholarship, is a
changed view of the Bible. The Bible and its traditional teachings are no longer assumed
to be authoritative by the majority of people. Thus Baillie urges the young minister to
“bring the everlasting word and gospel of God, yet bring it in a form suitable to the
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exigencies of his own time.”81 Even as he does this, Baillie presses the point that
“beneath a rapidly changing human life he [i.e., the minister] must be able to discern and
to appeal to a fundamentally unchanging human nature.”82
In comparing these two pedagogical articles, “The Fundamental Task” and “The
Young Minister,” it may be observed that Baillie has deep and lasting impressions of the
situation in which he and others are ministering and has equally deep and lasting
convictions about the nature of humanity to which their ministry is directed. Baillie’s
army experience and the scholarship assessing the religious life of the troops during
World War I are clearly significant in shaping his worldview.83 Not only did his war
experience inform his view of the nature and situation of people, but it shaped his view of
his pedagogical and scholarly tasks. As mentioned before, the context in which he
perceives his students to be ministering is also the one in which he sees himself
ministering.84
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The 1934 article, “The Office of the Ministry,” is an especially valuable resource
for gaining insight into Baillie’s work for a couple of reasons.85 First, it contains
significant portions of both the ideas and even expressions found in Our Knowledge of
God, published five years later.86 While Baillie himself says in his preface to Our
Knowledge of God that he had given lectures as early as 1936 on material that can be
found in the book, the date of the article tells us that he was working on these ideas even
earlier while at Union Theological Seminary (1930-1934). The strong similarities
between the article and the book testify to the continuation and stabilization of Baillie’s
ideas concerning the nature of our knowledge of God. It is clear that while the BarthBrunner debate certainly provided the occasion for Baillie to further express and extend
his theology of revelation, we should not assume that the debate sparked the ideas we
read in Our Knowledge of God. In fact, “The Office of the Minister” was published in
1934, the same year the natural theology essays by Barth and Brunner were published.
Second, the fact that an article focused on describing the office of the minister
contains so much theology shows that, for Baillie, his theology of revelation is
fundamentally linked to practical ministry. While the practical interest of his theology is
certainly conveyed in Our Knowledge of God, this early expression in “The Office of the

but I know that it should be the aim of every college of divinity to make either type impossible for
evermore.” (156) These are the same extremes Baillie himself is seeking to avoid, and in his conscientious
effort to do so he has come to be remembered as an irenic mediator.
85
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Ministry” of the theology found later in the book confirms that practical connection. This
point is illustrated well in a passage from the article, in which Baillie writes,
Religion is not to be understood as a phase of human culture, an aspect of human
self-expression or a subdivision of human philosophy, but only as the
confrontation of all life and all culture and all self-expression and all philosophy
by the transcendent reality of God. And the office of the Christian minister is
simply to be instrumental in bringing about such confrontation within the bounds
of the community in which his lot is cast.87
Thus the theology of revelation is defining to the minister both in what she communicates
to her congregation and how she communicates it. The minister must know the timeless
truth of the gospel and know the distinct culture of her community.
Additionally, the theology of revelation, as Baillie understands it, influences how
the minister relates the people to whom he or she brings the gospel; the gospel needs to
be communicated in such a way to people that the challenge of God in it is truly felt. The
minister’s task is to make transparent the inherent relevance of the gospel; Baillie
understood this task to be incompatible with the increasingly common apologetic
approach to evangelism. About this trend toward apologetics in ministry, Baillie reflects
in his article,
I believe that of recent years we have been far too ready to conclude that the
modern man has developed an immunity against the appeal of the gospel. We
have approached him apologetically. We have made stammering excuses for our
intrusion. We have begun our discourse with him on something like his own
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plane and have hoped gradually to lead him upwards to Christ’s level, but it is
seldom that we have succeeded in carrying him very far.88
For Baillie, an apologetic approach softens or weakens the challenge of God that is meant
to be conveyed in the minister’s preaching. The challenge rather becomes a mere set of
propositions strung together in an argument that either may or may not appear cogent to a
person. An argument distances the hearer from the immediacy of God’s personal demand
in revelation—the demand to receive God’s gift of salvation in Christ. Thus he
concludes,
I conceive it, then, to be the great task of the theology of the future so to
reformulate the great dogmas of the Christian faith that the direct and challenging
reality of them shall be inescapably and even (in view of our sinful loathness)
inconveniently clear. The Christian gospel was never intended to puzzle men; it
was intended to convict them, and unless we preach it in a form in which it does
convict, we are not preaching it as it was meant to be preached.89
Again, Baillie here is calling for the minister’s theology to be both strong in the truth of
the gospel but supple in its application to her congregation.
Almost two decades after writing “The Fundamental Task” (1922), and in his
fourth divinity chair, Baillie reflects again on the task of the seminary in preparing
ministers and missionaries in his 1939 article, “The Theological Course as a Preparation
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for the Missionary.”90 Similar to his earlier concerns, Baillie asks whether or not a
theological education ought to focus on intellectual or vocational preparation, or as he
puts it in this article, episteme or tekne. Here he is concerned to defend the Scottish
method of emphasizing episteme over tekne in general and, specifically, the benefit of
this emphasis to the training of missionaries.91 In short, Baillie defends the task of the
seminary to provide rigorous theological training. And it is the task of theology “to raise
the life of the Church and the individual’s life as a member of the Church to a higher
degree of self-consciousness.”92 Thus the seminary course provides for its students a
clarified structure of their belief. He is quick to point out, though, that this training in the
Christian faith does not make one a better Christian, though he certainly views and
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anticipates that such an education will be a means of grace in students’ lives. Even so,
“the advantage which the trained theologian has over the saint is not unlike the advantage
which the trained anatomist has over the athlete. The anatomist cannot use his body any
better than the athlete but he understands it better. The theological student is not a better
Christian than the unschooled and unlettered saint but he understands his Christianity
better. That then is what we try to do for our students.”93
Baillie makes an interesting point in his defense of an episteme education that
illuminates the context in which Our Knowledge of God was written (published in 1939,
the same year as this article). He is sensitive to the early usage of the phrase episteme
theologike by Aristotle, which might imply to someone an affirmation of Aristotle’s
method of natural theology. Baillie recognizes that there was an earlier medieval
endorsement of two ways to study theology—the way of natural theology and the way of
revealed theology. Baillie asserts
that this distinction has now long ago been transcended and left behind by the
onward movement of theological reflection. I think it is now believed by a large
majority of theologians within the non-Roman Churches that God can only be
found in His revelation, and that there is therefore no ‘scientific’ means of
investigating the problems of religion apart from the insight of religious faith
itself.94
Though his theology of mediated immediacy is certainly creative, Baillie’s insistence on
God’s personal self-revelation as the only means of knowing God and the impotence of
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traditional arguments for God and apologetics sets him, according to his assessment of
the situation, squarely in line with the contemporary movement of theology.
Baillie believes that the Scottish method of episteme theological education is
fitting for training both the minister and missionary and is good preparation for both the
modern domestic and foreign fields of service. Both the minister and missionary preach
to those inside and outside of ecclesiastical fellowship. Baillie reflects, “I am sure that
the two tasks must not be too sharply distinguished from one another. None of us is so
securely within that he does not need to be constantly recalled, and perhaps there is
nobody whom we have the right to address as if he is a mere outsider. Nothing like a
sharp line can be drawn between evangelistic and edificatory preaching.”95 No longer
can we assume that the minister at home in the west is engaging only those who have
been raised, to some degree, with a Christian influence. Baillie identifies secularism, in
some cases, as having affected both the domestic and foreign fields of ministry. In other
cases, he observes a common spread of an anti-rationalistic merging of religious and
political devotion. Whichever the case, his point is to show that the world in which
ministers and missionaries conduct their service is growing smaller, and for both the
episteme training they receive remains a vital and relevant preparation for their work in
their sphere of ministry.
The value of gaining some knowledge of Baillie’s pedagogical perspective is twofold. First, we are able to read his prepared lectures with this in mind: Baillie’s aim in the
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lecture material he presented was to equip his students to meaningfully and intelligently
engage their world with the gospel. Second, we not only know Baillie’s perspective of
the situation into which he believed his students were heading, but we also have insight
into the climate in which he likewise perceived himself to be working when he produced
his public lectures and publications. Based on the survey of the four articles, we observe,
for example, Baillie’s maintained conviction that the gospel is both an unchanging,
everlasting truth and a malleable message that must be shared in such a way as to answer
modern existential questions. Similarly, the human heart is universally in need of God
and his healing fellowship, but humanity’s articulation of this need and its attempt to
respond to it change with each generation. For Baillie, Christian piety is not identified
with theological acumen. Theology is not the ordering of an old orthodoxy which one
must confess for assurance of salvation; rather it is the ordering of our reflections on
revelation for the sake of meaningfully communicating the gospel to the world.
Having gained insight into some of Baillie’s pedagogical perspectives, we will
better be able to contextualize his divinity lectures. Our purpose in examining some of
these lectures is to discern the development, including the continuity and discontinuity, in
Baillie’s theology of revelation. Our primary point of comparison will be the theology
we have already carefully surveyed in Our Knowledge of God; lectures will be identified
as having come before or after its publication.
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Professor Baillie’s Course Lectures
There is a wealth of information available about John Baillie in an archive called
The Baillie Project maintained by the Special Collections Department at Edinburgh
University Library.96 This dissertation seeks to integrate the theology laid out in Baillie’s
course lectures with the published material available in order to provide a more complete
view of Baillie’s theology of revelation. One set of valuable lecture notes include those
for a course on the Doctrine of God.97 This course is identified in the archive as a 1953
course Baillie taught at New College. In fact, in the margins of the lecture notes Baillie
wrote, in different places, the years 1952, 1954 and 1955. One can only guess what these
dates meant to Baillie. Perhaps he wrote the year in the margin to keep track of where he
left off in his lecture in different years. Any professor who uses the same teaching notes
for more than one year knows that one never keeps the exact same pace each time. But
the idea that these dates in the margin are place holders, so to speak, is only speculation.
What we can be fairly confident of is that Baillie taught from these notes during the years
of 1952-1955. A strong case can be made, however, that his lecture on the Nature of God
within this course includes about ten pages of notes that pre-date the publication of Our
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Knowledge of God and which were likely used in its drafting. There are several clues
that support this conclusion.
Baillie’s lecture, “The Nature of God,” in his Doctrine of God course is written
out long hand, manuscript-style, as is common with all his archived course lectures. 98
The notes for “The Nature of God” begin on page 8; this particular lecture is twenty
pages long, with pages numbering 8 to 28. Pages 9 – 19 of the lecture all have two page
numbers at the top of each page, one of which is crossed out and replaced. This indicates
that pages 9 – 19 of the current lecture were taken from some previous set of notes and
inserted into this lecture.99 Another indicator that pages 9 – 19 were inserted into the
current lecture is that the writing on page 8, which introduces the lecture, ends midline
and midsentence near the bottom of the page so as to pick up the sentence already begun
on the top of page 9. Thus it would seem pages 9 – 19 were taken from previous lecture
notes and used here. The inserted notes contain many passages that can be identified
either exactly or closely with portions Our Knowledge of God.100 The question is, of
course, whether the inserted lecture notes were written before or after the publication of
the book. What these inserted notes tell us, at the very least, is that Baillie still felt
comfortable enough with the position held at the time of the publication of Our
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Knowledge of God in 1939 that he continued to teach from the same perspective fifteen
years later. This indisputable fact helps us gain a clearer picture of the continuity of
Baillie’s thought.
A very strong case may be made that the notes inserted into Baillie’s lecture on
“The Nature of God” predate the publication of Our Knowledge of God in 1939. Baillie
had the practice of cutting and pasting his previously published material into his lectures
when such material said what he wanted to teach to his students. There are several
examples of this in his manuscript notes. For example, in a lecture titled, “The Denial of
the Revelatory Significance of the Challenge,” Baillie quotes himself extensively from an
earlier inaugural address.101 In an Introduction to Theology course, Baillie makes a note
to himself in a lecture on “The Truth and Error of Humanism” to read from his book And
the Life Everlasting (1933).102 In another set of notes for an Introduction to Theology
course, Baillie cut and pasted several pages of Our Knowledge of God to introduce a
lecture on “The Nature of Our Knowledge of Persons.”103 These examples, particularly
the latter, show that Baillie had the practice of either cutting and pasting the actual
published text into his notes or directing himself to read from his published work in some
of his lectures. It can confidently be concluded, then, that where there is notable
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similarity between his handwritten lecture notes and his published material, the
handwritten notes came before and likely served as the basis for what was later
published. Thus, the notes numbering nine through nineteen were written before the
publication date of Our Knowledge of God in 1939.
The date of the notes in question can be further narrowed by taking into
consideration the publication dates of the sources cited in the notes. The material Baillie
quotes from contemporary authors includes Norman Kemp Smith, Is Divine Existence
Credible? (1931), Hubert Box, The World and God (1934), and W. G. De Burgh,
Towards a Religious Philosophy (1937). If Baillie made use of a book published as late
as 1937, it can be concluded that the ten pages of notes inserted into the lecture on The
Nature of God were written sometime between 1937 and 1939.
In his lecture, “The Nature of God,” Baillie explains that before we can study the
attributes of God (which is the focus of his next lecture in the course), we must consider
how we have knowledge of the nature of God:
We are aware of God as One who seeks to invade our lives at every point—
offering us His salvation and demanding our obedience. We are aware of Him at
the same time as a Claimant and as a Giver. And now the question before us is,
What character in the Claimant is revealed in the claim He makes; and what
character in the Giver is revealed in the gift He offers? Theology answers this
question in its doctrine of the attributes of God, and to the enumeration and
exposition of these individual attributes we shall come in our next section. But
first, in this section, we must concern ourselves in a more analytic way with the
preliminary question, How do we arrive at our knowledge of these attributes?
How do I know that God is infinite, eternal, unchangeable, omniscient,
omnipotent, omnipresent, impassible, etc? Whence do I derive these notions, and
how do I come to apply them to God? N.B. that we are not asking whether God is
infinite or omniscient: we know that; but what we are asking is how we know it.
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We are analyzing the nature of a knowledge that we possess rather than trying to
find our way to a knowledge that we do not possess.104
In addressing this question, Baillie provides a substantial overview of Aquinas’
epistemology and then briefly compares Barth and Kant, who both propose alternatives to
the Thomist perspective and are influenced by the Lutheran tradition. Some ways in
which Baillie’s lecture on “The Nature of God” sheds light on Our Knowledge of God in
particular and his theology of revelation in general will be examined.
In his third chapter, “Is Our Knowledge of God’s Existence Inferential?”, Baillie
criticizes the western assumption that knowledge of God’s existence is a conclusion that
we draw, much like we draw conclusions using mathematical equations or the scientific
method. As we saw in the last chapter, Baillie identifies the inception of this idea with
Plato, but then directs his focus to Aquinas (and the theological tradition that has
stemmed from his thought) as having a significant impact in fueling this assumption.
Baillie explains in his lecture why he engages Aquinas in the presentation of his own
thought. In addressing how we know the nature of God, Baillie says “it is best to begin
by having clearly in our mind the orthodox mediaeval teaching on this matter, because all
the answers that are before us today are in the nature of dissent from that.”105 The aspect
of Aquinas’ theology Baillie focuses on at this point, and which is presumably the aspect
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from which there is so much common dissent, is that we have no direct knowledge of
God. He writes,
According to St. Thomas, then, we have no direct knowledge of God either by
nature or by revelation. Our only direct knowledge is of the world of nature as
perceived by the five senses. Our knowledge of everything else, i.e. of all nonsensible and supersensible realities, is discursive in nature, being reached by
inference from the things we see and touch. This is true of God. He is known to
us—so far as our natural knowledge is concerned—only per suos effectus in the
world of nature, only per ea quae facta sunt, as St. Paul says in Romans.106
Certainly there were proponents of Thomism and the analogy of being (Hubert Box is
quoted by Baillie to represent modern Thomism), but Baillie argues that the Lutheran
theology of God in, with and under his creation provides a platform for an alternative
epistemology. Baillie gives little attention to Luther himself, but focuses on the fruit of
Lutheran theology in Kant and Barth in both his book and lecture notes.
While there is much overlap between the lectures and book, as evidenced by the
extensive quoting and paraphrasing of the inserted notes in Our Knowledge of God, two
aspects of the notes set them apart as helpful to the illumination of Baillie’s theology of
revelation.

First, in this lecture Baillie places a particular emphasis on the problem of

anthropomorphism in theology. Anthropomorphism and the attributes of God are
discussed in the closing pages of the book, whereas they are central to his lecture.
Second, in his lectures Baillie provides a critique of Barth and Kant, including a direct
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comparison of the two that is not found in Our Knowledge of God. We will include
extended sections of Baillie’s lectures which have not yet been included in the
scholarship and, in so doing, examine these two points unique to the lectures.
As stated above, Baillie begins the lecture summarizing Aquinas’ teaching of the
analogia entis and the via negationis, much of which can be found in his section on “The
Tradition of Theistic Proofs” in Our Knowledge of God. He concludes,
In this way it is possible to arrange created things in an order, ranging from the
less to the greater, from the less good to the more good, from the less powerful to
the more powerful; and thus we can see in what direction our thoughts must travel
to reach God. God is, as it were, at the end of the line that leads from the weaker
things we know to the stronger, or from the less good men we know to the more
good, – when that line is produced ad infinitum. Such, then, according to St.
Thomas, is the extent of our natural knowledge of God. But St. Thomas believes
that we have also a revealed knowledge of Him. This revealed knowledge is
essentially, however, of the nature of authoritatively-received information. We
have God’s word for it that He possesses the attributes of infinity, omnipotence,
omnipresence, immortality, etc. We have no direct knowledge of God’s
omnipotence, omniscience etc: but must accept it on the authority of Biblical
revelation.107
The latter half of this passage should not be read as though Baillie is saying that God’s
testimony to himself and his character is not sufficient, nor is he intending to diminish the
authority of the biblical witness. He is making clear the epistemological boundaries laid
by Aquinas and the subsequent theology built upon his thought along with the exclusion
of the possibility of direct knowledge of God. “According to this Thomist and Roman
teaching, then, the source of our knowledge of the divine attributes is twofold a) by
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analogy, b) by authoritatively communicated information. We have no direct knowledge
either way.”108
Baillie argues for an alternative perspective on our knowledge of God in a lengthy
section of notes not directly found in his published material.
The right view is, not that we first see goodness in ourselves and then imagine this
goodness as being increased to infinity, and ascribe it to God. The truth is the
opposite. It is the direct vision of God, and above all the direct vision of God in
Christ, that shows us what goodness is: And then we both see our own lack of
goodness and our own faint beginnings of goodness, receiving both for what they
are in the light of the standard we find outside ourselves in God.
This is the age-old question of the nature of our knowledge of the ideal
and the relation of our knowledge of the actual to our knowledge of the ideal.
Empiricism which believed, like the Thomists, that all our knowledge begins from
the things of sense, taught that our knowledge of the ideal was derived from our
observation of the actual; that the laws of correct thinking were derived from our
observation of how men actually think; that the moral law was derived from our
observation of actual human conduct. But this empiricist view cannot stand. It is
impossible to work out its case even plausibly, however plausible it may sound
when stated in a general form. The truth is that the laws of thought are derived by
us not from the actual course of our thinking, but from a standard by which our
actual thinking is always to some extent influenced, though it is seldom
completely formed by it. We must therefore have some independent knowledge
of this standard. It could never be deduced from the way we actually do think. It
must be in our minds a priori, as the philosophers says [sic]. The same is true of
our moral standards or ideals. The whole of Kant’s philosophical enterprise was
given to the demonstration, as against the empiricists, that our moral standards are
a priori. They were not derived from our experience of the actual, but were prior
to it and the necessary condition of it. Unless we already knew what ideal
goodness was, he contended, we could not know that any individual man or action
was better or worse than another. The knowledge of the ideal is not built up
(synthetically—as Box had it) from particular moral judgments, but is the
condition of our making any such judgments. And you remember how Kant said
that the whole of history did not contain a single certain example of observance of
the moral law. So far from goodness being something suggested by our
108
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observation of human conduct, it was something which may never have been seen
there—we cannot point with confidence to any example of ‘a good will.’109
Here in his lecture as well as in his published works, Baillie finds help from Kant in
laying a foundation for his own thought. As we saw in the last chapter, Baillie does not
agree with the whole of Kant’s philosophy, but he does find some of his insights useful.
He embraces Kant’s idea that knowledge of the ideal cannot be a posteriori in order to
leverage his own view that people can have a kind of direct knowledge of God. Baillie
rejects the idea that knowledge of God is derived or, as he puts in Our Knowledge of
God, inferred. It is noteworthy, too, that Baillie uses moral categories to describe the
nature of knowledge of God; to know the ideal of goodness is to know the goodness of
God, according to Baillie.
For Baillie, it is knowledge of the ideal of goodness, of God’s goodness, that
frames any gradation of goodness in a person’s judgment of self or others. The
complexity of Baillie’s position lies in the fact that such knowledge does not, in human
experience, come chronologically prior to knowledge of self and others, but in, with and
under it. Baillie puts it this way in his lecture:
We must therefore believe that the knowledge of the ideal standards – of truth,
beauty and goodness – in the light of which we judge our actual experience and
find it wanting though not actually worthless, are known to us a priori, i.e. not
chronologically before our knowledge of the actual, but independently of it – and
in such a connection with it that we could not have the kind of knowledge we
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have of the actual (i.e. we could not know it as a valuational field) if we did not at
the same time know the ideal.110
In other words, knowledge of the ideal is a logical priority for knowledge of the actual
and any judgment of the actual according to the ideal. Logical priority, does not equate
to chronological priority. Baillie is wary of interpreting a priori knowledge as a
chronology of knowledge (that is, knowing the ideal and then, chronologically speaking,
knowing the actual) because such chronology makes room for inference.111
Identifying Kant, among others, as an important signpost in an alternative
epistemological tradition to that articulated by Aquinas, Baillie then builds on Kant’s
position that we have a priori knowledge of the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness.
Identifying these ideals with the character of God, Baillie draws this conclusion:
Hence the conceptions of eternity, omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence
are none of them formed by us merely ‘synthetically’: they are not extensions of
our experience of the actual and of our valuation of it; they must be revealed to us
directly, somewhere else, as a condition of our ability to evaluate the actual. Our
view is that they are revealed to us in God, who is Himself directly revealed to
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us—and not reached by a process of analogical inference or any kind of
inference. We know what infinity, eternity, etc are because we see them in God
who is directly present to our experience. Man is thus directly conscious of the
Infinite. If he were not, he could never guess at it—in advance of its actual
presentation of itself to his consciousness!112
Again, he writes,
Here, then, is an immensely important conclusion at which we have arrived
concerning our knowledge of God’s nature and attributes. We are forced to the
conclusion that our knowledge of them is of such a kind as to make it quite
impossible that it could have been acquired by analogical inference from our own
nature and attributes or from the nature and attributes of any other created thing.
We must therefore have direct knowledge of them as they are in God Himself.
God Himself has been directly revealed to us, in His own nature and clothed in all
His attributes. Otherwise they would all be utterly and necessarily beyond our
conceiving.113
These passages, as noted, have strong correspondence to portions published in Our
Knowledge of God. Though the content is very similar, the lecture notes provide perhaps
more emphasis on the immediate nature of knowledge of God. These passages are
especially helpful in clarifying that Baillie’s position on the direct or immediate
knowledge of God does not undermine in any way a strong view of the otherness or
transcendence of God. In fact, Baillie’s insistence on the requirement of direct
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knowledge of God (as opposed to inferential knowledge) is a result of his insistence that
the nature of God is so far outside of the scope of what humans could ever grasp by
reference to their own experience. To Baillie’s thinking, an inferential knowledge of God
diminishes the nature of God; that is, God’s nature is capable of being reached by human
speculation. Baillie understands human nature to be so radically distinct (and in a sinful
world, so radically diminished) in comparison with the divine nature that knowledge of
God must truly be a revelation rather than an inference.
In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie distances himself from the view of Otto and
others, including Barth and Brunner, that God is wholly other as a repudiation of the
perceived extreme views of divine immanence.114 While there have certainly been
abuses of the theology of divine immanence, Baillie does not think that the belief in the
nearness of God itself undermines the transcendence of God; rather, his notes clarify
what his real concern is—anthropomorphism. The concern of anthropomorphism doesn’t
surface explicitly until the final pages of Our Knowledge of God, but it is a primary
concern in Baillie’s lecture notes. The way Baillie understands the threat of
anthropomorphism helps us understand his opposition to inference as a path to
knowledge of God.
In his lecture Baillie states that “the charge of anthropomorphism has often
haunted religion; ever since Xenophanes of Colophon, the pre-Socratic, wrote: ‘Men
make gods in their own image; those of the Ethiopians are black and snub-nosed, those of
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the Thracians have blue eyes and red hair. If horses or oxen or lions had hands and could
produce works of art, they would make their gods as horses and oxen and lions.’”115
From a modern source, Baillie writes, “Hare put it neatly when he said, ‘God made man
in His own image and man made haste to return the compliment.’” Thus Baillie
understands anthropomorphism here as the conceiving of God in our image, constructing
his nature from our own experience. For Baillie, this can only be viewed as an idolatrous
departure from true religion, as evidence by his citation of Deuteronomy 4:15-16 and
Romans 1:23, 25. He adds to this support a passage from the Westminster Larger
Catechism:
‘Q109 What are the sins forbidden in the second Commandment? A. The sins
forbidden in the second commandment are, all devising, counseling,
commanding, using, and any wise approving, any religious worship not instituted
by God himself; tolerating a false religion; the making any representation of God,
of all or of any of the three persons, either inwardly in our mind, or outwardly in
any kind of image or likeness of any creature whatsoever; all worshipping of it, or
God in it or by it….’ Here is forbidden the making of a mental image of God in
the likeness of any created being!116
Baillie’s emphasis that mental images of God are included in what scripture forbids as
idolatry brings into sharper focus his concern with the epistemological tradition whereby
God is known by the anologia entis and the via negationis. Nowhere does Baillie
condemn adherents to this tradition as idolaters, but his point is that the scriptures teach
that any conception we have of God that is constructed out of our own creaturely
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experience is necessarily false. This cannot be the way we know God. God must make
himself known.
In both his lecture notes and in Our Knowledge of God, Baillie examines the
thought of Kant and Barth as it relates to the nature of our knowledge of God. Though he
does not wholly agree with either thinker, he genuinely values Kant and Barth for their
distinct positions which provide alternatives to the tradition of the anologia entis.
Baillie’s lecture includes a comparison of Kant and Barth that is not found in Our
Knowledge of God and which is useful in clarifying how Baillie distinguishes his own
position in reference to theirs. He appreciates and shares with them an opposition to an
epistemology drawn from analogy to human experience. But he believes they go too far
in their insistence on the otherness of God. The following passage from Baillie’s lecture
notes offer fresh expression and insight into his own position.
It is to be noted also that Barth’s doctrine of the divine as the wholly other
corresponds, on one side of it, very closely to Kant’s doctrine of the moral law as
wholly foreign to man’s desire. The completeness of the Barthian opposition
between God and man corresponds to this extent with the completeness of the
Kantian opposition between duty and inclination, between what we know we
ought to do and what we want to do.
But the difference between Kant and Barth lies in the view they take of
reason. Barth puts reason on the human side of the opposition – on the side of
man and his inclinations, whereas Kant puts it on the divine side – on the side of
God and duty. In this difference between the Barthian and the Kantian views of
reason there seem, indeed, to be two differences involved. First, to Kant reason is
essentially a divine thing; it is of the essential nature of God to be reasonable, He
being the supreme Intelligence; and so reason belongs to the Uncreated world.
But to Barth reason is something created by God; by His sovereign Will He
determines what shall be reasonable. Barth always speaks of reason as part of our
human psychology – as an activity of created spirit. But second, Barth regards
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reason, along with the rest of human nature, to be totally corrupt; so that to follow
our reasons [sic] is to be led only into sin and error. Whereas Kant holds reason
to be our only protection against sin and error; he agrees with Barth that our
human nature is corrupt, perhaps even totally so – but reason is not part of human
nature.
…Barth makes the same complete cleavage between divine nature and
human nature that Kant makes between reason and desire, between duty and
inclination. To Barth man is wholly contrary to God; to Kant man’s inclinations
are wholly contrary to the moral law of reason. Barth is as anxious to separate
anthropology completely from theology as Kant was anxious to separate
anthropology completely from ethics.
Are they right in this? Is human nature totally corrupt? Are all our desires
completely contrary to our duty? And is God wholly other than man? Barth and
Kant valiantly defend us against anthropomorphism; but does their defense go too
far? Are they too much afraid of anthropomorphism? Is there a justifiable
anthropomorphism in theology, and a justifiable anthropology in ethics?117
One can almost discern the outline of Our Knowledge of God in the rhetorical questions
Baillie asks in the last paragraph quoted above. Based on what he writes in Our
Knowledge of God, it is clear that Baillie thinks that Barth and Kant do go too far in their
understanding of divine transcendence. Baillie’s brief study of Barth and Kant illustrates
the need to clarify what constitutes human nature (e.g., spirituality, rationality,
personality), how far sin extends into and throughout human nature and what its
corruption of that nature entails, which he does in Our Knowledge of God.
What this extended section from Baillie’s lecture notes also clarifies is that the
view of God’s otherness, as seen defended by Barth or Kant, must be maintained in
contrast to the kind of anthropomorphism he identifies with an epistemology based on the
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analogia entis. To be clear, Baillie is not using the term “anthropomorphism” here as a
biblical literary device, but as a theological term describing a conception of God
developed in reference to human nature. His brief reference to theological
anthropomorphism in Our Knowledge of God depicts it as a violation of the second
commandment, which forbids the creation or worship of an image of God. Baillie writes,
“What is false [in the analogia entis] is the assumption that the comparison moves from
man to God instead of from God to man. Such a view, if consistently carried out, is
bound to end in anthropomorphism, that is, in a breach of the second commandment.”118
In the notes that follow, Baillie argues that there can be a way that
anthropomorphism can be conceived of rightly in that it identifies the likeness and
therefore the revelatory point of contact between God and his human creatures. This is,
of course, where his position is set apart from that of Barth and Kant. Baillie claims that
anthropomorphism, a conception of God developed in reference to human nature, may be
justified when one takes into consideration that God has uniquely created humans in the
image of God, after his likeness. Some measure of anthropomorphism may only be
justified, however, if sin has not completely devastated the image of God in humanity.
To defend the idea that the image remains, in some sense, Baillie makes a case based on
John Calvin’s view of the image of God:
Calvin says, ‘The image of God extends to everything in respect of which the
nature of man surpasses that of all other species of animals.’ (Institutio I xv §3). I
am sure this is right. What differentiates man from other animals is that he bears
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the image of God. Whatever we say, therefore, of the extent of man’s depravity,
we cannot say that his likeness to God has totally disappeared; for then he would
not be a man at all. His likeness to God consists in the first place in his being a
spirit, a personal being.119
This means that the transcendence of God should not be conceived of as the
unknowability of God. Nor should the depravity of human nature be conceived of as an
obliteration of the divine image. Baillie writes, “In respect of spirituality, rationality,
personality, will, God and men are alike, and have something in common with God
which the rest of His creation has not in common with Him. If this were not so, man
could have no knowledge of God. Were we wholly other than He, we could not know
Him to be wholly other, because we could not know Him at all.”120
Due to the fact that out of all of creation only humanity was made in God’s
image, some support can be given for anthropomorphism. “To this extent,” Baillie
concedes, “Aquinas and the Mediaevals were right in finding an analogy between God
and man.” But Baillie goes on, “Where they were wrong was in attempting to construct
an argument of analogy from man to God. If argument there is to be, it must be the other
way around. It will not do to say that, because God’s image is in us, therefore by looking
at ourselves we can be led to the thought of God.”121 Baillie’s objection to the inferential
movement from humanity to God is rooted in his conception of human nature as bearer of
the divine image. He explains his view:
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What does it mean to say that we were made in God’s image and after His
likeness? It means that we are spiritual, rational, personal beings as He is. But it
is not as if we first possessed personality, rationality, spirituality, and then
employed these powers to find out God. Rather are these powers a fruit of
knowledge of God. So we must say that Human nature is constituted by the selfdisclosure of the Infinite and Eternal Reality which is God to our otherwise
merely animal finitude. Man is made man by the invasion of his otherwise merely
animal nature by the divine attributes of personality, infinity, eternity, etc.
It is not because we are spiritual and personal beings that we know God; it
is because we know God, because we are disturbed by the divine dimension of
things, that we are spiritual and personal beings.122
In other words, because God has revealed himself in human creatures, forming them in
his likeness, these creatures have the capacity to know God in return. Put another way,
God is a being who has knowledge, and so any being he creates to image himself will
also have this capacity. But this is not a static capacity or an ability with mere potential.
Instead, being an image bearer initiates the state of affairs in which the image bearer is in
actuality a knower of the one whose image is being sustained.
These notes demonstrate that Baillie consistently seeks to mediate the insights of
opposing viewpoints. He succinctly puts it this way, “Hence, though I think Barth
wrongly denies all analogy between man and God, making God wholly other (so that to
that extent I agree with Aquinas against him), I should agree with Barth as against
Aquinas in denying the validity of an argument of analogy from man to God.”123 He
expresses his mediating position, as demonstrated in the survey of Our Knowledge of
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God, by proposing that God reveals himself to us in, with, and under his creation—
including his human creatures.
Baillie’s argument that knowledge of God cannot be reached by the mere analogy
of human attributes seems the most straight forward when one is considering attributes
such as omnipotence, omniscience, or omnipresence. His argument requires nuance
when other characteristics that would seem more narrowly defined by human experience
are attributed to God. In the following portion of lecture notes, Baillie engages the
challenge of how such characteristics as the fatherhood of God can be said to be a priori,
even as divine omniscience is. The attribution of fatherhood, Baillie writes, “seems to be
a character first apprehended in man, and afterwards by analogy applied to God. Father
is a word whose primary meaning is within the domain of the mammals, the bi-sexual
animal species; and especially within the human family. When we call God Father,
therefore, we could seem to be applying to Him, with due modification, a conception the
meaning of which we have learned in our human family life. It would seem, in a word, to
be a metaphor. And it may seem thus to have been regarded in the teaching of our Lord.
Did he not use arguments a fortiori from human to divine fatherliness. “What man of
you, if his son ask him….? How much more shall your heavenly Father….!” And there
are such parables as the Prodigal Son. And in the Old Testament such drawing of
analogy as in the 103rd Psalm: “Like as a Father pitieth his children, so the Lord….”
Though it would seem that biblical use of the designation of “father” for God is
derived from human experience, Baillie finds insight in Barth that would argue otherwise.
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In the following passage, Baillie introduces and nuances Barth’s perspective on the
divine ideal of fatherhood.
… According to Barth, the original, literal, non-figurative and only ‘proper’ use
of the word Father is as applied to the relation of God the Father to God the Son –
the intra-trinitarian use. There is a secondary – and legitimate – use of the term as
applied to God’s relation to the creature (so that Father means Creator). There is
a tertiary use of it – also legitimate enough – as applied to the relation of human
progenitors to their progeny. And doubtless there is also a quaternary use, when
we apply it to the lower animals; this being derived from the tertiary human use.
But all these other uses are figurative, metaphorical. When a man says ‘God is
the Father of God the Son’, he is not using the figurative language of metaphor,
but when he says ‘John Smith was my father’, he is using the figurative language
of metaphor. What are we to say to all this? Ask Class.
… Now there is no doubt that all these names are applied as conscious
metaphors. And that means that in applying them to God we are using a human
analogy. This is as true of the name father as of any other name. Hence we may
hold, as against Barth, that the primary application of the word is to the natural
relationship of progenitor to progeny within the created world. It is a conception
empirically derived from an actual experience; and when we apply it to God, we
do so in a secondary and transferred use.
We may ask, Would Barth make the same claim for all the names of God
that he makes for the name ‘Father’? There is certainly no good reason for
admitting the claim in one case and denying it in another. When the Israelites
spoke of God as ‘Father’ and as ‘Shepherd of Israel’, or even as ‘Rock’, they were
following one and the same procedure. And Marcus Barth, in this class, told us
that his father, in the Seminary at Basel, had been asked this question and
answered, “Yes, it is the application of the word ‘Rock’ to God that is primary,
and non-figurative.
All this that Barth says seems absurd, but is it really so? I do not think it
is. I believe there is an element of profound truth in it, though Barth, here as
frequently, is to blame for presenting this truth in so one-sided a form.
To realise this element of truth, we must make a distinction. We must
distinguish between a factual and an ideal element in the application of all such
names, and particularly the name Father. When I say, “That man is a father”, I
may mean (a) he has begotten sons and daughters, or (b) he has behaved towards
these sons and daughters as a begetter should behave toward his progeny – as that
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I might say, “He’s a real father to them”. Now when we say that God is our
Father in Heaven, we are using the word in an ideal, not in a factual way. I.e. we
are denominating, not a natural relationship in which we stand to God as His
progeny or as His creatures, but the fact that He loves us with a perfect love and
with the most tender care.124
Baillie, then, understands fatherliness as an ideal that originates in God and which has to
do with perfect love. Baillie defends this idea by pointing out that we use the designation
of father to describe a person who exhibits the kind of “perfect love” and “tender care”
God demonstrates to his human creatures. It is only the revelation of ideal fatherliness,
Baillie writes, that yields to us “a standard which we can apply to human progenitors, in
order to judge how little or how much true fatherliness is in them.”125
This discussion of the ideal of fatherliness provides a helpful and nuanced
example of how knowledge of God comes in, with, and under knowledge of the world
and others. By this expression, “in, with and under,” Baillie means that “though our
knowledge of God is not derived from our knowledge of the created world, yet it is given
us only in conjunction with the latter. The fatherliness of God is a conception we could
not have reached save as we have knowledge of human fathers; but it is not from our
knowledge of human fathers that the conception itself is drawn.”126 Interestingly, this
illustration is not used in Our Knowledge of God, but it is clearly one that Baillie returned
to throughout his career. Earlier in this chapter in the section, The Interpretation of
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Religion in Retrospect, Baillie was quoted in his 1930 letter to David Cairns as using this
idea of fatherhood to illustrate the way in which something is uniquely known of God
through what appears to be a uniquely human experience.127 This discussion of analogy
illustrated by the designation “father” can also be found in an altered, though readily
identifiable, form in pages 120-121 in The Sense of the Presence of God, which was
written thirty years after his correspondence with Cairns. This demonstrates that, though
Baillie did not use this particular illustration in Our Knowledge of God, it is included in
the lecture notes that were clearly referenced for that book. Thus, there is evidence that
Baillie’s theology of revelation understood to be the divine self-communication given in,
with, and under human experience of the world and others was formed by 1930 and
maintained for the duration of his career.
So far, we have shown that much of the content of “The Nature of God” lectures
we have been examining is also found in Our Knowledge of God. We have shown that
though the notes we have are from 1953, a portion of them were taken from an almost
identical course that was likely taught sometime between 1937-1939, prior to the
publication of Our Knowledge of God in 1939. This means that Baillie maintained his
position on the theology of revelation during his tenure at New College. To further
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demonstrate the strong continuity of thought he maintained during the latter years of his
scholarship, we find in these same divinity lectures a section of material that likely served
as the basis for a section in the Gifford Lectures he was preparing up to the time of his
death in 1960 and which were published posthumously in 1962.

Conclusion
To review, there are four major points in Baillie’s thought which have been
identified and traced through his early writing and teaching prior to the publication of
Our Knowledge of God: 1) the revelatory presence of God, 2) the universal human moral
experience as the context for faith, 3) the defensible logic of faith, and 4) the revelation of
God in, with, and under human experience of the world and others. It was demonstrated
that, from his earliest published writing, Baillie insisted on linking the revelation of God
with the divine presence. Baillie understood the presence of God to specifically intersect
human experience on the plane of human morality, which was the focus of his two first
manuscripts, The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul and The Interpretation of Religion.
The universal confrontation of God to all humanity through its moral consciousness
provided the basis for what Baillie argued was a defensible logic of faith. This logical
argument, however, was never intended by Baillie to function as a source of faith, but as
a justification for the reasonableness of faith. The true source of faith, Baillie always
claimed, was the presence of God experienced in, with and under human experience of
the world and others.
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In the next chapter, the contextualization of Baillie’s thought as expressed in Our
Knowledge of God continues in the examination of some of his published articles,
manuscripts and unpublished divinity lectures.

CHAPTER FOUR
A Pilgrim’s Progress: A Study of Baillie’s Mature Theology of Revelation Following
the Publication of Our Knowledge of God
One of the recurring hallmarks of Baillie’s thought is his claim that God reveals
himself to all people through his immediate, personal, confronting and continuous
presence. In a lecture composed in the mid-1930’s, Baillie writes, “Every man is
conscious of a claim that is being made upon him, of a Higher Will, that challenges his
own will…. Unto all has been given the knowledge that something is expected of him
than that which he has already attained.”1 Here, prior to the publication of Our
Knowledge of God, Baillie simply states his conviction that all people have immediate
knowledge of God’s personal presence experienced as a challenge or confrontation.
Even at this relatively early date, however, Baillie observes a very specific contemporary
challenge to his claim that morality and religion are fused as God reveals himself to all
people through a personal demand. The challenge is humanism. “There are some men in
the world today,” Baillie concedes, “who say, ‘Yes, I have these experiences, but I find in
1
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them no revelation of God. There is indeed a challenge which has been made to me, an
obligation laid upon me. I do not deny the facts to which you point, but I deny their
revelatory significance.’”2
The previous two chapters of this dissertation have shown that Baillie has, from
the beginning of his career, aimed to demonstrate that the human moral consciousness is
religious in its origin and, as the moral consciousness is universal (and generally
acknowledged to be so), so humanity’s religious nature and knowledge is as well. It is
not until after World War II breaks out and he writes Invitation to Pilgrimage that Baillie
addresses humanism head on in one of his manuscripts. Whereas the theology of
revelation expressed in Invitation to Pilgrimage contains all the familiar elements seen so
far in Baillie’s previous works, this publication shows how Baillie would have his
theology constructed and applied to the biggest threat against Christianity he perceived in
his time.
This chapter will continue the task of the last chapter in examining Baillie’s
thought expressed in some of the manuscripts, journal articles and unpublished lectures
post-dating the publication of Our Knowledge of God in 1939. In so doing, we will
identify points of continuity and discontinuity with his earlier thought and will especially
be able to introduce some of the nuances of his theology of revelation as Baillie
expressed it in his maturity. We will observe the emphasis on the immediacy of our
knowledge of God rooted in Baillie’s theology of the continuous divine presence. We
2
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will also observe his continued explanation of the mediation of God’s presence through
his creation and the church, thus creating unique and compelling revelatory experiences,
and a more strongly expressed concern for the implications of his theology of revelation
in the lives of individuals and in the ministries of the church.

Invitation to Pilgrimage (1942)
In seeking to trace the development of Baillie’s thought, it is helpful to examine
his book, Invitation to Pilgrimage (1942).3 Though today it is a lesser known
publication,4 it is a valuable reference for several reasons. First, as mentioned, the
context for the book, to which Baillie makes open reference, is the Second World War
and this context appears to have motivated him to write a popular book making a case for
the Christian faith. The influence of World War I on Baillie’s view of humanity and his
theology has been described and highlighted in previous chapters; particularly shaping
had been his exposure to the British army working with the YMCA in France from 1914
to 1919. Just prior to the writing of Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie again volunteered
with the YMCA for about a year in 1939-1940. Isobel Forrester, Baillie’s cousin, recalls
that Baillie escaped France, after German invasion in May 1941, and “returned to
Scotland with a sure word of faith. Bewildered people turned to him for guidance, and
3
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from many pulpits he preached ‘to their condition,’ simply, realistically and with quiet
confidence.”5 Once again, the direction of Baillie’s theology was deeply influenced by
war-time circumstances.
Second, the popular level on which Invitation to Pilgrimage is written provides a
valuable insight into how Baillie’s theology of revelation and his pedagogical insights on
ministering to the masses were put into practice. Baillie writes in his “Preface to the
American Edition” that he had been working on this book and presented lectures based
on his work during the Spring of 1941 at Princeton Theological Seminary and later that
year, in fuller form, at the Alexander Robertson Lectures in Glasgow. It is clear that,
once again, Baillie was influenced by his exposure to the “common person.” And he
writes the book for those whom he has identified elsewhere as the “intellectual masses,”
for those, he writes, “who, while earnestly seeking a firm foundation for their life, are
willing to devote to the quest a certain sustained labor of thought.”6
Third, though it is published only three years after Our Knowledge of God, the
audience and context of Invitation to Pilgrimage make it a distinct text from Our
Knowledge of God; the comparison of the two will further illuminate the progression of
continuity and discontinuity in Baillie’s thought.
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There are three aims to Baillie’s Invitation to Pilgrimage. His first aim is to
diagnose those elements of modern thought that render true Christian belief difficult. His
second aim is to expose the weakness and gaps in modern explanations of reality. And
his third aim is to present the gospel in such a way as to overcome intellectual roadblocks
and meet people’s needs. As part of the review of this book, a brief summary of Baillie’s
diagnosis and critique of the western worldview will be given followed by an analysis of
his application of the gospel to his contemporary context. 7
While Baillie recognizes that people have always struggled to accept God in
Christ, he says there arose a particular stumbling block to Christian belief “in the changed
outlook on human life and history which came in with the Renaissance and was
reinforced by the Aufklärung. This outlook may be very simply described: it was a new
realization of the powers and dignity of man.”8 While such a realization need not
necessarily be juxtaposed to Christian faith, since humanity is most certainly elevated by
the teaching that it is made in God’s image, this realization did in fact generate a
humanistic hubris that diminished the felt need of dependence upon God and his
salvation.
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Baillie spends two chapters describing four characteristics of humanistic thought.9
His responses to these are especially illuminating of his own position. First, Baillie
observes, humanism ushered in the belief that people are able to control their own fate.
Given the advances in science, industry and medicine, this confidence is understandable.
Even so, Baillie sees this as a false confidence; nothing that humanity invents can
diminish its need for salvation in Christ. Humanity’s need and the salvation God offers
in Christ runs deeper than material need or circumstance.
Second, closely related to the first, humanism is characterized by the increasing
comfort with and acceptance of life as it is. When life is made easier by various material
and cultural advancements, it is understandable that people would become numb to the
urgency of the gospel. Baillie writes, “The appearance of a more optimistic assessment
of human nature and a less tragic sense of our fallen and helpless estate is unmistakably
the underlying factor in the situation.”10 For Baillie, nothing has changed or will change
in human nature that could legitimize its hope in human progress and potential; he
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maintains that, even with such a season of progress, humanity retains its need of
salvation.
Even as humanism shapes people’s view of humanity, it shapes people’s view of
history. Baillie’s third observation about humanism regards its view of history, where
history is viewed as a record of human initiative and this view has elevated the stature of
human freedom. To this Baillie responds: “The Christian confession concerning Christ
cannot then be made to square with a purely free-will conception of human life and
history, but only with the conception of human life and history as undergirded by the
prevenient grace of God.”11 For Baillie, the description of life shaped solely, or even
mainly, by human will and effort simply does not fit his reading of scripture’s historical
narrative or his own experience. Reminiscent of personal reflection passages in Our
Knowledge of God, Baillie asks, “Can I, looking back on my own life and history,
truthfully describe it as an eager quest? Was it I who was all the time seeking an elusive
Good, or was I the elusive one, artfully evading the Good that was seeking me?”12 And
of his reading of scripture, Baillie observes that it is God who is the main actor on the
stage of history, not humanity.
The fourth characteristic of humanism Baillie identifies is its view of history as
progress, a process of continuous ascent fueled by human initiative. Such a view directly
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conflicts with the Christian view of history which has as its center the incarnation, death
and resurrection of Christ and which anticipates a triumphant consummation of God’s
kingdom.13
Baillie identifies the western world in a state of worldview flux. He describes
people as living in a culture that has been shaped by the Christian faith while distancing
themselves from its tenets of worship and morality. The rationalistic humanism that
carried the eighteenth century with confidence and hope has been deteriorating into
naturalism, which can only lead to an epistemological wasteland, according to Baillie.
Early on in the book, Baillie puts it this way: “Rationalism, in thus freely following out
its own destiny, has seemed to overreach itself, and in overreaching itself to turn back
upon itself and pass into something very like its own opposite.”14 Once reason had been
celebrated as a means to understand the truth, but since the Enlightenment, it increasingly
became the case that the tool of reason was associated with sensory observation. Reason
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became hijacked by a Rationalism that had come to serve the conclusion that God, who is
not corporeal, did not exist.15 The wartime context in which the western world finds
itself is, Baillie observes, eroding the confidence, independence and optimism of the
humanist perspective on humanity and history.16 In its place is developing what Baillie
describes as an unbelieving and irrational authoritarianism. Baillie is critical of the
Christian thinkers who mirror too closely the intellectual climate of the day, seeking “to
confront anti-Christian dogmatism with Christian dogmatism, an unreasonable paganism
with an equally unreasonable Christianity.”17
For Baillie, Christianity is superlatively reasonable and is therefore rationally
defensible. This conviction is sustained throughout his scholarship, beginning with Roots
of Religion in the Human Soul (1926), where we find Baillie’s first attempt to explain the
logic of faith. Though Baillie does not outline the logic of faith in Invitation to
Pilgrimage as he has in previous publications, neither does he reject it. His
understanding of the reasonableness of Christianity does not lead him to suggest (as
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many Christian thinkers in the previous century had suggested) that people can be
persuaded to Christian belief simply by means of a well-crafted argument for God’s
existence; Baillie rejects that apologetic in Invitation to Pilgrimage just as he had in Our
Knowledge of God.18 Even so, Baillie does not seem to view an appeal to the logic of
faith as a helpful tactic in this more popular book. It can be recalled that he had once felt
he must begin with people’s moral experience and make a case for the reasonableness of
the Christian faith from that starting point.19 In the case of his World War II audience,
Baillie appeals to people’s longing to make sense of their world and discern the truth of
the times, insisting reason is the tool humanity has to perceive truth. Baillie defines
reason as “the ability to recognize truth when it is presented to us.”20 The irrational
dogmatism he sees about him is, for Baillie, a kind of blindness cloaking humanity from
the truth of God that is, in fact, all around. His urging is to live with eyes wide open to
the world, including its suffering and tragedy. Baillie is firmly convinced that God
confronts people with his saving grace even in such a broken context, perhaps especially
in such a context.
In Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie maintains that humanity is as sinful as it ever
was and no milestone of modern progress can diminish humanity’s need for salvation,
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though it may diminish it’s perception of need. Furthermore, people’s rejection of their
need for salvation does not have any bearing on their de facto need for salvation, but it
does force one to look for a way to share the gospel such that it responds to a need that is
acknowledged. Baillie writes, “We are not allowing the Gospel to do its own work
unless we present it to the men of our time in the form in which the profound truth of it is
most likely to be evident to them. If we present the Gospel in the form which brought
most conviction to the men of the fourth century, or of the thirteenth or sixteenth, we are
likely to be presenting it in a form which may actually obscure its relevance to the
problems and trials of today.”21 And how does Baillie present the gospel? He tells his
own story of encountering God, describes the way God encounters all humanity, explains
why people resist the God they encounter and how instead they can embrace him.
Baillie’s story of encountering God begins with his earliest memories – memories
to which he has referred to consistently throughout his career to illustrate his theological
perspective. He recalls, “I cannot remember a time when my life seemed to me to be my
own to with as I pleased.”22 His perception of reality was that he was under the authority
of someone else. In telling his own story of encountering the challenge of God that he
was not his own, Baillie believed he was expressing a common contemporary experience
and feeling. Certainly he knew himself to be under the authority of his parents and
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community, but as he grew to observe those around him, he saw that they, too, were
under the same authority. “I understood,” Baillie writes, “that my parents were under the
same constraint that they were so diligent in transmitting to me.”23 Interestingly, part of
his discovery that it was God whose authority he was under included the discovery of the
fallibility of his mother and elders. Such an episode proved not to be a mere conflict of
wills (a common enough experience for any parent and child), but a conflict of judgments
regarding what was right. In such a conflict Baillie was confronted with these questions:
“What then was the ultimate source of the authority which my parents were thus doing
their fallible best to administer and under which they stood no less than I? What was this
constraint that was laid on us? Whose was this greater will that we were both called upon
to obey?”24 Baillie answers that, from the beginning, he knew it to be God whose
authority and will constrained both his parents and him.
Baillie’s awareness of God’s authority over him generated in him a corresponding
awareness of his resistance to and rebellion against this authority. He refers to this
resistance as the “naughtiness” he recalls from a very early point in his life. “I have no
hesitation,” Baillie writes, “in saying that its essence lay in the tendency to find the centre
of my life in myself, to behave as though I were the centre of my world…. I knew that
when I was naughty I was taking the management of things into my own hands instead of
allowing myself to be managed by God; and I knew that in so doing I was putting things
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badly out of joint…. I knew that when I put self in the centre of things, I was putting
myself where no man, not even a father, has any right to be. For I knew that at the real
centre of things is only God.”25 This particular reflection exhibits not only Baillie’s
awareness of God’s presence and demand, themes which can be found in Our Knowledge
of God, but also of God’s sovereignty in his life – a point of particular emphasis in
Invitation to Pilgrimage. The sovereignty of God is a poignant emphasis given the
wartime context of the book and its tackling of the problem of evil. Here, Baillie’s
identification as the “orthodox liberal” (so David Fergusson) leans heavily to the side of
his Presbyterian orthodoxy. For Baillie, the awareness of this demand placed upon us
and our resistance to it marks the starting point of every person’s journey to God. Even
the apparent journey away from God or the fruitless search for an evasive God fits, as
Baillie understands it, into this paradigm. In a passage reminiscent of Our Knowledge of
God, Baillie writes, “Part of the reason why men cannot find God is that there is that in
Him which they do not desire to find, so that the God whom they are seeking and cannot
find is not the God who truly is.”26
Baillie rejects the modern notion that such angst is an entirely interior experience
created by a tension within one’s own self. He insists that the notion of a moral ideal, the
sense of duty to do what is right, even at a cost, is what creates this tension; furthermore,
25
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this ideal or sense of what is expected comes to a person from outside of herself and hits
hard against her awareness of who she actually is. Baillie says it cannot be society which
is the external thing burdening its members with ideals, for the society, too, seems to be
placed under the same ideals. Though he doesn’t explicitly make the argument, it is clear
that Baillie is operating according to the logic of faith he has long defended: human
moral experience is integral to the experience and knowledge of God and it is our moral
experience which illuminates a moral, personal and absolute being.
It is noteworthy that Baillie here seems to suggest that it is not enough that God is
the source of moral ideals (something he has always affirmed); humanity must also
acknowledge God to be such. This latter point appears to be an addition to what he has
said in earlier writings. Baillie claims “that the moral and spiritual life of man can have
no real meaning apart from God. It is out of man’s dealings with God that this moral and
spiritual life has emerged and, if God is made to disappear from it, nothing at all of it is
left – nothing, that is, that is characteristically human.”27 Moral standards come from
God, and if people persistently and continually reject the revelation of God in their moral
awareness, that moral awareness will diminish just as their awareness of God diminishes.
Baillie admits that, just as a vegetable does not wither and die immediately after it has
been uprooted, so there is some moral vigor to be found in the atheist who lives with the
inheritance of a Christian culture. “There has even been seen in the world,” Baillie
observes, “such a thing as a professed and professional atheist manifesting in his own
27

Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage, 46.

196
deeds the fruit of Christian love. But it would appear that this is likely to be no more than
a very temporary phenomenon. It cannot last long, and it may be that it has already
passed away.”28
In Our Knowledge of God Baillie articulated two sources for unbelief: moral and
intellectual. The moral source is identified with willful resistance to God’s call and
demand while the intellectual source is identified with honest misunderstanding; the
former is identified as sinful while the latter is not. In Invitation to Pilgrimage Baillie
speaks much more openly about sin and seems to articulate a stronger view of its role in
unbelief. Though Baillie still allows for the possibility of someone whose rejection of
God is a misunderstanding of the gospel in Invitation to Pilgrimage, he does not defend
the possibility of a sinless ignorance as the source of atheism as he did in Our Knowledge
of God. He writes in Invitation to Pilgrimage, “I have no doubt that difficulties of belief
are immensely complicated and aggravated by misunderstanding. Of course, they are
never due to misunderstanding alone; another factor is always concerned in them,
namely, sin; and it is this hopelessly raveled and reticulated tangle of sin and unreason, of
wrong motives and wrong logic, coming from a bad heart and a bad head, that creates the
real complexity of our task.”29 What accounts for this diminished concern to defend a
sinless disbelief? Perhaps audience has something to do with it, but it may also be that
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the context of a second world war was the cause of a waning optimism in the possibility
of a pure-of-heart atheism.
In multiple places in Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie describes the foundation of
the spiritual life as a knowledge that a transcendent claim is made upon oneself.30 But,
according to Baillie, what we know at the bottom of our hearts we most often
misunderstand with the top of our minds: “He who stands at the door has come with a
gift, but we are so ready to think that He has come for a payment. The knock is a
Savior’s knock, but we are so ready to think it is a Taskmaster’s…. We interpret the
divine summons merely as a demand for obedient service, and so we try to still the
knocking by feverish action. We turn our religion into a code of good conduct, an ideal
to be striven for, a law to be obeyed.”31 Baillie observes the divine summons to result in
the misunderstanding of feverish moral action, which confirms his early position that the
moral conscience is a central point of contact in divine revelation. But that Baillie insists
this divine summons is not a summons to moral action reinforces and clarifies a nuance
he introduces in Our Knowledge of God. There he writes, “Every revelation of God is a
demand, and the way to knowledge of God is by obedience.”32 Lest this demand for
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obedience be misunderstood to mean, as Kant would view it, a moral demand that
requires moral obedience, Baillie says, “A demand is indeed made, but it is a demand that
we should accept a gift.”33 The gift is simply that, “The righteousness which is
demanded of us, and which we are unable to achieve, has been achieved for us and is
now freely offered to us. God Himself, in the person of Christ the Son, has satisfied His
own claims upon us.”34
In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie discusses the extent of sin insofar as it bears on
his theology of the continuity of nature and grace and the image of God. In Invitation to
Pilgrimage, Baillie examines the nature of sin in general and its impact on people’s
response to the divine summons to receive the gift of God in Christ. Why, Baillie asks,
do people refuse such a gift? He answers that the source of such refusal is pride;
specifically, pride that puts self at the center of reality instead of God. Baillie describes
this pride in terms of one seeking mastery of her own destiny apart from the one who
governs all destiny. It is the misalignment of place wherein the creature seeks to usurp
the role and right of the Creator. In other words, this pride amounts to the rejection of
God’s right to summon one to obedience, especially when that obedience consists of
accepting the righteous work of another in place of one’s own failures.
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Baillie discusses sin and saving faith differently in Invitation to Pilgrimage than
he does in Our Knowledge of God. He does not talk about sin in terms of pride in Our
Knowledge of God, and he does not address saving faith in Our Knowledge of God nearly
to the degree he does in Invitation to Pilgrimage. These differences certainly make sense
given the different audiences and agendas of the books. In Our Knowledge of God,
Baillie devotes much more space to clarifying and defending his distinction between
belief at the bottom of one’s heart and belief at the top of one’s head than he does to
explaining the nature of saving faith. Of course, such an emphasis fits Baillie’s purpose
in Our Knowledge of God, which is, in part, to defend the continuity of nature and grace.
His care to explain a kind of knowledge or belief in God that all people have (which the
preacher can assume in her hearers as being part of the image of God retained by all
people and which is revelation’s point of contact) is part of that defense. In that book he
insists that one must be justified by faith to be saved, but he also allows that “an unselfconscious faith may also in its measure be a fides salvifica.”35 If one only reads Our
Knowledge of God, however, one might suspect of Baillie such a weakened view of
saving faith as to suggest a kind of universalism.
In Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie writes about faith and salvation in much more
Reformed theological terms. For example, he says, “Christianity teaches that salvation is
not by works but by faith, and that ‘justification’ is a pre-condition of sanctification and
not a result of it. We cannot put ourselves right with God by being good; we can only be
35
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good when we are already right with Him; and therefore we must be put right by Him and
not by ourselves.”36 In both books Baillie uses Jesus’ analogy of the good tree bearing
good fruit37 to show that people are recognized by the fruit they bear – not justified based
on their fruit, but recognized.38 In both occasions, Baillie uses this analogy to argue that
if a person bears “good fruit,” it can be deduced that the person is a “good tree.” Put
another way, the fruit that is called sanctification cannot bear forth from someone who is
not justified. In both books Baillie is trying to show that one must be in a certain state,
presumably a changed state, in order to bear good fruit. In Invitation to Pilgrimage,
Baillie explains more clearly what must take place in a person in order to be a bearer of
good fruit: one must be justified by faith in Christ. In terms very different than he uses in
Our Knowledge of God, Baillie writes, “Our salvation consists in trusting and rejoicing in
his rightness rather than in trying to put ourselves right. The Christian revelation is that
God accepts me ‘just as I am’, and not because I have first become other than I am.”39 It
is difficult to see how the trusting Baillie describes here can be anything but selfconscious, particularly if it is a trusting that comes as an expression of humility, as it
must if it involves the acknowledgement of someone else’s righteousness given on our
behalf. Baillie clearly links justification with the surrender of the pride that is the
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hallmark of human sin; this pride is surrendered in the act of acknowledging that in
Christ God has provided the righteousness we could not. This justification can be
understood to be the making of a “good tree” that will and must yield good fruit.
Because Baillie argues that justification and sanctification are organically joined, one can
look to the sanctification in one’s life to test, so to speak, the authenticity of one’s
justification.

Though Baillie in no way indicates that he is crossing anything he said in

Our Knowledge of God, it is difficult to see how, given the way he describes justification
in Invitation to Pilgrimage, one could be a good fruit bearer having experienced no selfconscious surrender of pride. He writes, “Because Christian sanctification means the
progressive defeat of pride, it must mean gradual growth in humility.”40 Again, it is
difficult to imagine that one could both cultivate a sense of surrender and indebtedness
though not having any self-conscious awareness of to whom one was surrendering and
indebted.

“Why I Believe in God”
In a brief article published in 1948, Baillie pulls together many of the themes of
his theology of revelation in a personal and practical reflection on why he believes in
God.41 This article, though it contributes nothing new to his theology, provides a
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meaningful summary of some key components of his thought at a more mature stage in
Baillie’s theological career.
The point has been made that Baillie’s theology of the presence of God is central
to his theology of revelation. In fact, this article and portions of Baillie’s lectures
indicate that the divine presence was not a mere piece in a theological jigsaw puzzle, but
is the very real context for all he does and thinks. God’s presence is so real to him he
acknowledges that it would be entirely appropriate for him to speak to God rather than
about God in reflecting on the question of why he believes in God. He concludes, “But if
I follow the more usual practice, and speak to you about God in the third person instead
of speaking to him in the second person, I must at least not forget (and you must not
forget) that He is of our company this evening, and knows and hears what I say.”42
Similarly, a few years after this article, Baillie again claims that divine presence carries
implications for one’s life and work and thought. In a lecture on the attributes of God in
a new course on the Doctrine of God, Baillie writes,
The analysis of the nature of God is the boldest piece of analysis that the mind of
man ever undertakes; and it must be remembered that it is undertaken in His
presence. He whose nature we are analysing is present to us in the very moment
of our analysis – analysing us! He will hear all we are going to say about Him.
This is a realisation that was before us in our introductory course, but at the
present point in our studies we need to remind ourselves of it again. It means that
we must be facing toward God when we speak about Him; not facing away from
Him and merely towards one another, as if He were not there all the time.
Therefore our talk about Him must be part of our response to Him; and this means
two things: first, that it must be responsible talk, talk conducted in constant
realisation that He of whom we speak is demanding something of us, even as we
42
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speak; and second, that our speaking about Him must in some sort be a speaking
to Him. Our theology, that is, must be part of our worship. Our mention, our
enumeration, of His attributes must be part of His praise.43
With such a perspective, Baillie casts aside the possibility that the task of theology can be
distinct from the work of faith. Theology that attempts to abstract ideas about God from
a relationship to God is not theology at all.
That theology (dogma, doctrine) should be inseparable from faith and an
acknowledged relationship with God requires Baillie to put certain constraints on his
ideas of the nature of one’s knowledge of God. True knowledge of God (that is, not mere
epistemological acquaintance with but an epistemic embracing of God) stems only from a
relationship that already exists. To illustrate, Baillie compares the basis for his belief in
the Pythagorean Theorem with the basis for his belief that Wordsworth’s poetry is
superior to Byron’s. Baillie is confident he could persuade one of the rightness of his
belief in the Pythagorean Theorem by producing the mathematical proof. As for proving
the superiority of Wordsworth to a skeptic, Baillie is not so confident. Though the
skeptic’s doubt has no power to dissuade Baillie from his belief, he admits “my
explanation would leave much to be desired; and however good it was, I should not really
expect to convince you of Wordsworth’s superiority unless you are already aware of
it.”44 Here Baillie articulates this crucial and clarifying assumption in his theology:
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I am far from being able to analyse and set forth the grounds of human belief in
God, and of my own belief in God, to my own complete satisfaction…. Here is a
region in which you must have the belief before you are able to think out the
grounds of it, and in which you will never, however long you live, or however
hard you think, be able to think out the grounds completely or to state them
perfectly. Here is a region also in which men have not been led to the belief, or
are ever likely to be led to the belief, by a prior logical exposition of its
grounds…. If men begin by being without all belief in God, it would be quite
hopeless to try to convert them by argument. Men will believe in God only when
they find themselves unmistakably confronted by His holy presence.45
In other words, the grounds for belief in God are so immediate, so basic, that it is
impossible to recreate the argument or circumstance by which one came to believe. This
is not to say there are no reasons for the belief, but the reasons are not sufficient to
recreate the experience by which one comes to faith.
Baillie’s skepticism of the utility of argument to persuade people unto faith has
been an element of his theology since his earliest publications. Even though, for
example, The Interpretation of Religion made a strong case for the logic of faith and took
care to spell out the rational grounds for faith, it never suggested that faith could be
argued into existence. Baillie seeks to preserve a distinction between an argument that
constrains one to believe and an argument that justifies the interpretation of certain
experiences as revelatory of God in Christ. In a mid-1930s lecture previously
mentioned, Baillie writes, “If you tell me that you have had no such experience of a claim
made upon your will, and a rebuke offered to your selfishness, or if you doubt the
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experience to be more than a subjective illusions, then I can offer you no proof of the
reality of God. The knowledge of God is given only in the experience of revelation. We
cannot first prove the existence of a God who then reveals Himself to us in a fashion
more direct.”46 This must be the context in which all of Baillie’s expressions of personal
belief or defense of the reasonableness of Christian belief is to be received. In the case of
belief in God, Baillie does not pretend he can convince one of something they do not
already have some awareness of.
Baillie answers the question of belief in God with the same kind of language he
has used his whole career. “Why do I believe in God? I believe in God because He
confronts me with a demand that brooks no refusal.”47 Baillie experiences God’s
confronting presence in the form of an undeniable demand placed on him. He says, as he
has said elsewhere, that he has been aware of this presence to one degree or another since
his earliest childhood memories.48 Through the people in his life who taught him about
God and told him the story of Jesus, Baillie became deeply aware “that I was ‘not of my
own’ and that my life was not my own to do with as I pleased. I have always been aware
of this supreme authority under which my life is set.”49 Reiterating a point he has made
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in both Our Knowledge of God and Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie clarifies that “the
presence at my heart’s door has not been that of a Taskmaster, but that of a Savior. I
know that what God wants of me is not in the first place that I should do something but
that I should let something be done for me, and done to me and in me.”50 Baillie
recognizes that rebellion against this demand takes the form of strategizing to take charge
of one’s own life, to live as though there is no demand. But even as he has struggled with
this rebellion, he confesses that “deep down within me I have always known that His
demand was a rightful demand, and that only in the acceptance of His gift could I ever
find a lasting peace and blessedness. It seems to me that this knowledge is much more
deeply grounded than any conclusion that could be reached by so-called scientific
argument.”51
Baillie claims that the confrontation he has experienced is universal; this claim is
based on his understanding that the divine confrontation is a result of God’s
omnipresence. The holy God is near and his nearness meets all humanity with the
experience of demand. Part of being human, according to Baillie’s understanding, is
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being confronted by the holy presence of God. Thus there is no person who can claim to
have no sense at all of God, but only one who thinks he has no experience of God.52 Of
atheism he writes,
Savages do not know God as it has been given to us to know Him. They do not
know the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. But they are very far indeed
from being atheists. I feel, therefore, quite sure of my ground when I say that if
atheism were to become the dominant outlook of our western world, we should be
threatened by a far more serious disintegration of human life than any that history
has known. What a blessing then it is that men go on believing in God in the
bottom of their hearts, even after they have denied Him with their lips! What a
blessing it is that God does not always let go His hold on us when we let go our
hold on Him!
There are no atheists; no people who genuinely have no knowledge of God. All people
are constrained by the presence of God, it would seem, in some way. Particularly in the
west, people benefit from cultural mores that have been conflated with Christian practice.
It may be recalled that what Baillie identifies as belief in God in the bottom of hearts is
simply the way in which a person lives in a Christian way even when she rejects the
doctrinal tenets of the Christian faith.

The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (1956)
Many of Baillie’s books are the product of preparing for publication material that
was originally delivered as lectures. In the case of The Idea of Revelation in Recent
Thought, Baillie had been invited to deliver the 1954 Bampton Lectures at Columbia
University in New York City, which he then revised and expanded for publication two
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years later. Baillie admits in the preface to the book, “The task I had set myself in the
first instance was the comparatively humble one of attempting to survey the considerable
body of recent thought and writing concerning revelation. What I had in mind might be
described as an extended review.”53 Modest though it may seem, The Idea of Revelation
remains a relevant survey of the theology of revelation developed during the first half of
the twentieth century. In terms of its value for Baillie scholarship, Baillie’s relatively
sympathetic depiction of the current theology of revelation clarifies and confirms who
some of the contemporary influences on his thought were.54
The Idea of Revelation begins with a brief survey of the theology of revelation
characterizing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the theological shift that took
place in the nineteenth century. This narrative of a long-standing rationalist conception
of revelation and the swing to a romantic conception is one that Baillie tells in many of
his books, including The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul, The Interpretation of
Religion, Our Knowledge of God, and to some degree Invitation to Pilgrimage. It is an
essential story for Baillie as it contextualizes twentieth-century thought in an important
way. The two-source conception of revelation that had dominated the medieval era
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remained essentially unchallenged until the nineteenth century. The Rationalists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries maintained the idea of a two-fold source, though it
put such emphasis and value on the source of human reason for revelation that the divine
source of faith came to be viewed as somewhat redundant. The Romantic period in the
nineteenth century reacted to what was perceived as the audacious claims of reason and
developed instead bases for theology that were neither reason nor revelation, which for
some time had been understood as the authoritative communication of doctrine. The
twentieth century then faced the question of revelation standing in an inheritance which
had rejected both the unaided intellect as a source to discern divine truth as well as the
conception of revelation as a function of the mind to assent to a certain set of doctrinal
propositions. The rest of The Idea of Revelation examines what recent thought on the
idea of revelation has proposed concerning the nature of divine revelation – how it is
transmitted and received and what difference it makes to conceive of it in a new way.
Natural theology, the idea that human reason apart from special divine
illumination is able to deduce the existence and even nature of God from creation and all
its workings, was no longer an unchallenged explanation for revelation in the twentieth
century. Baillie reports four key ideas characteristic of the theology of his day that
essentially reject the viability of natural theology. First, it was claimed that the
apprehending apparatus of revelation is not reason but faith. This switch marks the
concern people had to identify God as somehow being a part of the reception process;
human reason was often juxtaposed to faith as being an entirely autonomous means by
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which to apprehend God.55 Second, is was argued that God’s self-revelation was not
static; that is, God’s revelation is not an announcement posted on a bulletin board that
one may or may not choose to stop and read. An important change that took place in
twentieth century theology of revelation was the conception that divine revelation
required both the transmission and reception of that transmission to be considered actual
revelation. Third, closely related to the second point, revelation was necessarily
understood to be an event. If God’s revelation is not static and requires that the
transmission of God be received by a person, then what is taking place can accurately be
described as an event or encounter. Baillie puts it this way, “The receiving is as
necessary to a completed act of revelation as the giving. It is only so far as the action of
God in history is understood as God means it to be understood that revelation has place at
all. The illumination of the receiving mind is a necessary condition of the divine selfdisclosure.”56 The fourth point distinguishing the contemporary thought Baillie surveys
is key to its position and its move away from the traditional conception of revelation as
the communication of doctrinal propositions; that is, revelation introduces people to God
himself. Baillie writes, “God does not give us information by communication; He gives
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us Himself in communion.”57 These four points are all interrelated and depict the
contemporary rejection of natural theology.
As mentioned above, one of the significant shifts in the conception of revelation
involved the idea that divine revelation did not constitute a mere transmission, but a
transmission received. The twentieth-century theology Baillie surveys in The Idea of
Revelation conceives of this reception of revelation as an exercise of faith. This
reception does not utilize reason to detect a static divine revelation; it is faith that
responds to an encounter with the divine. According to Baillie, the contemporary
consensus is to describe this revelation-as-event in terms of a demand or call.58 While
Baillie spells out his own conception of this demand in detail in Our Knowledge of God
and Invitation to Pilgrimage, here he simply identifies it as a point of consensus among
his contemporaries and one which shapes the modern conception of faith as a response to
revelation.
Baillie points out that there is always a logical correspondence to be found in the
way revelation and its reception is understood in any given era. For example, if
revelation is understood to be the communication of doctrinal propositions, then the
primary reception of that revelation would have to take the form of some kind of
intellectual assent to those propositions. In the case of divine revelation consisting of a
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personal encounter with God through his action in history, the corresponding view of
faith shifted from intellectual assent to a form of personal trust. Baillie argues that “What
is important is that there should be correspondence in all points between our
understanding of the revelation that is given and our understanding of the faith that
receives it. If what is directly revealed is God Himself rather than truths about God, then
faith must be primarily trust rather than assent. If God has revealed Himself in a saving
Event, then faith must be a reliance upon the saving power of that Event. If revelation is
at the same time an offer and a demand, then faith must be understood as an acceptance
of the offer which is at the same time a yielding to the demand.”59
In his discussion of faith in The Idea of Revelation, Baillie describes the three
elements distinguished in faith during the medieval era: understanding (notitia), assent
(assensus), and trust (fiducia). Baillie defends the contemporary conception of faith as
trust, being an act of the will, claiming this perspective is an improvement over the
traditional view of faith as primarily assent, an act of the intellect. He does not here
suggest that faith should be conceived of as trust and not as assent; rather, trust is the
primary action in the faith that responds to divine revelation. Baillie asks, “Can there be
fiducia without assensus? Obviously not. A man cannot embrace Christ’s salvation
without assenting to the fact that Christ is such as to be able to save.”60 In other words,
assent is an implicit part of trust. Again, because revelation is conceived of as the
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communication of salvation itself and not mere knowledge about salvation, the
appropriate response to it is faith understood as something more than an acknowledgment
of understanding. And though assent is an implicit part of trust, trust is not an implicit
part of assent.
In defining the relationship between assent and trust, Baillie makes two
observations about this contemporary view of faith. First, none of the thinkers he
surveys, specifically Temple, Brunner and Barth, “desires to extrude the elements of
notitia and assensus, and none would tolerate a formless faith from which these were
absent. But they are anxious to establish the primacy of trust as over against assent.”61
Second, he says these thinkers are also anxious “to affirm that the trust and commitment
may be wholehearted before the elements of assent which it implicitly contains are drawn
out in a self-conscious way, and even when they are drawn out incorrectly.”62 Baillie is
among the contemporary thinkers who defends the idea that faith’s assent can exist
without being conscious of itself. In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie criticized the
Westminster Assembly for insisting that faith’s assent must be self-conscious. To his
thinking, this insistence was born of an overly intellectualistic interpretation of
Christianity and, in effect, it makes right belief the test of true faith. In response he
writes, “There is no reason why we should not extend the distinction between fides
directa and fides reflexa to the element of assensus as well as to that of fiducia, and speak
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of an unconscious assent.”63 Baillie’s view of unconscious faith in Our Knowledge of
God is clarified by his discussion of it in The Idea of Revelation.64 This unconscious
faith is what he defended as belief in God at the bottom of one’s heart in Our Knowledge
of God. It is challenging to conceive of what an unconscious assent looks like, but it can
be said to be one of Baillie’s characteristic commitments to insist that Christianity make
room for a kind of subterranean faith that manifests itself in the good fruit it bears.
Baillie contextualizes his point about implicit assent in a brief discussion of the
historical development of doctrine in The Idea of Revelation. Instead of leaving it to
sound as if there are two different forms of faith by which a person may be saved, Baillie
describes the lack of conscious assent this way: “When I trust somebody, or have fiducia
in him, I am manifestly at the same time believing certain things about him to be true, yet
I may find it very difficult to say exactly what these things are – I may even flounder
helplessly in the attempt to assign the reasons for my trust. This is why the formal
development of dogma, especially of Christological dogma, hardly got under way until
the Christian mission had been confronted with the skepticism of the Greek mind.”65 In
other words, assent to certain facts about God is implicit in one’s trust of him. This
context for Baillie’s defense of belief at the bottom of one’s heart or implicit assent is the
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most helpful context for understanding and accepting his idea because it resonates with
common experience.
The claim that trust involves implicit assent can be illustrated with familiar human
relationships. Take as an example the observation of a mother and her three-year-old
daughter at a playground. The child is playing on the equipment only with significant
reliance on the mother’s help: she crosses the monkey bars and braves the long drop to
the ground because the mother is holding her daughter at the waist; she goes down the
very steep slide because her mother holds her hand as she slides down; she jumps from a
platform twice her height because her mother stands below to catch her. To the observer,
it is evident that the daughter trusts her mother to make her exploration of the play
equipment safe and enjoyable. But can the three-year-old girl articulate this trust?
Would she say that she trusts her mother, let alone defend why she trusts her mother?
Not likely. Even so, the daughter’s willing and fearless leap into her mother’s arms is the
fruit, as Baillie would say, of such trust. And the facts about the mother which the child
must surely believe in order to trust her (such as her goodness, her dependability, her
strength) are implicit in that trust, though again, not likely to be articulated by a threeyear-old.
In another example, take the case of the Christian believer who is cornered by an
atheist’s well-articulated argument against the existence of God based on the problem of
evil. The Christian may not be familiar with the traditional elements of this argument
targeting the goodness and power of God and may not know how to challenge the non
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sequiter conclusion that God must not exist if evil does exist. And insofar as the
Christian is unable to defend her faith in this context, it would appear that the Christian
does not know what she believes and is easily defeated by her agnostic opponent. Yet,
the Christian knows, no matter what argument is made against her belief, that God is and
he is good and he has saved her. She may be distressed that she is unable to articulate her
faith in a convincing manner, but she remains unshaken in her belief about who God is.
She just knows that any attack on his existence and goodness simply is not grounded in
reality. The fact that this Christian assents to knowledge she cannot articulate is
demonstrated when, after taking some Bible, theology and philosophy courses, she
declares, “Now I know better what I believe.” Her fundamental belief in God has not
changed, but she has learned to identify the implications of her belief in God, to see the
logical connections within her belief system, to recognize classical arguments for and
against God’s existence, and to articulate a reasonable defense of her belief in God. This
common scenario illustrates that a person can believe in God with a trust that does not
waver despite seeming intellectual defeat. The arguments that might rationally justify
such trust are not consciously accessible to the person and therefore cannot be
consciously assented to, though they can be said to be implicit to her trust in God’s
existence and goodness.
The last chapter of The Idea of Revelation examines the impact the contemporary
view of revelation has had on the understanding of Scripture as revelation. Baillie says
there are important implications for Scripture as revelation given the shift in
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understanding revelation as involving not only divine transmission but also human
reception of that transmission. Baillie says,
We have accepted the view that the completed act of divine revelation consists in
the intercourse of event and interpretation. God’s revealing activity is recognised
by the Christian not only in the mighty acts which He performed for our
redemption but in His illumination of the prophetic and apostolic mind. He so
chose Israel that He not only led them out of Egypt but also enabled Moses and
the prophets to grasp the significance of that exodus. He so loved the world that
he not only sent His Son but at the same time enabled the apostles to grasp the
significance of that mission.66
But should the Bible be viewed as God’s revelatory transmission? Is it a record of human
reception? Baillie says Scripture should not first be identified as either. “After the
illumination was the witness. The illumination was integral to that to which witness was
borne, but the witness itself came afterwards. There was indeed a spoken witness before
there was a written one…. The Bible is the written witness to that intercourse of mind
and event which is the essence of revelation.”67 In other words, Scripture is not called
revelation because it does not, of itself, involve the event and illumination of a mind
which is entailed in true revelation. It is a common thing to hear Scripture described as
God’s revelation, and, according to the view Baillie is surveying and endorsing, Scripture
certainly can be God’s revelation, but it ought not be described as existing in a revelatory
state. According to Baillie, nothing exists in a revelatory state; revelation is not static.
Rather, Scripture is a witness or testimony of revelation. Of course, Baillie recognizes
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that the reading of Scripture may be the event in which God illuminates the mind and
stirs the heart to faith; in such an event the witness has become the revelation. As Baillie
puts it, “Nothing is the vehicle of revelation for me unless I hear God speaking to me
through it.”68
As mentioned, the redefinition of revelation as a personal encounter with God
himself, as opposed to the communication of doctrinal propositions, other elements
related to revelation must be redefined to maintain congruence. The theme of personal
encounter with God is the hallmark of the new direction theology of revelation takes in
the early twentieth-century and is a point of agreement among the main theologians
Baillie engages in his survey of the subject in recent thought. The personal nature of the
encounter with God requires that faith is no longer viewed as primarily intellectual assent
but as trust in the God encountered in revelation. Likewise, the bible is not described as
containing revelation (as if revelation were a set of collected propositions), but as
witnessing to revelation (understood as encounter). In other words, revelation is an
event.69
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Baillie briefly addresses the traditional characterizations of Scripture as inspired
and infallible. He describes the Bible’s inspiration as an enlightenment given by the
Holy Spirit to assist the biblical writers in conveying the message of salvation to others.70
This inspiration does not bring with it a guarantee of infallibility; rather, “The witness
itself if a human activity and as such fallible.”71 Baillie suggests that the only way
human involvement could not include error would be if the Spirit overrode human
participation completely, and this he denies. Even so, he seeks to preserve the special
nature of Scripture. He writes, “The Scriptures are holy because they are the vehicle
through which the Gospel is communicated to us. We know nothing of Christ except
what comes to us through the Bible, all later communication of Christian knowledge
being dependent on upon this original record.”72 Baillie sets Scripture apart as having a
unique role in revelation because of it special purpose in communicating the gospel,
rather than due to the fact that it is inspired by the Holy Spirit. In fact, “the inspiration of
the Holy Spirit was not denied to later writers, or to later preachers and teachers.”73 It
would seem, then, that Baillie seeks to set Scripture apart as preserving the record of the
gospel, which is essential to, though distinct from, revelation.
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Baillie acknowledges that the Bible can be revelation, but asks to what degree it
can be revelation. He accepts
Luther’s criterion that the revelatory quality of each part of the Bible is to be
judged according to the measure in which it ‘preaches Christ’ (Christum treibt);
and whatever some have professed in theory, nobody has ever in practice treated
all as on the same level in this regard…. There is no Christian who hears God
speaking to him through every passage in the Bible, so that for each of us there
are some passages that are not revelatory at all. Nevertheless it is always our duty
to ask ourselves whether the defect may not be in ourselves rather than in the text,
whether even here it is not we who are not willing to listen rather than that
nothing significant is being said.74
It would seem, then, that Baillie wants to assert that the whole of the Bible can be
revelatory (that is, used by God to illuminate a truth to someone), but that it also has a
primary and objective message to which every pericope, in varying degrees, contributes.
This situation suggests that perhaps a distinction needs to be made between the Bible as
possible medium for revelation and the Bible as providing revelatory content.
Baillie writes an Epilogue, “The Challenge of Revelation,” to The Idea of
Revelation in which he takes the opportunity to move from the abstract discussion of
revelation to a more personal point of view. Specifically, he seeks to “consider in as
realistic a way as possible the challenge to each one of us individually that is contained in
the impingement of the divine upon our daily life.”75 Though much of Baillie’s theology
of revelation can be recognized in his survey, some of his unique phrases and anecdotes
anchor this last part of the book. What does the challenge of revelation look like for each
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person? It is the challenge to listen and obey. Revelation challenges one to respond in
faith, and faith is essentially “to listen and to obey, to be alert to whatever God may have
to say to us, and then to adjust our lives to what we hear.”76 This response fits with what
Baillie says earlier in the book about trust being the primary activity in belief; trust is
both harkening to and heeding the call of God.
Baillie is sympathetic to the resistance commonly found in response to the
challenge of revelation. The complaint that God ought to provide an unmistakable and
undeniable sign of his existence and lordship is one that Baillie himself wrestled with
during his university years, an experience that kept him sensitive, over the years, to
others’ struggles. In this book he tells again of a wintry walk home after a philosophical
discussion on the existence of God and, pausing to look at the stars, “hurled [his]
despairing question, but it seemed to hit nothing, and no answer came back.”77 In
retrospect, Baillie discerns that the hollow silence that followed his question did not
reflect God’s absence but Baillie’s own inattentiveness. He describes himself as being
“conveniently deaf” to what God was saying to him: “Much of the trouble in the days
when I could not hear God’s voice was that I was not really listening…. And why did I
not thus hearken? It was that there were certain things I did not want to hear.”78
Reflecting his perspective in Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie suggests that he, as others
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are today, was influenced by the spirit of the age and the philosophical ideas in vogue. In
other words, the intellectual climate of the day (specifically, the humanism Baillie wrote
about in the 1940s) is making it “difficult to achieve, or to recover, that naked contact of
our minds with the confronting reality out of which true wisdom can alone be born.”79 In
other words, Baillie says, one must respond to God’s challenge like a child – “only the
innocent and childlike mind can hearken diligently.”80 Two brief questions close
Baillie’s reflection on the challenge of revelation and function themselves to challenge
his readers. First, he asks, “are you sure there is not something which [God] is plainly
saying to you, and to which you are not giving ear?”81 And second, “If you have listened,
have you obeyed?”82
In his 1959 Eugene William Lyman Lecture, “Liberalism in Theology,” Baillie
provides further reflection on the changed view of Scripture in contemporary theology.
Here he defines theological liberalism as “a movement towards greater freedom from the
fixity of the traditional interpretation of the faith.”83 Baillie suggests that the momentum
for such a movement is started by one’s realization that the tradition surrounding a belief
is in need of “adjustment or re-interpretation before it can be accepted or before its true
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significance can be grasped.” Baillie continues, “Partly he is concerned with the problem
of communication, as we now call it; but he is concerned no less so to adjust or interpret
the tradition that he himself can give credence to it and understand its true relevance.
The reason why he feels this process to be necessary is that the tradition was formed in a
by-gone age whose intellectual climate was very different from that in which he and his
contemporaries now live.”84 In this article Baillie seeks to provide a mediating
perspective on theological liberalism. What he identifies as a “pre-1914 version of
liberalism,” that is, pre-war Protestant Liberalism, has come to be viewed as having gone
too far in its re-interpretation of the Christian gospel.85 But the anti-liberalism of postwar theology, specifically any sympathetically Barthian theology, does not, in fact, reject
the tenets of liberalism as absolutely as it might think. He insists that the adjustment and
reinterpretation of the truth of scripture is something that continues to be the focus of
contemporary theology and that this is still a characteristic of liberalism. Baillie
observes, “We are nowadays very much in revolt against nineteenth-century liberalism…,
but I do not think we are in revolt against its changed concept of revelation, its new
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outlook on the Biblical literature, or its new sense of the element of uncertainty in all
historical evidence. These are matters in which we are all equally liberals.”86
For Baillie, then, the preserved insight of liberalism lies in its “effort to
distinguish the substance of the received teaching from its accidents, the kernel from the
original or traditional husk, the unchanging truth from its time-conditioned setting.”87
This characteristic of liberalism can be observed in Baillie’s perspective on scripture as
revelation in The Idea of Revelation in which he insists that “there is that in the Bible to
which we must hold fast in a way to which we cannot hold fast to its pre-Copernican,
even pre-Ptolemaic, cosmography of an ‘up-and-down’ and ‘three-storey’ universe; yet to
do so is precisely to disentangle the essential revelation from the contemporary thoughtform in which alone it could at that time be received.”88 Putting aside for the moment
important questions like what criterion one might use to disentangle essential revelation
from a particular context or how one might recognize what is essential to revelation and
what is not, it may be observed that Baillie’s primary concern is the preservation of the
gospel. In his Lyman lecture, Baillie recognizes that the gospel is characteristically a
stumbling block. But he says, “While the Gospel, if it is truly presented, must always be
a stumbling-block to the rational man, we must nevertheless be careful that the
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stumbling-block which we exhibit in our preaching of it is the real stumbling-block and
not an adventitious one.”89 Elsewhere Baillie has expressed concern that the preacher
must present the gospel in such a way as to be understood to be addressing a universal
need, that the gospel is intrinsically relevant to all people, but it is the preacher’s job to
show that it is relevant. Invitation to Pilgrimage, for example, was one of Baillie’s
significant attempts to relevantly convey the gospel to his peers. He framed the gospel in
terms of God’s challenge to each person, a challenge that can be recognized if we but pay
attention to the disquiet in our lives.
On the matter of the gospel being a stumbling block, Baillie again addresses the
matter of honest intellectual doubt (which he seems to juxtapose to culpable moral
doubt). In addition to the characteristic nature of the gospel to be a stumbling block,
Baillie remarks that he has long felt that there is an additional, accidental stumbling block
that has come to be associated with the Christian gospel. “In our generation,” he writes,
“there are many men of an integrity such as would put most of us Christians to shame,
who are seeking the light with an eagerness of which we cannot all boast, yet who cannot
without intellectual dishonesty, such as is itself a form of the love of darkness,
accommodate their minds to much that the tradition contains.”90 Baillie goes on to say
that such people stumble at the trappings of revelation – those historical-cultural
assumptions that for the original hearers of scripture would have not made an impression
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since they would have been part of their “common sense outlook” or worldview. “Only
to a very limited extent, then, is it true that the Gospel preaching met in those days with
honest intellectual difficulty of the kind it so often meets with to-day.”91 Baillie goes on
to observe that “there is no doubt that our problem goes deeper than theirs, as having its
root in changes of outlook which are in no way specific to a particular philosophy but
which to-day are shared alike by all philosophies and by those who have none. Now I
venture to think that the Gospel of Jesus Christ was never intended to be intellectually
baffling in this way. This is not the authentic stumbling block, but an adventitious one,
which it is our duty to remove from before men’s feet as best we can.”92 What Baillie
writes here is valuable, for it would appear this is the first place in in his writings that he
identifies the problem of honest intellectual doubt as a largely contemporary problem.
Baillie introduces the idea of honest intellectual doubt in depth in Our Knowledge of
God, twenty years before this lecture is given, and returns to it consistently throughout
his writings as a contrast to the more common culpable moral rejection of the gospel.
This makes sense of why he defends it in Our Knowledge of God despite his admittance
that the Apostle Paul does not seem to acknowledge anything like Baillie’s honest (nonculpable) intellectual doubt in his descriptions of humanity’s rejection of the gospel. He
observes the common person to be enmeshed in the prevailing humanistic worldview and
the impact this has on how the gospel is understood and heard and felt. The challenge of
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the gospel becomes muffled by its encasement in its own worldview assumptions and is
thus received as irrelevant. This is the unnecessary stumbling block to the gospel Baillie
aims to do away with.

Swansong: The Sense of the Presence of God (1962)
Baillie died on September 29, 1960. He was scheduled to deliver the 1961-1962
Gifford Lectures, and though many were disappointed that he would not be able to
deliver them himself, his lectures were so thoroughly prepared and edited prior to his
death that they were published as Gifford Lectures in 1962. John McIntyre, who read
through the manuscript to assess its possibility for publication, writes in the Foreword
that these lectures “show how to the very end of his life [Baillie] actively maintained his
concern with contemporary problems, and how clearly he continued to state the great
certainties of the faith in the context of a changing intellectual environment. There could
scarcely be a finer conclusion to a life of such academic brilliance, theological literary
achievement and profound Christian devotion.”93
The Gifford Lectures were designed to give special opportunity to those
theologians and philosophers who would, with enthusiastic endorsement, take up the
subject of natural theology. Baillie was not the first lecturer who could not bring such
enthusiastic endorsement to the lectures. What he did provide, characteristically, was a
mediating position on the nature of our knowledge of God. As he had many years before
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in Our Knowledge of God, Baillie rejects the idea of a natural theology that depends
solely on inferences made from empirical experience of the world. Instead he endorses
John Calvin’s idea that there is a sense of the divine all people experience. What Baillie
insists on, though, is that this sense is not a static, innate body of knowledge implanted in
all humanity, nor was it once given and has since deteriorated through the generations.
Consistent with his career-long teaching of the active presence of God, Baillie insists this
sense of the divine comes from the divine in fact engaging with humanity. Thus in his
reflection on the world’s religions through history, Baillie writes, “If there is any measure
of true insight into things divine, however limited, within the great ethnic systems of
religious thought; if there is any element of truth, mixed with however much error, in the
thinking of Gautama Buddha, the Bhagavadgita, Lao-tse, the Greek tragedians, Socrates,
or Epictetus; it came through no ‘unaided’ exercise of human wit but from the working of
the Holy Spirit of God. What is true in any religious system is from God; what is false is
of our own imagining.”94
An important implication of Baillie’s view of God’s continuous presence is that
the arena of human knowledge is broader than what many thinkers of Baillie’s day were
willing to concede. Specifically, in The Sense of the Presence of God, Baillie challenges
what he claims to be the limiting assumptions of logical positivists, those he labels
“reductive naturalists,” and other narrow-minded empiricists. Though his engagement
with these various perspectives and their representatives remains gracious throughout the
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book, Baillie allows himself the rare opportunity to vent his frustration in his
“Retrospect” chapter. Here he writes,
In the early chapters I argued at considerable length with the school of logical or
conceptual analysis which has recently dominated the philosophical thinking of
Oxford and Cambridge, has spread to the provincial English Universities, and is
increasingly invading the American Universities and Colleges. I have made many
concessions to this school, have accepted no small part of what it puts forward,
and have learned much from it. But when I am asked to swallow it whole, I
become angry, and the more of the recent books I read by its representatives, the
angrier I become.95
Baillie’s anger comes from a deep pastoral concern. He is concerned that the advocates
of the recent philosophical trend are finding it acceptable to function without the virtues
of love and humility; Baillie calls such people “half-men.” And “it is with the half-men
who know nothing but analysis, and leave us nothing but the reductive naturalism in
which it issues, that my present argument has been concerned; and I confess that in my
heart of hearts my impatience with them knows no bounds.”96 Baillie’s honest
expression of anger and impatience is notable since he does not write this way in his
other works. Did he grow intemperate with age? Or did his cancer, the pain of which he
worked through while writing this manuscript, bring his frustrations to the surface? Or
perhaps both his age and illness simply clarified what was most important to him: the
fellowship of love, as he puts it his swansong manuscript.
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Despite the newer philosophical terrain in the 1950s, The Sense of the Presence of
God essentially defends the ideas found in Our Knowledge of God written twenty years
prior. The new context draws out some different features and emphases in Baillie’s
thought; for example, the idea of the fellowship of love and the communal aspect of
God’s revelation are central to his argument. The familiar features include, as mentioned,
the continuous presence of God and the idea that God comes to humanity in, with, and
under other elements of creation. In fact, it is in his argument that God’s presence meets
humanity in, with and under creation, including other people, that Baillie makes his case
that the arena of human knowledge is greater than just the material world. Analogous to
humans having senses designed to apprehend the material world, humans also have the
capacity – the sense – to apprehend the divine. Such senses “enable us to perceive
something not otherwise perceptible; to perceive it, I say, and not merely to conceive it as
a concept to which we are led by argument.”97 Interestingly, though the scope of human
knowledge goes beyond the corporeal, this “beyond” is only detected through the
corporeal.
As formerly in Our Knowledge of God, Baillie is concerned to defend knowledge
of God as immediate. The inherent connection between one’s sense of the presence of
God and one’s sense of the material world might mislead one to think that the presence of
God is inferred from some magnificent display in nature. Baillie is very clear that the
immediacy of sensory knowledge of the material world is part of the analogy of sensory
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Baillie, Sense of the Presence, 53.

231
knowledge of God. Knowledge of God in, with, and under the natural world is
immediate, meaning that it is not inferred from any other experience. Thus the nature of
knowledge of God being a mediated immediacy becomes again clear: it is knowledge
mediated through all God has created, but not inferentially mediated. Knowledge of God
is immediate because it entails direct perception, and this direct perception is the faculty
of faith.
Baillie describes faith as the sensing faculty by which one perceives God and not
as a product of religious experience. Faith is not, for Baillie, a conclusion one draws
having reflected on a spiritual encounter; it is a gift. Baillie puts it this way, “Faith is
experience, but like all veridical experience, it is determined for us and produced in us by
something not ourselves. We cannot make ourselves believe and we should not try. If it
is veridical at all, faith is the gift of God.”98 In another passage, Baillie writes, “Faith
does not deduce from other realities that are present the existence of a God who is not
present but absent; rather is it an awareness of the divine Presence itself, however hidden
behind the veils of sense.”99 Baillie describes other persons as being a vital mediation of
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the reality of God’s presence: “The way to God passes through my relation to my
neighbour, and the way to my neighbour passes through my relation to God.”100
Baillie also describes faith in terms of commitment; faith is not only a mode of
apprehension, but an expression of commitment or obedience.101 This dual action of faith
makes sense when faith is understood to be the mode of apprehending God in, with, and
under fellow humans. Baillie notes that one’s interaction with another human being
naturally generates a sense of responsibility, to some degree, for that person. “In the
ethico-religious sphere,” Baillie writes, “where we have to do with personal relations, we
do but evade the realities presented to our apprehension if we face them otherwise than
responsibly.”102 This perception one has of responsibility for another person is not a
distinct apprehension of the faculty of faith but it illustrates two interesting points. First,
that just as one is not meant to perceive another person with disinterest, so one is not
meant to perceive the divine being with disinterest. In both cases, the faculty of
perception carries with it a mode of response. Second, faith’s perception of God through
perception of another person and all the moral trappings that come with that human
relationship is an essential means by which God directs the response of faith. That is, the
faithful response to God is to love one’s neighbor. According to Baillie, “We can reach
God only through our neighbour. We cannot love him except in loving our neighbour.
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Nor does God reach us or manifest his love to us save through our neighbour – that is,
save in our togetherness with him. Christianity is in its very essence a matter of
fellowship.”103
Though Baillie is careful to delineate the nature of faith as the mode of
apprehending God in The Sense of the Presence of God, he writes of faith in much more
philosophically epistemological terms (as opposed to biblical or salvific terms) than in
either Our Knowledge of God or Invitation to Pilgrimage. This can certainly be
explained by the audience and venue to whom and in which Baillie anticipated giving
these lectures. But just as he added an Epilogue to The Idea of Revelation in Recent
Thought in which he could reflect on the matters of revelation more personally and
practically, so he closes his argument in The Sense of the Presence of God with a
practical and pastorally minded summary of what faith looks like in the life of a
Christian. The chapter is titled, “Grace and Gratitude,” and Baillie argues that the reality
with which people are confronted with in God’s presence and which is apprehended by
faith is ultimately the reality of God’s grace. And the response of faith, the appropriate
commitment or obedience of faith to that reality is gratitude. Baillie writes, “Gratitude is
not only the dominant note in Christian piety but equally the dominant motive of
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Christian action in the world. Such gratitude is for the grace that has been shown us by
God.”104 In Invitation to Pilgrimage, Baillie observed that the key character of sin is
pride, and that salvation is the humility that receives what God has done in Christ on our
behalf. Picking up these same themes, Baillie says that gratitude must be the motive for
Christian action because it is the only motive consistent with the grace shown to sinners.
“Our best service is no more than a token,” he writes, “and even then it is not a token of
repayment, but only a token of gratitude. We must never try by anything we do to put
ourselves right with God. ‘It is God who puts us right’ … and it is out of the confidence
that we are thus already right with him that our sense of gratitude is born”105 Thus faith
apprehends God’s grace and responds with the obedience of gratitude.

Conclusion
In the introductory chapter to this dissertation, the question was raised, generally,
why some people believe in God and some do not. The point was made that any theology
of revelation must grapple with this question. It has been demonstrated that Baillie did
indeed take up this question throughout his career, but the brief survey of some key texts
in Baillie’s later years suggest that this question was especially in the fore of his thought.
And in these later years, the question of belief and unbelief was not a mere academic
question to him, but one he passionately and persistently engaged.
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Baillie’s insistence that his theological explanations and explorations of the
theology of revelation have personal impact can be demonstrated by both his Epilogue to
The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought and his closing chapter in The Sense of the
Presence of God. In both these closings to scholarly contributions to the theology of
revelation, Baillie allows himself the opportunity to follow through on what the theology
looks like when it is lived. After surveying contemporary trends in revelation theology in
which God’s self-revelation is described as personal encounter with the divine, Baillie’s
Epilogue to The Idea of Revelation addresses what must be our response to such an
encounter: to listen and obey. Similarly, Baillie turns the podium into a pulpit at the
close of his Gifford Lectures to admonish his listeners to live a life of grace as an
expression of gratitude to God for the grace shown in his saving self-revelation.
Though Baillie acknowledged even in Our Knowledge of God that theology is a
task performed in the presence of God, it appears that this conviction manifests itself
more in his later years. Baillie’s view of theology as worship and dialogue is a feature of
his later thought that distances him somewhat from his earlier thought. In an earlier
“Introduction to Theology” course, predating both The Roots of Religion and The
Interpretation of Religion, Baillie defines theology as the science of religion.106 He
changes his way of defining theology in a later Introduction to Theology course (this one
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drawing on Our Knowledge of God instead of The Interpretation of Religion).107 There is
the practical reason that the term “science” can be somewhat misleading; Baillie writes,
“Is theology properly to be spoken of as a science? In my Interpretation of Religion I
adapt this usage, but now I have some doubts about the wisdom of it….I think it may be
wise to avoid speaking of theology as a science at all.”108 Though he never meant it in
this way, Baillie wants to move away from theology as a science, with its connotation of
studying God using a scientific method of disengaged observation and deduction.
Instead,
Your theology then is part of your religion, part of your worship of God. In this
classroom you will all the time be worshipping God, but you will be worshipping
Him in a special way—in a way in which only few men are called upon to
worship Him. You will be doing nothing here but developing into a stronger
growth one side of your religion, namely the intellectual side of it; which it is not
necessary for all to develop to anything like this extent; and without developing
which (to this extent) religion can be at its very highest and purest, as the cases of
many of the greatest saints show.
But now, if theology is ‘nothing but the experience of religion’ itself
raised to a higher degree of intellectual self-consciousness, a very important
consequence follows: namely, that the theologian always takes up his standpoint
within the religious experience which it is his business to explicate. He is never
looking at religion (or Christianity) from a point outside of it. He is never
examining God’s dealings with man from the point of view of one with whom
God has no dealings, but always from the point of view of one with whom, in the
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very moment of his study, God is having that very dealing which is being
studied.109
Perhaps Baillie’s keen awareness of the presence of God and its revelatory impact in his
mature years led him to realize that not only was he expressing his theology as a dialogue
with God,110 but that others were reading or hearing it in God’s presence and it therefore
could be used by God as an occasion to mediate his presence to a person’s conscience.
From the earliest articles of his career to his last work, Baillie knew the presence of God
had revelatory significance, and increasingly he sought to teach this concept with clarity
and live out its implications with authenticity.
One of the themes that emerges in Baillie’s later thought is the identification of
humanism as a serious contemporary threat to the understanding and acceptance of the
gospel message. Invitation to Pilgrimage is an important attempt on Baillie’s part to
articulate how humanism has eroded a worldview that was once more hospitable to the
gospel message. Humanism is the culprit, according to Baillie, behind the diminished
perception of God working in, with, and under all things to reveal himself. Humanism
anesthetizes humanity’s sense of the presence of God.
Of course, Baillie is not naïve to think that prior to the rise of humanism in the
west people were free to accept the salvation of God in Christ without any stumbling
block. Baillie speaks more of sin in the latter half of his career than he did before, and he
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maintains that human sin is at the heart of disbelief in God. Baillie does discuss sin in
Our Knowledge of God and in some earlier works, but it is notably marginalized as a
feature of his theology of revelation in the early years. In the works surveyed in this
chapter, Baillie writes about sin and salvation with a more reformed theological bent than
before. In Invitation to Pilgrimage and Sense of the Presence, Baillie emphasizes more
of the sovereignty of God in salvation. Yes, God is present to all people, but faith, which
Baillie identifies with the perception of God, is a gift. The gift nature of faith is a
biblical111 idea that the Reformed theological tradition particularly emphasizes and which
is understood to correspond to the sinfully depraved nature of humanity who stands in
need of some kind of intervention to change its course as the enemy of God.
In closing this two-chapter survey of Baillie’s thought leading up to and following
the publication of Our Knowledge of God, it can be noted that though Baillie lived and
worked through two world wars on two different continents, his thought continued along
a remarkably steady course. From the beginning, he understood that God’s presence had
revelatory significance. He believed there is a logic to faith that can be defended, but
cannot compel belief in God. He observed the organic connection between morality and
theology and believed the universal human conscience was a point of contact for divine
revelation. He believed humanity, though bearing the image of God, was broken and
stood in need of divine salvation and that this salvation began with the initiative of God.
What changed over the years was his emphasis and expression of these ideas. As this
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chapter has shown, Baillie’s observation of the influence of humanism on western
worldview and the crisis of a second world war drove him to articulate his theology in a
more transparently pastoral way. Baillie was always a scholar, and though he was
ordained from his youth, it may be said that he became more of a pastor in his role as
professor and scholar.
In the next chapter, we will introduce the tenets of Reformed epistemology, a late
twentieth-century development in the area of philosophy of religion, and will examine in
particular the thought of Alvin Plantinga’s significant work, Warranted Christian Belief
(2000). By comparing Plantinga’s main epistemological proposal, as articulated in
Warranted Christian Belief, with Baillie’s theology of revelation as surveyed in this
dissertation, it will be shown that Baillie’s thought finds echoes in Reformed
epistemology and is relevant to today’s contemplation of the nature of God’s selfrevelation.

CHAPTER FIVE
A Common Pilgrimage: A Comparison of Baillie’s Theology of Revelation and Alvin
Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology
In the first chapter of this dissertation, it was shown that though enough
scholarship focused on John Baillie since his death in 1960 has continued to justify his
being the subject of current study, there is arguably a need to justify the contemporary
relevance of his theology of revelation for the ongoing task of theology. Certainly Baillie
makes for an interesting figure for historical theological purposes, but can he
meaningfully contribute to modern systematic theology?
Baillie himself is a fine example of the good thinking that can be produced when
a theologian is attentive to and conversant with trends in philosophical thought. One of
the more important developments in the area of philosophy of religion since Baillie’s
death is the emergence of a movement that has come to be known as Reformed
epistemology. This chapter will show that many of the key characteristics of Reformed
epistemology, especially as expressed by Alvin Plantinga, parallel Baillie’s own thought.
The demonstration of this parallel validates the relevance of Baillie’s thought for today’s
theology as his perspective can provide a good starting point for a contemporary
discussion of the theological application of Reformed epistemology. In this chapter, a
brief summary of Reformed epistemology will be given and some key points of
commonality between Baillie and Reformed epistemology will be identified. Special
attention will be given to Alvin Plantinga’s thought, particularly as it is expressed in
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Warranted Christian Belief (2003), in order to make a more acute comparison of the
common ground between a specific articulation of Reformed epistemology and Baillie’s
theology of revelation. This chapter will show that John Baillie’s theology of the
mediated immediacy of our knowledge of God shares meaningful kinship with the
modern movement of Reformed epistemology and on this basis should be engaged as a
valuable partner in contemporary studies in the theology of revelation.

Summary of Reformed Epistemology
The beginning of Reformed epistemology can be marked by the 1983 publication
of a collection of essays, Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God,1 which
captured the yearlong thinking and conversation of scholars from a variety of disciplines
around the subject of a Reformed view of faith and reason.2 Three leading scholars in the
area of Reformed epistemology today, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and the
late William P. Alston, took part in this initial project and contributed essays to Faith and
Rationality. In his introduction to the anthology, Nicholas Wolterstorff identifies several
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themes that serve to unify the essays; a brief review of three of these themes will provide
a helpful introduction to the essential character of Reformed epistemology.
Reformed epistemology was conceived in the intellectual climate in which
scholars recently had been challenging the epistemological structures which had
supported western thought for centuries. Classical, or modern, foundationalism3 – the
epistemology that fueled the Enlightenment and the modern devotion to rationalism that
followed – was believed to have had collapsed. In the 1970s scholars were returning to
the epistemological drawing board, so to speak, and were questioning not only the type of
foundationalism that had long characterized epistemological structures in the West, but
even foundationalism itself. Reformed epistemology, then, is characterized by its
embrace of the collapse of the classical type of foundationalism. Put another way,
Reformed epistemology rejects the boundaries laid by classical foundationalism.
Specifically, what is rejected in classical foundationalism is its assumption that a properly
basic belief, that is, a belief which justifiably serves as the basis or foundation for other
beliefs, must be self-evident and incorrigible, where self-evidence is often, but not
exclusively, identified with what may be observed using the senses.4
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Embedded in the framework of classical foundationalism is the assumption that
reason is the singular guide to knowledge of reality. Since the Enlightenment, this
assumption has prevailed. The discernment of truth and the justification for beliefs
concerning reality have been governed by evidentialism, that is, the position that a belief
is rational (and therefore justified5) only if it is supported by evidence. What
characterizes Reformed epistemology is not the rejection of reason or evidence or the call
for justified beliefs,6 but the rejection of a rationalistic evidentialism governed by the
limits of classical foundationalism. So a second characteristic of Reformed epistemology
is its engagement with the evidentialist challenge to religious belief.7 Evidentialism has
tried to show that the evidence required to rationally justify Christian faith, according to
classical foundationalism, cannot be produced and therefore Christian faith is irrational
and thus wrong to maintain. Christians have responded to this challenge in a variety of
ways, from arguing that the evidence requirement has, in fact, been met (e.g., B.B.
Warfield), to rejecting the legitimacy of the challenge altogether (e.g., Karl Barth).
Reformed epistemology is unique in that it takes on the challenge by arguing that the
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nature of the evidence and the rules of justification are no longer governed by classical
foundationalism.
A third characteristic of Reformed epistemology is that it corresponds to the
Reformed or Calvinist theological tradition in its view on the immediate nature of our
knowledge of God. In his Preface to Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga,
Hoitenga says Reformed epistemology identifies with the epistemological claims of
Calvin in his Institutes of the Christian Religion; to illustrate, he quotes these well-known
lines:
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of
divinity…. This conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally inborn in
all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow…. It is not a doctrine
that must be first learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his
mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget, although many
strive with every nerve to this end.8
Though several of the scholars identified with Reformed epistemology do, in fact, come
out of a Reformed theological context, including Alvin Plantinga, such personal
theological affiliation is not necessary. Furthermore, Reformed epistemology and the
Reformed theological tradition both share a common perspective on the relationship
between faith and reason – a perspective that recognizes reason is not infallible and faith
can be a source of knowledge.
In summary of Reformed epistemology, then, three characteristics may be
identified: the embrace of the collapse of classical foundationalism, fresh engagement
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with the evidentialist challenge to religious belief, and correlation with the Reformed
theological tradition. In what follows, Baillie theology will be briefly assessed in light of
these three characteristics in order to demonstrate the affinity between his thought and
Reformed epistemology.

Baillie and Reformed Epistemology: Making the Connection
Baillie may not have been part of the generation of thinkers observing and
engaging the collapse of classical foundationalism, but the collapse of any structure that
has stood long and loomed large does not happen suddenly. Baillie’s thesis of a
knowledge of God, a revelation of God, characterized as a mediated immediate sense of
the presence of God and its strong parallels to some of the defining characteristics of
Reformed epistemology decades later suggests there had been cracks in the edifice of
classical foundationalism for quite some time. Previous chapters reviewing the history of
Baillie’s thought shows that he had long sought to navigate between the extreme
influences of Rationalism and Romanticism, between reason and intuition.
The anti-evidentialism of Reformed epistemology is not itself what sets it apart as
a noteworthy movement in recent decades. As has been noted, the Reformed theological
tradition has long been taking up an anti-evidentialist position. What makes Reformed
epistemology unique is its proposal that the belief in God, in particular, is a properly
basic belief.

246
In claiming the basic nature of theistic belief, Plantinga does not mean to say that
belief in God lacks rational grounds. In an important section of his essay, “Reason and
Belief in God,” Plantinga explains that belief in God has reasonable grounds though it
may not be based on evidence.9 Plantinga commonly turns to the illustration of
perceptual beliefs; for example, on this October day I see that the leaves on the tree
outside my office window are orange and, occasioned by my perception of the orange
leaves, the belief “The leaves on the tree outside my office window are orange” is
formed. The perceiving is the basis for the belief, but not in an evidentiary way. A belief
formed on the basis of perception is an immediate belief, caused by the encounter of the
subject with some perceptible thing, and as an immediate belief it is also basic.
There are two important consequences for theistic debate implied by the thesis
that belief in God is properly basic. First, the thesis suggests that the evidentialist
assumption that the burden of proof in theistic debate lies with the theists is no longer
valid. The debate changes from its atheistic starting point, from which the theist must
produce evidence to persuade the skeptic of God’s existence, to a legitimately theistic
starting point, from which the theist must rather show that her belief in God is reasonable,
with no goal to persuade the skeptic to share her belief in God. In other words, it is no
longer the mark of rationally justified belief that it is intended to result in the persuasion
of the skeptic. And this state of affairs introduces the second important consequence of
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the thesis that belief in God is properly basic. This thesis upsets the ideal of
Rationalism, which is the philosophical assumption that, given the use of the right
method of reasoning, one can expect substantial and perhaps universal agreement on a
conclusion. The disruption of this ideal means the association of a justified belief with
the truth of that belief is no longer a necessary association.
In the case of defending the belief that God exists, Plantinga suggests that the
proposition, “God exists,” is not itself the belief about God that is properly basic for the
theist. Rather, based on various experiences and perceptions a person has in relation to
God (e.g., God is speaking to me, God forgives me), a person concludes that God
exists.10 Likewise, based on certain experiences in which a person perceives God is
absent or unwilling or unable to give his aid in hardship, for example, a person may
conclude God does not exist. The point is that experience and perception can yield
opposing but properly basic beliefs. And demonstrating the justifying grounds for those
opposing beliefs does not and cannot indicate which belief is true. In other words, reason
alone does not lead one into all truth.
It is interesting to note that though Baillie did not benefit from the intellectual
climate produced by the collapse of classical foundationalism, he pursued avenues of
thought similar to Plantinga and other Reformed epistemologists. Baillie, too, claimed
that arguments for the existence of God were not what produced belief in God. He, too,
claimed that though belief in God was not produced through rational argument, it did not
10
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mean that it was not rational to believe in God. Baillie, too, argued that belief in God
was immediate, that it was not mediated by inference of any kind. He, too, described the
immediacy of belief in God in terms of perception and experience. A more detailed
comparison of Baillie and Plantinga will be made in a following section of this chapter.
As Wolterstorff states in his Introduction to Faith and Reason, the Reformed
theological tradition, especially the Continental Reformed tradition, has long taken an
anti-evidentialist position in the faith and reason debate. Though the anti-evidentialism
characteristic of Baillie’s thought is not a necessary position for an adherent to Reformed
theology, Reformed theology surely provides an amenable cognitive context for antievidentialism.11 So, in sharing the common theological ground of the Reformed
tradition, Baillie and Plantinga likewise share a certain kind of view of the world.
Notably they share a strong view of God’s sovereign involvement in overcoming the sincaused damage that alienates humanity from God. The Reformed view of sin, which
describes sin in terms of both the human inability and hostility toward the good God wills
for his image bearing creatures, necessitates the action of God to enable humans to both
will and do the good. Baillie was not only deeply influenced by his Reformed upbringing
but continued throughout his life to use such Reformed plumb lines as the Westminster
Confession of Faith and the writings of John Calvin to engage his own and others’
thought.
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Both Baillie and Plantinga also engage Karl Barth as a participant in the
Reformed tradition whose alternative approach to the evidentialist challenge found in
natural theology invites dialogue and critique. Both agree that Barth’s absolute rejection
of the evidentialist challenge is not an adequate response. In assessing other people’s
ideas, Plantinga exhibits, like Baillie, the willingness to listen carefully to a position, set
aside what is not profitable, and retain what is useful. For example, though Plantinga
does not think Barth’s reasons for rejecting natural theology are persuasive, he values
Barth’s alignment with other theologians in the Reformed tradition who maintain it is
perfectly rational to believe in God without the support or evidence of other beliefs (i.e.,
that belief in God is properly basic).12
One reason why it is interesting to compare Baillie and Plantinga, as a
representative of Reformed epistemology, is that by doing so the comparison is also
introduced between Baillie and other Dutch Reformed theologians cited to support
Plantinga’s arguments.13 Specifically, in his essay, “Reason and Belief in God” in Faith
and Reason, Plantinga cites nineteenth-century Dutch Reformed theologian Herman
12
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Bavinck to illustrate one of the many arguments against natural theology to be found in
the Christian tradition.14 There is no evidence in Baillie’s work, either published or
unpublished, to suggest that he was familiar with the Dutch Reformed theological
tradition.

Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief
Alvin Plantinga has spent much of his career addressing two kinds of objections
to the Christian faith, which he explains in the preface to Warranted Christian Belief.15
One objection targets the truth of the Christian faith and the other targets the
reasonableness of the Christian faith. Plantinga refers to the former as the de facto
objection, one of the most common expressions of which is some version of the argument
of the problem of evil. The latter objection he refers to as de jure, which claims that,
regardless of the truth of the Christian faith, it is unjustifiable, irrational or even immoral
to entertain Christian belief.16
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga ultimately takes up both questions,
explaining that in determining the warrant of Christian belief, the de jure question is
found to entail the de facto question. Plantinga describes the state of affairs he believes
must exist in order for a belief to have warrant. He writes, “A belief has warrant for a
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Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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person S only if that belief is produced in S by cognitive faculties functioning properly
(subject to no dysfunction) in a cognitive environment that is appropriate for S’s kind of
cognitive faculties, according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth. When a
belief meets these conditions and does enjoy warrant, the degree of warrant it enjoys
depends on the strength of the belief, the firmness with which S hold it.”17 Plantinga
proposes what he calls the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model), so called because of
Aquinas and Calvin’s teaching that all people are born with a natural capacity to know
God. This model describes a view of the world in which the conditions of his definition
of warranted belief are met by Christian belief.18 The A/C model introduces warranted
theistic belief, and drawing more deeply from his theological sources, especially John
Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, Plantinga delineates the “extended A/C model,” which
proposes warranted Christian belief. The A/C model in its extended form will be used in
the comparison with Baillie.
Plantinga observes agreement in Aquinas and Calvin regarding a kind of natural
knowledge of God that humans possess. “There is,” Plantinga explains, “a sort of
instinct, a natural human tendency, a disposition, a nisus to form beliefs about God under
a variety of conditions and in a variety of situations.”19 Even objections to God serve as a
kind of testimony about him. Calvin calls this basic idea the sensus divinitatis which, in a
17
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both theologians.
19
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wide variety of circumstances, produces in people beliefs about God. According to
Plantinga, “These circumstances trigger the disposition to form the beliefs in question;
they form the occasion on which those beliefs arise. Under these circumstances, we
develop or form theistic beliefs—or, rather, these beliefs are formed in us; in the typical
case we don’t consciously choose to have those beliefs. Instead, we find ourselves with
them, just as we find ourselves with perceptual and memory beliefs.”20 All people have
the capacity for this knowledge of God and were originally designed by God to attain this
knowledge, to some degree, by way of the sensus divinitatis.
Plantinga outlines several features of the A/C model which provide a helpful
summary of the model and will form the structure of comparison with Baillie’s theology
of revelation in the next section. First, theistic belief produced by the sensus divinitatis is
basic and enjoys proper basicality with respect to both justification and warrant. Thus a
person is justified in holding her theistic belief as properly basic because she has not
accepted it on the evidential basis of other propositions.21 Similarly, a person is also
warranted in her belief in God when such belief has come from the sensus divinitatis
understood to be “a belief-producing faculty (or power, or mechanism) that under the
right conditions produces belief that isn’t evidentially based on other beliefs.”22 To this
point, Plantinga writes,
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According to the A/C model, this natural knowledge of God is not arrived at by
inference or argument (for example, the famous theistic proofs of natural
theology) but in a much more immediate way….It isn’t that one notes some
feature of the Australian outback – that it is ancient and brooding, for example –
and draws the conclusion that God exists. It is rather that, upon the perception of
the night sky or the mountain vista or the tiny flower, these beliefs just arise
within us. They are occasioned by the circumstances; they are not conclusions
from them.23
In other words, beliefs about God’s existence occasioned from nature are not governed by
the faculty of reason. Plantinga is describing another faculty at work, one identified by
theologians as the sensus divinitatis. This spiritual-sense faculty which enables a person
to recognize a divine other is just as natural and universal as the human sense of sight that
enables a person to recognize a human other.
Second, the operation of the sensus divinitatis in the A/C model is a natural
operation, meaning it is part of their purpose and design for human beings to know God
through the proper functioning of their original cognitive equipment.24 The fact that this
natural operation fails to function properly does not at all undermine the claim that the
sensus divinitatis is a universally human faculty. No one could justifiably argue that
visual blindness or impairment proves that vision is not a natural part of being human.
Blindness only proves that the properly functioning faculty of vision may be impaired,
even to such a degree that it ceases to function. The extended A/C model takes into
consideration the damaged state of the sensus divinitatis and describes the work of the
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Spirit upon our minds by which humanity’s broken epistemic equipment and
environment is overcome in order to once again be revelatory; Plantinga is mindful that
this spiritual work is “part of a special response to the fallen condition into which
humankind has precipitated itself,” while the sensus divinitatis is part of our original
epistemic endowment.25
Plantinga says the sensus divinitatis, a natural operation of humankind, functions
similarly to perception or sight in that it generates the kind of experience that occasions a
properly basic belief. The description of the sensus divinitatis as perception or sight must
be analogical. The physical eye is designed to perceive material things; since God is not
in himself a material being, he cannot be immediately perceived by the human eye. But
God is present, though he is invisible. The sensus divinitatis is a perceiving faculty
understood as a spiritual-sense designed to perceive the presence of the divine other.
One of the important distinctions Plantinga makes throughout the book is between
de jure and de facto objections. He makes an effort to show that de jure objections to
belief in God, that is, objections appealing to the laws of reason, are fundamentally
flawed in their effort to disassociate from the question of the reality of God and the nature
of belief in God. Plantinga puts it this way:
What you properly take to be rational, at least in the sense of warranted, depends
on what sort of metaphysical and religious stance you adopt. It depends on what
kind of beings you think human beings are, what sorts of beliefs you think their
noetic faculties will produce when they are functioning properly, and which of
their faculties or cognitive mechanisms are aimed at the truth. Your view as to
25
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what sort of creature a human being is will determine or at any rate heavily
influence your views as to whether the theistic belief is warranted or not
warranted, rational or irrational for human beings. And so the dispute as to
whether theistic belief is rational (warranted) can’t be settled just by attending to
epistemological considerations; it is at bottom not merely an epistemological
dispute, but an ontological or theological dispute.26
Thus Plantinga concludes the de jure question is not independent of the de facto question;
the reasonableness of a thing, with regard to warrant at least, cannot be discussed apart
from the truth of a thing. Plantinga’s A/C model proposes that all humans have a
spiritual-sense faculty which, properly functioning in its proper environment, perceives
the presence of God and makes God known. The extended A/C model addresses 1) the
fact that the sensus divinitatis is not working properly and does not dependably and
universally produce knowledge of God and 2) what God has done to restore human
knowledge of himself.
So Plantinga affirms humans are capable of natural knowledge of God, but not in
their current sin-affected state. Thus a third feature of the A/C model claims the natural
knowledge of God available from the sensus divinitatis is impeded by human sin and its
consequences. Of the many consequences of human sin in the world, Plantinga focuses
on sin’s serious noetic effect on human knowledge of God. The seriousness of this
cognitive impairment lies in the fact that, according to Plantinga and the A/C model,
failure to know God skews knowledge of ourselves, others, and the world we live in.
“Were it not for sin and its effects,” Plantinga writes,
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God’s presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the
presence of other minds, physical objects, and the past. Like any cognitive
process, however, the sensus divinitatis can malfunction; as a result of sin, it has
indeed been damaged. Our original knowledge of God and his glory is muffled
and impaired; it has been replaced (by virtue of sin) by stupidity, dullness,
blindness, inability to perceive God or to perceive him in his handiwork. Our
knowledge of his character and his love toward us can be smothered: it can even
be transformed into a resentful thought that God is to be feared and mistrusted; we
may see him as indifferent or even malignant.27
If the effect of sin is to diminish our natural knowledge of God to the point that we really
must say we have no functional natural knowledge of God, then the explanation of
human origin, identity and purpose provided by the deliverables of the sensus divinitatis
is no longer available and some other narrative can and does (and likely must) take its
place.28 The Christian story depicts sin as damaging both our minds and hearts so that
not only is our perception of the deliverables of the sensus divinitatis diminished,
Plantinga explains, but our desire for these deliverables is redirected. If we cannot know
God, then we cannot love him and want him as we ought; instead, we continue to seek
insight into our nature and purpose as humans and, in so doing, end up loving and
wanting things that are insufficient replacements of God and ultimately only intensify our
insatiable search. Such is the compound nature of sin.
A fourth feature of the A/C model is that the revelation of God given in scripture
and through the Spirit produces knowledge of God in a sinner by way of faith. Given our
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To illustrate, Plantinga shows how philosophical naturalism and its corresponding narrative of
evolution can attempt to fill the epistemological void left by the impaired sensus divinitatis.
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sin-affected state, God designed and put into motion a way of salvation from our sin and
alienation from God through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, the Son of God. He
also designed and put into motion a process of revelation, which Plantinga calls a “threetiered cognitive process,” by which this salvation is secured in particular persons.29 The
three pieces in this process include, 1) God’s arrangement for the production of scripture,
2) the Spirit’s repair of the damage caused by sin, and 3) the exercise of faith to accept
God’s salvation. Plantinga summarizes, “What is really involved in a believer’s coming
to accept the great things of the gospel, therefore, are three things: Scripture (the divine
teaching), the internal invitation or instigation of the Holy Spirit, and faith, the human
belief that results.”30 Though Plantinga distinguishes between the scriptures, the Spirit
and the faith given by God to people, it is the Spirit who is active in both the production
of scripture and its acceptance by faith. To be clear, then, Plantinga says knowledge of
God comes to us in a sin-altered world only through the Holy Spirit and not through any
one of the natural cognitive faculties with which humans were originally created.31
Beliefs concerning God, Plantinga writes, “don’t come just by way of the normal
operation of our natural faculties; they are a supernatural gift.”32
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Including scripture in the cognitive process of salvation means for Plantinga that
there is a propositional object to faith, which he identifies as God’s plan of salvation as
made known in the Bible and as it applies to one personally. The experience of faith
involves what Plantinga calls a “doxastic experience,” which is the experience
accompanying the formation of belief in which one feels the “rightness” of the belief.33
So when one has some encounter with the biblical message of the gospel in which the
Spirit produces faith, one has the experience that “what is said simply seems right; it
seems compelling; one finds oneself saying, ‘Yes, that’s right, that’s the truth of the
matter; this is indeed the word of the Lord.’”34 Plantinga recognizes that this process of
faith may “go on in a thousand ways,” but it will always include the proposal and
acceptance of the gospel.
Plantinga aims to defend the claim that faith is a kind of knowledge, as it is
described by Calvin in his definition and in the definition of faith given by the Heidelberg
Catechism.35 Faith is a special knowledge in at least two ways: the content of faith is of
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unique importance and the process by which one believes that content is also unique.
Plantinga defends faith as a kind of knowledge in that it is a belief-producing cognitive
process involving cognitive faculties, just like memory or perception; faith differs from
these other faculties only in that it also involves the direct action of the Holy Spirit.36
What is required for knowledge, Plantinga explains, “is that a belief be produced by
cognitive faculties or processes that are working properly, in an appropriate epistemic
environment (both maxi and mini) according to a design plan that is aimed at truth, and is
furthermore successfully aimed at truth.”37 The sensus divinitatis, without damage
caused by sin, meets these requirements; however, the sin-damaged sensus divinitatis
cannot yield knowledge because sin damages the cognitive faculties of the knower. Sin
introduces distortion into the environment that would otherwise be a means of
knowledge, of truth; a malfunctioning sensus divinitatis and a corrupted epistemic
environment do not successfully arrive at truth.
Plantinga identifies the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit as the way in which
all that is damaged, broken and malfunctioning is made right. “Regeneration heals the
ravages of sin – embryonically in this life, and with ever greater fullness in the next.”38

through the gospel, that, not only to others, but to me also God has given the forgiveness of sins,
everlasting righteousness and salvation, out of sheer grace, solely for the sake of Christ’s saving work.”
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Plantinga says that the Spirit repairs the sensus divinitatis (as opposed to formulating
some new means by which we can know God). This repair enables people to once again
“see God and be put in mind of him in the sorts of situations in which that beliefproducing process is designed to work.” 39 Regeneration helps people to see God, to see
his loveliness and, correlatively, to see one’s own wretchedness apart from God – and not
only to see God rightly, but to desire and love him.
Thus, the A/C model Plantinga outlines is designed to propose a plausible
scenario in which Christian belief may (and indeed is claimed to) enjoy warrant. Four
key features of the model have been briefly surveyed in order to summarize the model
and provide meaningful points of comparison with Baillie’s theology of revelation. In
the discussion that follows, it will be shown that Plantinga and Baillie share significant
common ground.

A Comparison of Baillie and Plantinga
One of the challenges of comparing any two people’s thought is the matter of
vocabulary. It is the aim of this section to show that Baillie’s theology of revelation is at
least compatible with and in some areas similar to Plantinga’s theological application of
his religious epistemology and in this way to make a link between the scholarship of
Baillie and Reformed epistemology.
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It has been shown in previous chapters that the presence of God is central to
Baillie’s theology of revelation. God’s holy presence itself confronts broken people,
disturbing them with some kind of awareness that the way things are is not the way things
are supposed to be. God’s presence agitates his sin-marred image-bearers, creating a
longing or nagging sense that something is missing, and it is this point of contact between
creator and creature Baillie identifies as revelatory. There is no indication from Plantinga
in Warranted Christian Belief that would suggest Baillie’s idea of the divine presence
would be incompatible with his own thought. Plantinga simply does not write about
God’s presence with any emphasis. He does, however, emphasize the role of the Holy
Spirit in his epistemology, and the Spirit is the presence of God. But Plantinga writes
about the Spirit in terms of his specific role in faith. This role is a targeted, focused work
of the Spirit on a particular individual at a particular time, whereas Baillie’s theology of
the presence of God has drawn out the epistemological implications of God’s continuous
presence to all people at all times.
Plantinga’s description of the properly functioning sensus divinitatis shows that
he believes God is present and epistemologically accessible to all people at all times,
given the right epistemic conditions. According to Plantinga’s model, it seems it was the
sensus divinitatis that served as the apparatus by which humans knew God before sin
entered the world, that sin broke this apparatus and that the Holy Spirit repairs it in the
work of regeneration. Regeneration heals what sin has broken and makes it possible for
people to see God, says Plantinga. Plantinga uses the language of knowledge of God to
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refer exclusively to that restored capacity to know God through the faith that comes only
with the Holy Spirit’s work of regeneration. Knowledge comes, we can recall Plantinga
saying, when a belief is “produced by cognitive faculties or processes that are working
properly, in an appropriate epistemic environment (both maxi and mini) according to a
design plan that is aimed at truth, and is furthermore successfully aimed at truth.”40 For
Plantinga, there can be no knowledge of God apart from repaired cognitive faculties.
So do Plantinga and Baillie disagree on the nature of our knowledge of God? In
Our Knowledge of God, Baillie clearly argues that all people have some kind of
knowledge of God, even if it is buried deep at the bottom of their hearts. Here it is
important to try and compare what Baillie and Plantinga are really saying and not just the
terminology they employ. According to Plantinga’s definition of what constitutes
knowledge of God in a sin-broken world, no one has knowledge of God prior to or apart
from regeneration. But Baillie maintains that even the person who has not received the
healing intervention of the Holy Spirit’s regeneration has some knowledge of God,
though admittedly diminished. For Baillie, the challenge to the wayward soul created by
the continuous presence of a holy God constitutes a kind of knowledge. Whereas
Plantinga requires that one’s cognitive faculties be functioning properly according to a
design plan aimed at truth in order for there to be knowledge, Baillie claims the
malfunction of cognitive faculties affected by sin in a context and design plan aimed at
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truth create such cognitive and affective tension that the disturbance itself operates as a
revelatory point of contact, an open door, a readiness to receive, a gaze captured but not
yet focused.
A key element in Plantinga’s A/C model is that the knowledge of God is given in
Scripture and that by the work of the Spirit in tandem with Scripture, a person comes to
have faith – knowledge of God. Plantinga’s requirement that a person know God by
Scripture might, at first glance, appear to be a point of distance between Plantinga and
Baillie, but upon closer examination, this is not the case. Plantinga’s view of how
scripture functions in a person’s knowledge of God is congruous with Baillie’s theology
of revelation. Baillie, as it has been shown, opposed the idea that knowing God was
merely the exercise of knowing the right set of propositions concerning God. He was
wary of any approach to scripture by which scripture was simply the prescription of
stories to which one must give assent and that somehow in doing so, one could claim to
know God. Plantinga is clearer and more insistent than Baillie about the role Scripture
plays in the formation of religious belief, but how he describes scripture’s role can be
harmonized with Baillie’s theology. For Plantinga, our experience with scripture is not
“that the Holy Spirit induces belief in the proposition the Bible (or the book of Job, or
Paul’s epistles, or the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians) comes to us from the very
mouth of God. Rather, upon reading or hearing a given teaching – a given item from the
great things of the gospel – the Holy Spirit teaches us, causes us to believe that that
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teaching is both true and comes from God.”41 What Plantinga describes here is the
typical use of Scripture by the Holy Spirit to occasion belief in God. He puts it this way:
“So the structure here is not: what is taught in Scripture is true; this (e.g., that in Christ
God was reconciling the world to himself) is taught in Scripture; therefore, this is true. It
is rather that, on reading or hearing a certain teaching t, one forms the belief that t, that
very teaching, is true and from God.”42 Similarly, Plantinga writes, “The belief in
question is, instead, immediate and basic, an immediate response to the proclamation.”
What Plantinga describes here is consistent with Baillie’s theology of mediated
immediacy on several points. First, it recognizes the presence of God, specifically the
Holy Spirit, as being essential and foundational to the divine self-revelation. Second, it
acknowledges that God reveals himself through media, but that he does so directly. In
other words, God himself confronts a person in the reading or hearing of scripture (or of
the message of scripture). In the case of such a direct encounter, a person’s response is
not to assent to certain propositions or arguments about God, but to acknowledge the
divine person being revealed – to trust him, so that what a person experiences primarily is
not assent but trust.43
Baillie describes knowledge of God in terms of relationship. Faith is not simply
knowledge of information, but knowledge of a person. This is not to suggest that trust
41
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comes temporally before assent in the activity of faith or that assent plays an insignificant
role in faith. Rather, trust and assent are experienced together. Still, priority must be
given to trust since mere intellectual assent to biblical propositions does not depict the
faith of relationship and salvation both Baillie and Plantinga advance. Trust in response
to God’s message of hope creates a bond between sinner and savior, creature and creator,
child and father.
Furthermore, Baillie’s concept of a pre-regenerative knowledge or awareness does
not mean there is not also a need for divine initiation in knowing God. As Baillie says,
God is on both sides of the relationship. “When I respond to God’s call, the call is God’s
and the response is mine; and yet the response is God’s too; for not only does he call me
in His grace, but also by His grace brings the response to birth within my soul. His Holy
Spirit is the real author and originator, not only of His address to me, but of my address
to Him.”44 Again, this perspective on the nature of our knowledge of God can be
attributed to Baillie’s epistemological application of God’s omnipresence. God is not just
in, with, and under beautiful sunsets and breathtaking mountain views, but he is in, with,
and under every human being. Though sin has set human will over against God, it has
not and cannot set human being against God – that is, it cannot change the fact that
humans remain creatures of God.45 Baillie asks, “How can God be only over against me,
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if all the good I do is wholly His and yet most truly done by me, if all the truth I think is
wholly His and yet most truly thought by me, and if I am never so truly myself as when
He does in me what He wills and thinks in me what He would have me think?”46 Baillie
is here capturing the mystery of God’s concurrent activity with our own. God’s
authorship of salvation does not mean only that he provided the means for humans to be
reconciled to God through the obedient life and sacrificial death of Jesus Christ. Also
authors the human response to such reconciliation.47
A surface reading of Baillie and Plantinga might lead one to think they actually
oppose one another in their proposals of how one knows God. As it has been shown,
Baillie’s entire career assumes the epistemological impact of the presence of God and he
increasingly makes use of the language of sensory perception as an analogy for how God
may be known. Plantinga compares himself to Alston, a fellow scholar in the area of
Reformed epistemology, and says that though there is much harmony between their
projects found in Warranted Christian Belief and Alston’s Perceiving God, there is also
difference. Plantinga is not arguing that Christian belief is warranted by means of human
perception or experience of God’s presence or properties. He does not deny that people
experience God, nor does he deny that there are some who perceive God. But Plantinga
wants to make a distinction between the phenomenological experiences that can
46
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accompany the formation of belief and the belief-formation experience itself, which he
calls the doxastic experience.
To illustrate, Plantinga briefly cites John Wesley’s phenomenological description
of his faith formation in which Wesley reluctantly attends an event at which he hears
Martin Luther’s preface to the Romans, to which he describes having both a
phenomenological and doxastic experience: his heart felt warmed and he felt personally
assured by the message of salvation in Christ.48 Plantinga makes an important distinction
in his assessment of what is happening to Wesley; he writes, “Here what Wesley comes
to believe, or believe more profoundly, is just what the Heidelberg Catechism sees as the
content of true faith: that the divine scheme of salvation applies to oneself personally.
Several observations ought to be made about how Plantinga makes use of
Wesley’s testimony in the context of his argument. First, as mentioned, he makes the
distinction between the doxastic experience of faith and the experiences occasioning that
faith. The doxastic experience of faith may be described as my trust and assurance that
the good news of the gospel is true and extends to me personally. This experience of
trust and assurance is distinguishable from hearing the message of the gospel and the
physical feeling described as one’s heart being warmed.
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Second, though Plantinga elsewhere describes faith as a process including
scripture, it is notable that what Wesley was hearing was not scripture proper but the
preface to a commentary on scripture. This means that Plantinga does not assume the
very words of the Bible are essential to the formation of faith, but its message more
generally.49
Third, Plantinga makes clear that he does not understand the kind of experience
Wesley had as the experience of perceiving God. He and Alston agree that perception of
God can and does occur, but that it is a different kind of experience than the experience
of faith. Plantinga puts it this way:
Consider also the apostle Paul’s vision on the way to Damascus: no doubt he then
did perceive Jesus, and furthermore perceived that he said that he was indeed the
Christ. So it is certainly possible to perceive Jesus the Christ and perceive that he
is saying that he is the Christ; still, can we perceive that Jesus actually is the
Christ? That he actually is the second person of the trinity? I’m inclined to doubt
it. And the more ordinary cases where someone’s belief in the great things of the
gospel comes by way of faith (i.e., Scripture/internal instigation of the Holy
Spirit/faith) seem even less properly thought of as cases of perception.
Accordingly, there is indeed such a thing as perceiving God; furthermore
perceiving God plays an important role in the religious and spiritual lives of many
Christians, in particular, Christians who have been blessed with considerable
progress in the spiritual life. Indeed, we might think, following Edwards, that
perceiving God – perceiving that he is lovely, amiable, holy, glorious, and the like
– is an essential element in the full-blown, well-rounded Christian life. I agree,
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Distinguishing the teaching or message of scripture from scripture itself as being sufficient for
faith formation has significant implications for what kinds of circumstances and stories can occasion saving
faith. This is a distinction Baillie would appreciate; in a passage in which he reflects on the way God
reveals himself through biblical history, he extends this concept to include God’s revelation through story
in general. He writes, “Other tales of later days were told me, and in them the same Presence seemed to be
speaking to me something of the same word. Were this Presence and this word in every tale I was told? I
think not…. The stories that had Presence in them for me, though they were by no means always Bible
stories, were somehow of a piece with the Bible stories.” See Our Knowledge of God, 186.
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furthermore, that these perceptual beliefs can have warrant. The central Christian
beliefs, however, are not perceptual beliefs; they come, not by way of perception
of God, but by way of faith. The warrant those beliefs have is not perceptual
warrant; it comes rather by way of faith.50
For Plantinga, then, perception of God seems to be an experience relegated to the sphere
of the mature Christian life. It does not describe the kind of experience a person has
moving from disbelief to belief in the gospel. For him, some other kind of cognitive
activity is going on – one he calls faith, which incorporates the message of scripture, the
work of the Holy Spirit and trusting faith in the gospel.
It is interesting that Plantinga takes up the classical term “sensus divinitatis,” the
sense of the divine, but resists the language of sense perception in his depiction of faith.
Plantinga ascribes to all people the sense or perception of God in their sinless state (the
sensus divinitatis being the natural knowledge of God), but denies that sinners, even
redeemed ones, universally retain this perception. For Plantinga, “perception of God is
an important part of the mature Christian life, but maturity in the Christian life isn’t
attained by most of us; and even for the fortunate few who do achieve maturity, the
warrant their central Christian beliefs enjoy does not come by way of perception.”51 It
appears, then, that Plantinga distinguishes the cognitive activity of faith from the
cognitive activity of perceiving God; in other words, perception of God may be included
in but is not necessary to faith.
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Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 288.
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Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 289.
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Baillie uses the term “perception” somewhat differently than Plantinga. Baillie’s
context includes a modern epistemology that is based mainly on empiricism – experience
of the corporeal world as revealed to us by our bodily senses. Baillie observes that when
one assumes that experience of the corporeal world is the only kind of experience
available to humans, it follows that there can only be one kind of knowledge available as
well.52 In opposition to this position, Baillie contends that humans have “what can
properly be called sense experience of other things” than what may be experienced by the
five senses that perceive the material world.53 According to Baillie, the language of
perception is an accurate way of describing the “certain subtler senses or sensitivities
which go beyond the bodily senses.”54 Among the sensitivities Baillie says are common
to human experience is what has been described as the sense of the holy, the sense of the
divine, or the sense of the presence of God.
In contrast to Plantinga, Baillie places perception of God at the heart of what it
means to be human. It is identified with the image of God, but is not a wholly lost part,
and so cannot be exclusively identified with the sensus divinitatis broken in the fall. The
ability to perceive God, Baillie claims, is part of the image of God that is not altogether
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Once again it is clear that one’s beliefs about the existence of God, or at least of an incorporeal
reality, set the interpretive grid through which one engages reality and reflects on personal experiences. If
one believes there is no God, God’s knowable presence cannot be an available experience or an acceptable
interpretation of experience.
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Baillie, Sense of the Presence of God, 52.

Baillie, Sense of the Presence of God, 52. Perhaps reading Baillie’s use of “sense” as
“sensitivity” may be helpful and will help to distinguish his use of “sense.”
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lost, though its light is dimmed. What remains is the anknupfunkspunt and it is precisely
what is at work in the activity of faith. The point of contact for revelation – for the good
news scripture teaches, for the work of the Spirit to open eyes – is essentially the point of
discontent and restlessness that all persons at all times experience. And this discontent
and restlessness, as we’ve noted already, is generated by the continuous confrontation of
the sinful person with the perfect holiness of God. It is the gnawing aggravation that
comes from the awareness, to some degree, that I am not my own despite my desire to
live as though my life is mine alone.
While Plantinga’s distinction between faith and perception would seem to create a
significant gap of incongruity between Baillie and himself, a closer look at Plantinga’s
“testimonial model,” an aspect of the extended A/C model, suggests there may be more
actual agreement between the two. Probably the most important common ground shared
by Baillie and Plantinga is their integration of redemption history into their
epistemological proposals. Both understand that the nature of our knowledge of God has
undergone change in the course of human history. As creatures uniquely made in God’s
image, humanity was capable of and privy to knowledge of God like no other creature
was. Baillie links knowledge of God with being image-bearers, the divine image opening
the way for relationship, understanding and communication between humans and God.
Plantinga identifies the sensus divinitatis as the natural capacity for knowing God
available to all people before the introduction of sin into the world. Both Baillie and
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Plantinga, then, recognize that a natural means of knowing God was part of God’s gift to
humanity and was something that sin undid.
Both Baillie and Plantinga also view redemptive history as an epistemic history.
As we have seen, there was a particular way of knowing God for which humans were
designed and created – a way that has been lost in sin and which God’s salvation in
Christ restores. At the heart of the image of God in human creatures is their capacity to
know and relate rightly to God. In sharing a Reformed theological heritage, Baillie and
Plantinga also share a perspective on the way sin has an impact on knowledge of God.
Sin does not only interrupt and disable a properly working epistemic mechanism, it warps
the will so that what was once loved is now loathed. As the apostle Paul puts it, “The
sinful mind is hostile to God; it does not submit to God’s law, nor can it do so.”55 As
Baillie describes it, there is a moral element to belief in God.
Plantinga examines the impact of the will on the epistemic situation created by
sin. Sin does not simply introduce a state of unknowing, but a condition of misdirected
desire. In his engagement with Jonathan Edwards, Plantinga observes, “Sin is
fundamentally a matter of failing to have the right affections and having the wrong ones;
it isn’t (in the first instance, anyway) a failure of knowledge. It is less a failure to see
something than to feel something. The hard-hearted person fails to love the right things;
he lacks the virtuous affections of love for the Lord and neighbor and for the great truths
of the gospel; he also lacks the hatred and sorrow for sin, gratitude for salvation, joy,
55

Romans 8:7.
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peace, and all the rest that flow from a proper love of God.”56 This distinction between
intellect and the will in faith is significant because it reinforces the distinction between
the activities of assent and trust in faith described above. If in sin a component of the
problem is that one does not desire God (because he is holy and we are not, because he is
Creator and we are not, because he is provider and we are not, etc.), then the answer
cannot simply be that previously unknown information be provided.57
Again, though the language is different, what Plantinga refers to as the distinction
between the cognitive and affective elements of unbelief mirrors Baillie’s distinction
between intellectual and moral doubt. Both identify an intellectual component to faith
that is necessary, but which is not alone sufficient for true knowledge of God.
Knowledge of God must also include the embracing of who God reveals himself to be, as
opposed to being repulsed by him. It may be recalled how Baillie repeatedly told the
story of his being confronted with God’s will but not wanting to have anything to do with
it, of claiming to be unable to hear God when in fact he did not want to hear what God
was saying to him – this is the moral doubt or unbelief that parallels the misdirection of
the affections described by Plantinga.
Because Baillie and Plantinga link religious epistemology to soteriology, the
description of salvation is also a description of restored knowledge of God. Plantinga
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Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 297.

Both Baillie and Plantinga appeal to James 2:19 to support the distinction between the intellect
and will in faith: “You believe that there is one God. Good! Even the demons believe that – and shudder.”
James 2:19. See Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 66 and Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 291.
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describes regeneration, that initial saving work of the Holy Spirit, as “curing the will, so
that we at least begin to love and hate the right things; it also includes cognitive renewal,
so that we come to perceive the beauty, holiness, and delightfulness of the Lord and the
scheme of salvation he has devised.”58 There are several observations to be made of
Plantinga’s description of regeneration. First, it depicts salvation in notably epistemic
terms. Second, it depicts salvation as having a moral and perceptual component.
Regeneration does not simply enable sinful humans to love, but to love the right things.
And regeneration likewise does not simply provide information, but reinstates the
capacity to perceive God – and in perceiving him, to know him. Third, it regards the
work of making knowledge of God possible as a work of God himself – specifically, a
work of the Holy Spirit. These qualities of Plantinga’s description of regeneration
complement Baillie’s own theology.
Certainly the epistemic, moral, and perceptual components of regeneration as
described by Plantinga dovetail with the theology of Baillie previously surveyed. The
idea that the capacity to perceive and love God is itself an act initiated by God is also
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Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 304. Plantinga’s description of regeneration is
interesting; apart from his inclusion that one be able to perceive the beauty of the gospel, it might seem like
he is describing a grace common to all humanity. According to his description of regeneration, one need
only begin to love and hate the right things. Are not all people functioning with some proper alignment of
their affections? The man who lovingly and patiently rocks his colicky infant, the child who demands her
friends stop throwing rocks at a cornered stray cat, the woman who remains respectful and kind to a
reproachful mother-in-law – these are recognizably human activities, fallen though we may be. And if
perception of the Lord is characterized by the experience of longing in the face of beauty, then such
perception is not exclusively the experience of Christian believers.
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something that finds agreement in Baillie’s theology.59 An important application of
Baillie’s theology of omnipresence includes the idea that God himself is working in
people to perceive and love God. Baillie writes, “God appears in some sort to be present
on both sides of the relationship. When I respond to God’s call, the call is God’s and the
response is mine; and yet the response is God’s too; for not only does He call me in His
grace, but also by His grace brings the response to birth within my soul. His Holy Spirit
is the real author and originator, not only of His address to me, but of my address to
Him.”60
Baillie understood the address of God to be both direct and mediated. Though
this is a unique expression of the nature of God’s self-revelation, we will see that
Plantinga’s model includes several shared or compatible perspectives. It will be recalled
that Baillie maintained that God is known with the world, not through the world (as
though God’s existence might be deduced from the world). “Nature is not an argument
for God, but it is a sacrament of Him.”61 Baillie does not reduce “nature” here to mean
only the natural world of mountains and rivers and deserts, but also the world of human
relationships, activity and history. In addition to the knowledge of God that comes in,
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Agreement at this point is no small thing considering the influences of liberalism on Baillie.
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common theological ground. It is striking that “the orthodox liberal” retains this element of his Reformed
heritage, even if expressed in non-traditional terms.
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with, and under nature, humans and history, knowledge of God comes in Scripture.
Despite Baillie’s opposition to the idea that knowledge of God can be reduced to
propositions for assent, he insists Scripture is vital for knowledge of God because the
story it tells is essential to know God.62 The main point is that God uses a variety of
media to reveal himself; in this sense knowledge of God is mediated. It is immediate,
however, in that what all these things mediate is not knowledge about God but God
himself. The media become occasions or vehicles by which God is directly encountered.
Plantinga’s discussion of the cognitive and affective aspects of knowledge of God
culminates in an interesting exploration of the typological significance of eros. Plantinga
describes a kind of spiritual experience that comes in, with, and under a
phenomenological experience. The spiritual experience of longing that comes in, with
and under erotic longing involves the perception that there is some greater, more
consuming longing organically connected to but surpassing the physical experience.
Baillie’s concept of a sacramental universe in which God is revealed in his creation,
broadly understood, dovetails nicely with Plantinga’s illustration of typology as
revelation.
Plantinga reflects on the Westminster Catechism’s first question and answer
which teaches that it is all people’s chief purpose in life to glorify God and enjoy him
forever. He understands this glorification to involve our perceiving, appreciating, and
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In fact, he writes that “the Christian knowledge of God is not given to any man save in
conjunction with the telling of an ‘old, old story.’” Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 180.
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delighting in God along with our expression of that perception and delight. And the
enjoyment he identifies as a kind of union with God which we are able to experience in
varying degrees.63 Plantinga describes sexual eros, with its yearning and longing, as “a
sign and foreshadowing of the longing and yearning for God that will characterize us in
our healed and renewed state in heaven; and sexual satisfaction and union, with its
transports and ecstasy, is a sign and foreshadowing of the deeper reality of union with
God – a union that is at present and for the most part obscure to us.”64 Not only sexual
longing and satisfaction typify human love for God and our passionate desire to be united
with him – confrontation with any thing of transcendent beauty or grandeur or poignancy
triggers a similar reaction.65
Eros is not only a type of human love and longing for God, but is a type of God’s
love for humanity. It depicts his searching, suffering, saving, sustaining love. When
humans love one another with erotic love, a love that is devoted to the union and
communion with the other, we deepen the image of God in us and occasion, for ourselves
and others, a view to God himself.
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Plantinga once again works to articulate something both experientially familiar and
linguistically elusive. Other words he uses to describe this longing include yearning, nostalgia,
homesickness, the desire to be absorbed into the thing, the insatiability of the desire, and more. See
Warranted Christian Belief, 318.
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Conclusion
In order to demonstrate the relevance of Baillie’s theology of revelation for
contemporary theology, this chapter introduced the field of reformed epistemology as a
valuable arena for dialogue. Specifically, Plantinga’s epistemological model in
Warranted Christian Belief was a focus for comparison with various components of
Baillie’s theology of revelation.
In the concluding chapter, a summary of the dissertation’s thesis and its
supporting chapters will be given, highlights in Baillie’s theology of revelation will be
reflected upon, and some potential avenues for future Baillie studies will be proposed.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
It has been the aim of this dissertation to show that John Baillie’s unique
contribution to the theology of revelation in the idea of the mediated immediacy of God’s
presence plays a formative role in the rest of his theology and is valuable for a Reformed
theological engagement of twenty-first century theology. To support this thesis, the first
two chapters of this dissertation are devoted to an introduction to John Baillie, his context
and a careful summary and assessment of his central work, Our Knowledge of God. To
review, the first chapter surveys the scholarship on Baillie and shows that he has
continued to be a figure of interest both for his characteristically mediating and irenic
contributions to the field of theology and for his trans-Atlantic career. The second
chapter provides a thorough summary and brief assessment of Baillie’s first and most
carefully argued proposal of divine revelation as the mediated immediacy of God’s
presence as found in Our Knowledge of God. In this chapter the theme of God’s presence
and its epistemological implications is introduced as a unifying theme in Baillie’s
scholarship.
Chapters 3 and 4 survey notable journal articles, manuscripts and divinity lectures
written before and after the publication of Our Knowledge of God. These chapters show
that Baillie’s concept of God’s presence was a defining point of his theology from his
first published article to his posthumously published Gifford Lectures. They also trace
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how the idea of God’s revelation as both mediated and immediate emerged out of his
early thought and was an idea to which he circled back in his later years.
The fifth chapter makes the case that engagement with Baillie’s theology of
revelation is a relevant task. The brief introduction to Reformed epistemology shows
that the movement that began in the early 1980’s shares some concerns and conclusions
with the theology Baillie had articulated decades before. And particularly, a comparison
between Baillie and Alvin Plantinga’s Aquinas/Calvin model in Warranted Christian
Belief shows that Baillie’s theology of revelation shares some common ground with
Plantinga’s proposal. The point of demonstrating this common ground is to show the
relevance of Baillie’s theology for contemporary theological study.

The Guides of Experience, Scripture and the Christian Tradition in Baillie’s Theology
of Revelation
One purpose of this concluding chapter is to critically reflect on some of the
notable characteristics and insights of Baillie’s thought introduced in previous chapters.
At the beginning of this dissertation, it was suggested that a meaningful understanding of
the nature of our knowledge of God should reflect the central teachings of Scripture,
employ the insights of the Christian tradition, and make sense of human experience.
Such an understanding should help to provide answers to the questions, also posed at the
open of this dissertation, and which get at the heart of God’s self-revelation. To review,
these questions are: How is it that an infinite Creator God can make himself knowable
and, in fact, known to his finite creatures? What capacities or opportunity do humans
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possess that uniquely enables us to perceive and to know God? Why do some people
appear to exercise this capacity while others do not? Are some people privileged with the
opportunity to know God while others are not? In short, how do we know God and why
do we know God?
Baillie’s theology of revelation, as articulated in Our Knowledge of God and
supported by other manuscripts and writings during his lifetime of scholarship, does meet
these three criteria and therefore should be considered a valuable perspective in ongoing
theological discussion and reflection on the nature of divine revelation. The survey of
Baillie’s work made in this dissertation shows Baillie to be deeply concerned that his
theology both employ the insight of experience and make sense of common human
experience of God. It is a familiar characteristic of his scholarship that he reflects and
draws upon his personal experience to illustrate his ideas.1 It was also shown that his
interest in the question of our knowledge of God was piqued by his experience working
with British soldiers in World War I – he longed to understand the relationship between
morality and the manifestation of Christian faith.2 His concern to make sense of his
observation of human experience motivated his attempt to distinguish belief in God
occurring at the top of one’s head and at the bottom of one’s heart.

1

In fact, the survey of Baillie’s work in this dissertation shows there were several stories he
repeated in various writings, indicating both their formative significance and his view that they clearly
illustrated his theology.
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Roots of Religion (1926), Baillie’s first published manuscript, provides this insight.
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Baillie also used the themes of creation, fall, redemption and consummation
found in Scripture to give shape to his theology of revelation. As our brief comparison
with Alvin Plantinga’s Aquinas/Calvin proposal showed in the last chapter, religious
epistemology can alternatively be understood and discussed in terms of soteriology. And
though framing epistemology in soteriological terms is not unique to Baillie’s thought,
his particular care to show the relationship between these four components in Scripture’s
narrative is a good model to build on.3
According to Baillie, God created humanity with the capacity to know its creator.
Because God created humans in his image, humans are capable of relationship – certainly
with each other but also with the God. Baillie views God’s presence to his image-bearing
creatures as a continuously relationship-forming, revelation-producing presence.
Because God’s presence has epistemological significance, not even sin is able to utterly
disrupt God’s self-revelation and sever the relationship between God and his human
creatures. Sin garbles people’s reception of and response to God’s presence so that the
experience produced by confrontation with God is a tension between God’s holy presence
and sovereign right and one’s wayward willfulness. Because people still stand in
relationship to God and retain enough of an awareness of God to be disturbed by his
presence, Baillie argues that sin does not obliterate human capacity for revelation. In
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Barth, for example, understood religious epistemology in soteriological terms. According to
him, sin had so severed a person’s capacity to know God that any knowledge of God was utterly and
entirely dependent on God’s regenerative act of giving faith. Baillie understands the relationship between
creation, fall and redemption differently.
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other words, what remains in the state of sin is not knowledge of God understood in
terms of fellowship, but an awareness of brokenness – an experience of disquiet that
comes from sensing that things are not the way they are supposed to be. And Baillie
uniquely counts this as a kind of revelation; it is a revelation unto rejection rather than a
revelation unto fellowship.
Despite Baillie’s efforts to distinguish a belief at the top of one’s head from the
bottom of one’s heart, he insists that faith, which involves agreement that one cannot
make right what sin has made wrong and acceptance of what God has done in Jesus
Christ to right the relationship between Creator and creature, is a gift from God. In other
words, God does not only provide a means of salvation for humanity in Jesus Christ,
whose obedience in life and death remain the only possible payment for sin, but he also is
responsible for applying the benefits of that salvation to individual persons.
One of the ways Baillie makes use of the richness of the Christian theological
tradition is to claim that we do not have to await the final purge of death in order to enjoy
immediate knowledge of God. He rejects the Thomistic epistemology which relegates
direct knowledge of God to a postmortem beatific vision. Instead, he looks to alternative
proposals by Anselm and Bonaventure to support his view that there is an element of
directness in the knowledge of God believers can enjoy even now.4 For Baillie, this
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Recall Baillie’s challenge to the tradition supporting the inferential character of our knowledge
of God in chapter three of Our Knowledge of God. Specifically, he writes, “Even in our earthly
communion with God there is something of the substance of beatitude. It can never indeed be more than an
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directness exists because God’s presence engages us continuously. We do not infer his
existence from a world in which the Creator has left his signature mark, but from a world
which is his temple. God may be known in, with, and under his creation – a knowledge
that is both mediated and immediate. Again, we see that Baillie’s theology of the divine
presence is central to his theology of revelation; because God’s presence has
epistemological impact, the knowledge one has of God through faith can be described as
beatific. In other words, the divine presence as a source for knowledge of God provides
continuity between knowledge of God in a redeemed state (that still, however, suffers
from the impact of sin and the consequences of brokenness) and the final state of
consummation.
Baillie’s use of an alternative perspective on the progress of our knowledge of
God promotes an alternative perspective to the nature of our knowledge of God. We
know that the finitude that limits our full vision of God is not an epistemological factor
that changes in death. Human creatures, whether in states of sinful brokenness or
consummated perfection, remain finite. The epistemological limits placed on us by our
finitude when it comes to knowing an infinite being are necessary and unchangeable.
Our physical nature, to the degree that it shapes and limits our knowledge of God who is
spirit, is not something we escape at death. Jesus Christ, whose resurrection precedes our

earnest, a fragmentary foretaste of that which is to come, yet it too is in its measure an enjoyment of the
presence of God.” Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, 171.
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own and who exists as the incarnated second person of the trinity today, reminds us that
we are meant to know God in our material state.5
Thus, our finitude and materiality are not barriers to our knowledge of God. God
created human beings in his image for fellowship with himself but the limits of being
finite material creatures are not sinful limits or limits that must somehow be overcome.
God has designed us to know and fellowship with him and has placed us in an
environment designed to mediate that relationship. If finitude and materiality are not
what keeps humans from knowing God, then it must only be sin. And if it is sin that
limits our knowledge of God, clouding our vision, causing us to see through a glass
darkly, then to the degree that humans are able to enjoy freedom from that sin prior to the
purging sanctification of death, they are also able to enjoy immediate knowledge
(understood in terms of relationship) with God before death. The beatific vision, to put it
eschatologically, is both already enjoyable and not yet consummated. Though Baillie
does not articulate this position exactly, it is rooted in his theology and is a small example
of the kind of perspective Baillie’s theology stimulates.

Epistemological Implications of the Divine Presence Considered
It has been shown that the idea of God’s presence has had a formative role in
Baillie’s theology from the beginning of his academic career, and we have attempted to
show how he has sought to draw out the epistemological implications of God’s
5

Since finite beings are not necessarily also physical beings (e.g., angels), it is helpful to
distinguish human finitude from human materiality.
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omnipresence. His effort to wrestle with these implications has produced in Baillie’s
thought some interesting insights that are valuable for our theology today.
The reality of God’s presence anchors Baillie’s theology of revelation. His
theology of revelation has elsewhere been described in this dissertation as immediate,
continuous, personal, and confronting. Each of these descriptors stems from the fact that
God is present. It is the nature of presence to be immediate. One’s physical presence in
a place indicates nearness; one may be observed, one may be engaged in conversation,
and it may be assumed that one is equally mentally present in order to socially connect
with another person.
Baillie’s understanding of God’s presence accounts for the immediacy in his
theology of revelation. God is immediately known; his presence is sensed, as he puts it in
his final work. God in his self-revelation is so near, so present, so immediate and direct
that Baillie absolutely rejects any theology of revelation in which God’s reality is
inferred. A theology of inference would suggest that God is actually more distant than
Baillie understands him to be; it would suggest that there is some way in which people’s
knowledge of God is somehow independent of God’s direct confrontation with them.6
Baillie recognizes that describing this immediacy is difficult. He relies on the analogy of
our common experience of the immediate presence of another person to illuminate the
6

On the one hand, the presence of God is not sensed in a non-cognizant way, such that the
experience of encountering God should be described as a feeling or that it is part of some kind of
subconscious awareness we have. God’s presence is not intuited. It was shown that Baillie rejected this
approach to revelation from the very beginning of his career. On the other hand, the presence of God is not
something that can be overly intellectualized, that is, something that can be solely derived by piecing
together clues left to us.
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immediate nature of our knowledge of God. When a friend stands nearby in the same
room with me, I perceive with my senses that he is there and am ready to trust the
reliability of those senses to accurately indicate to me the reality of my friend’s
proximity.
Another key characteristic of the presence of God is, according to Baillie, its
continuousness. The continuousness of the divine presence marks an important departure
from the analogy of human presence because the divine presence never loses proximity.
When a friend leaves the room, though I may believe her to still exist and be present
wherever she is, her presence has left the reach of my senses and my capacity to perceive
her presence is effectively useless. In such a case, I may grant the presence of my friend,
but I must do so on different grounds than immediate perception and experience.
Because God is omnipresent, however, his presence is continuous. There is never a
situation in which I must believe God to be present apart from experiencing his
immediate presence.
The personal nature of God’s presence is also essential to Baillie’s theology.
Perception of God’s presence is not perception of a force, the way we feel the “presence”
of the wind or the “presence” of torque. Although the material world certainly can and
does mediate our immediate perception of God’s presence, this presence is not
intrinsically attached to any material thing. For example, though one may experience a
sense of holiness or transcendence or sacredness when sitting quietly in an ancient
cathedral, the cathedral itself is not a portal of the divine presence. Baillie’s best and
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most consistent description of the personal nature of the divine presence is that it meets
us in the form of an address. Wind and torque do not address us personally; any such
language used to suggest that an impersonal force or thing addresses us is utilizing the
metaphor of personification. But God is believed to be personal, to have a mind, will and
character that can be communicated to another through word and deed. Even though this
divine address always comes to us through some element of the created world, whether
something external to us or internal, it is perceived directly and is perceived as an address
by an other.
Baillie describes the presence of God in terms of a confrontation. The experience
of being confronted or challenged, the feeling of the weight of demand upon oneself
comes from the one’s encounter with the holy God. The demand is not to accept a list of
righteous tasks but to accept a humble state of being as one who is the recipient of a gift.
In Our Knowledge of God, Baillie frames the demand this way: “The Source of the
obligation is Himself [God] directly revealed to us and that it is in this vision of His glory
and His holiness that our sense of obligation is born. It is His perfection that rebukes us;
it is His love that constrains us.”7 And as Baillie has faithfully argued, all people receive
and experience this personal address by God because 1) God is omnipresent and 2) all
people retain, even after the fall, the capacity to perceive God’s presence experienced as
address. God’s presence is experienced as a demand, a confrontation that must be
addressed. Humanity encounters God not abstractly or theoretically, but concretely in the
7
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midst of relationship – and always initially as a broken relationship. The confrontation of
a broken relationship, the failure to live a holy life before a holy God, can seem daunting;
it can be something we want to avoid or escape or deny. And this willful avoidance and
denial is the natural and initial response of broken humanity to God’s holy presence. As
Baillie explored in Invitation to Pilgrimage, sinful humans are not initially interested in
(nor are they naturally disposed to) the humble response required by the demand of God,
that is, the humility to receive God’s gift of a righted relationship through the perfect love
and obedience of Jesus Christ.8
It is important to remember two significant motivations behind Baillie’s insistence
on his somewhat difficult distinction between knowledge of God at the top of one’s head
and the bottom of one’s heart. First, Baillie understands faith as trust in response to a
person and not as mere intellectual assent to doctrinal propositions. As he articulated so
carefully in The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, one’s view of faith must
correspond to one’s view of the nature of revelation. Since Baillie views revelation in
terms of an encounter with God himself – as personal communion instead of
communication of information – he views faith more in relational rather than cognitive
terms. Second, Baillie’s own humility and piety finds frequent expression in his
hesitance to draw lines in the sand with regard to who is and is not a recipient of God’s
grace. He is never comfortable categorizing others in their faith journeys. He very

8
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carefully assesses his own pilgrimage of faith, and on multiple occasions confesses that
his own resistance to God was not born of honest intellectual doubt but was an act of
resistance to that which he saw in God and did not wish to be confronted with. We can
be sympathetic to these motivations for making a distinction between knowledge of God
at the top of one’s head and the bottom of one’s heart. But the case could be made that
this distinction is less of an asset and insight in Baillie’s theology and more of a
stumbling block.
It is difficult to discern how faith can retain its relational status, being the key to
communion with God, while remaining so dormant in a person’s psyche that she can
honestly confess she has no belief in God whatsoever. What ought to be valued about
Baillie’s proposed theology is that he is seeking to articulate a theological explanation of
reality, of his common, everyday experience. And what he is confronted with, as we are
today, is the fact that there are notably generous, compassionate, kind people who lay
down their lives for others but who confess nothing of the Christian faith. Are we to
dismiss such goodness simply because it is not accompanied by a proper doctrinal
statement of faith? Is God not at work in such a good life? As we have seen, Baillie is
unwilling to demarcate the presence of God that yields the fruit of the Spirit in this way.
His answer is that wherever there is the fruit of the Spirit, there is the Spirit himself, and
this communion only comes through faith. In other words, God’s presence, with its
experience of demand, has been met, on some level, in such a person with some level of
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acceptance and submission so that his life bears testimony to his bottom-of-the-heart faith
though his lips may not.
But is Baillie’s proposal to make sense of our experience the most reasonable and
biblical option? What elements of his thought are helpful and what elements only lead us
to more questions? I think Baillie is correct on several points. First, he is right that we
must take seriously the biblical text that testifies to the fact that all people are culpable for
knowledge of God. This concern occupied the whole first section of Our Knowledge of
God as Baillie developed a theology of the image of God and the revelatory point of
contact distinct from the positions of Barth and Brunner. There he said that human nature
is formed by being in relationship with God. In other words, the impact of God revealing
himself to humanity through his immediate, continuous personal and confrontational
presence is that it has made humanity personal and capable of being in relationship with
God.
Baillie insists, most clearly in The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought, that
God’s effort at self-revelation must be apprehended as such in order for revelation to
have taken place.9 In other words, the transmission of God’s self-revelation must be
received by our apprehension for it to be considered a true revelation at all. Though God
may be utilizing something historical to communicate himself, the fact remains that
revelation is an event that necessarily takes place in the present moment. We should be
careful to clarify what sort of response is sufficient here. For example, has God revealed
9
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himself only when someone receives his self-revelation with fellowship-restoring faith?
Or do we say God has equally revealed himself to the person who perceives the divine
self-revelation but rejects it completely? Are we to conclude that God revealed himself
to Moses but not to Pharaoh based on their responses to God’s self-revelation? Should
we make a distinction between revelation unto fellowship and revelation unto
condemnation? A brief look at just a couple of biblical examples will illustrate that the
answer to why some accept and some reject the revelation of God is rooted in the mystery
of the divine will even though all people are held responsible for their responses to God’s
personal, confronting presence. The examples chosen are from the Gospels, for Jesus is
considered to be the clearest revelation of God in all history. In the Gospel of Luke’s
story of Jesus’ triumphant entry into Jerusalem at the end of his ministry, we read that
Jesus wept over the city he approached. He grieves over the people’s response to the
revelation they have received and the consequences their blindness will bring. Jesus
says, “If you, even you, had only known on this day what would bring you peace – but
now it is hidden from your eyes. The days will come on you when your enemies will
build an embankment against you and encircle you and hem you in on every side. They
will dash you to the ground, you and the children within your walls. They will not leave
one stone on another, because you did not recognize the time of God’s coming to you.”10
What is challenging about this brief passage is that Jesus seems to maintain two,
seemingly opposing perspectives. First, Jesus wishes the people of Jerusalem knew the
10
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way of peace, but he acknowledges that it has been hidden from their eyes. Did they
exceed some kind of statute of limitations, running out of time to embrace the right view?
We don’t know, but what is clear is that what could have been known and would have
brought peace is now no longer available and is hidden from their eyes. This would seem
to support the idea that we are not all culpable for revelation transmitted – how would it
be fair to be held responsible for a transmission that is hidden from me? The second
challenging part of the passage is the last line that suggests that the responsibility for the
upcoming judgment lies with the same people who were seemingly unable to recognize
the time of God’s coming. In other words, these people ought to have recognized
Emmanuel, God with us, but because they did not, whatever the explanation, their lack of
recognition was judged a rejection.
The Gospel of John also records the event of Jesus having entered Jerusalem
amidst a throng of fans. Those who had witnessed Jesus’ raising of Lazarus from the
dead were following him and spreading the word of this miracle. The new crowd in
Jerusalem also witnessed a voice thundering from heaven, affirming what Jesus spoke.
But there were many skeptics in the crowd, and the text says that “even after Jesus had
performed so many signs in their presence, they still would not believe in him.”11 How is
it that people did not believe in Jesus – whose reputation as a miracle-working rabbi
preceded him, whose claim to glorify the Father was confirmed by a voice from heaven,
whose other miraculous works were performed among this crowd and testified to by
11
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others? The author of the gospel interprets this lack of belief as a fulfillment of
prophecy. He writes, “For this reason they could not believe, because, as Isaiah says
elsewhere: ‘He has blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts, so they can neither see
with their eyes nor understand with their hearts, nor turn – and I would heal them.’”12
This passage begins with the blame for unbelief put on the people who had received so
much revelation and had refused to embrace its testimony. But then the narrative
explains that this unbelief was a result of God’s unwillingness that they would believe in
Jesus, which in turn seems to come from his unwillingness to heal them. Again, we see
that people who were in the presence of Jesus and witnessed his miraculous signs and
who did not believe in him were held accountable for this unbelief though they are also
portrayed as having had something kept from them.
In these examples we are confronted with some challenging biblical imagery that
deserves attention. In both cases there is the language of vision used to depict revelation
–a common metaphor used in both biblical and theological literature. In the Luke
passage, the people were described as having failed to recognize what they saw. Again,
in the John passage, the people were described as having personally witnessed Jesus and
his signs but with blinded eyes. So it would seem there is some way in which the crowds
saw a revelation, which they were clearly held accountable for having seen, and some
way in which they were blind to a revelation, which was clearly understood in terms of a
culpable rejection of what had been revealed. How are we to make sense of an event that
12
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seems to be, at the same time, revealing and concealing? Here Baillie’s idea of the
mediated immediacy of divine revelation is useful. The medium of revelation is the
scenario people witness with their physical senses; it is the fact of the circumstances of
the revelation that all parties can agree upon. The immediacy of revelation has to do with
the meaning or value of the witnessed fact and depends on how one perceives the divine
presence. To illustrate this distinction, we may look at John 12:27-29. In these verses,
the Bible records Jesus speaking aloud to the Father and the Father answering him
audibly, “for your benefit, not mine,” Jesus says to the crowd.13 But the Bible also
testifies that a Father’s reply is not what most people heard – some said the sound was a
rumble of thunder while others attributed it to angels. The agreed on fact in this case is
that there was a noteworthy sound that appeared to be a kind of response to Jesus’ prayer.
Where there lacked consensus was regarding the meaning or value of the sound. Though
the account tells us that God spoke aloud, he apparently did not speak for everyone to
understand him.
Distinguishing as Baillie does between the medium of God’s self-revelation and
the revelation itself (his immediate, personal presence), shows that any one object or
person or story or event can be the means of divine revelation and that nothing is or must
intrinsically be revelatory. For example, in one of Baillie’s repeated stories of having left
a philosophy discussion late one night during his student days in Edinburgh, he tells of
looking up at the starry night and finding it cold and speechless. He remarked that he
13
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could not recite with integrity the lyrics of Joseph Addison’s hymn: “What though in
solemn silence all / Move round the dark terrestrial ball/ What though no real voice nor
sound / Amidst their radiant orbs be found? / In Reason’s ear they all rejoice / and utter
forth a glorious voice / forever singing as they shine / ‘The hand that made us is divine.’”
For Joseph Addison, the starry heavens had “spoken” to him of God’s existence; he
“saw” the divine hand in what he beheld. For Baillie, on that one evening as he wrestled
with doubt, he looked upon the same sky and neither heard nor saw anything that assured
him of God’s existence. Put another way, for Addison, there had been something that
had come to him in, with, and under his study of the night sky – revelation of God – that
did not come to Baillie in, with, and under the same sky.
Revelation as mediated immediacy preserves the understanding of revelation as
an event. If nothing in the material world is intrinsically, in and of itself, revelatory, then
revelation is not static. It is rather dependent on God’s presence and therefore
determined by him alone. What is not clear from Baillie is why, exactly, some people
receive the revelation from God and some people don’t. It is clear, as we have briefly
shown above, that the same event can yield different receptions of revelation. But is this
because God, who is clearly in control of utilizing his creation for revelatory purposes,
chooses to provide two different but simultaneous transmissions of his self-revelation?
For example, in the case of the John 12 passage recording God the Father speaking from
heaven – did God both conjure up human speech and rumbling thunder and then
specifically direct the two separate transmissions to whom he will? Or was there a single
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transmission of God speaking that either was or was not discernible to people depending
on their capacity to receive God’s self-revelation? Even for people who seemed to have a
restored capacity to receive the revelation of God (for example the disciples of Jesus),
there are still many instances where the Bible indicates that these devoted followers
failed to grasp what Jesus was teaching. This again is a reason to value Baillie’s insight
that revelation is an event; there is nothing static about it. It would seem that neither in
terms of the transmission of revelation or the reception of it does illumination function
independently of God’s intimate, moment-to-moment activity. Thus, our journey to God
is always a journey to the God who is here.

Next Steps in Baillie Studies
Four areas for further engagement with Baillie’s scholarship have been
introduced, to some degree, by this dissertation and may be recommended. First, the
Baillie Project introduced by the Special Collections department of Edinburgh University
Library in 2003 includes many kinds of documents relevant to John Baillie’s life and
career. Personal correspondence with his brother Donald, his wife, Jewel, and a variety
of scholar friends would provide interesting insight and information about Baillie’s life
and perspective. His lectures, which read as manuscripts, would benefit from further
evaluation with regard to their sequence and relationship to his published works.
A second area for future Baillie scholarship would include a study of Baillie’s
theology of revelation from a pneumatological perspective. The swell of theological
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interest in pneumatological studies in the twenty-first century prompts one to view
Baillie’s theology in this light. Reading Baillie’s theology, with its strong emphasis on
the revelatory significance of the presence of God, can help us think creatively about the
revelatory work of the Spirit, who is God with us today.14
Third, there is more work that can be done to continue Baillie’s conversation with
the Reformed epistemology movement. For example, William Alston’s book, Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (1991), and Nicholas Wolterstorff’s
book, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (1995)
both provide interesting proposals on topics Baillie addressed in his writings. A
comparison between Baillie’s idea of the mediated immediacy of divine revelation and
Alston’s idea of perception would make for an excellent study. And Wolterstorff’s ideas
about the nature of divine address could be used in a study of Baillie’s ideas of the
perimeters of scripture’s revelatory function.
Finally, there has been an increase in interest in both Hermann Bavinck and
Abraham Kuyper in American theological studies, evidenced by The Abraham Kuyper
Center for Public Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary and The Bavinck Institute
at Calvin Theological Seminary.15 It would appear Baillie did not have knowledge of or
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The Kuyper Center was started after Princeton’s special collections 1999 acquisition of more
than 30,000 volumes related to Kuyper studies. The Bavinck Institute began in 2009 after Calvin Seminary
hosted a Bavinck conference, the excellent attendance of which was due, in part, to the relatively recently
published English translation of Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics.
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engagement with the thought of these Dutch reformed theologians.16 Both theologians
wrote extensively in the area of prolegomena, and as we engage in continued reflection
and dialogue concerning the theology of revelation, consideration of these theologians
alongside of Baillie will only enrich our perspective and deepen our insight into the
nature of our knowledge of God.

16

Bavinck and Kuyper were contemporaries who died (1921 and 1920, respectively) at the
beginning of Baillie’s career.

APPENDIX A
Baillie’s Pre-1926 Lecture on the Scope of Theology
The following excerpt is taken from John Baillie’s lecture on the scope of
theology prepared for a pre-1926 theology course.1 As noted in chapter 3 of the
dissertation, this lecture, along with other portions of this course, were likely the
foundation for both The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul (1926) and Interpretation
of Religion (1928).
The lecture has been transcribed from Baillie’s hand-written notes and retains the
original format, including spelling, paragraphing, capitalizing, abbreviating, and
underlining. Where portions of this and other hand-written document have been quoted
within the body of this dissertation, the underlined words have been changed to italicized
words in order to maintain a uniform style throughout the dissertation. Where the hand
writing was illegible, a bracketed question mark has been inserted following the word in
question.

Lecture III
The Scope of Theology
We have described the business of theology as the analytic and systematic
presentation of religious belief. But the question may be put whether we should not
rather say Christian belief: or, if any of us are Jews or Buddhists, the Jewish or Buddhist
belief. Some will take this view. They will say that there is in the world no such thing as
religion, but only religions: and that therefore all we can do is to systematise the beliefs
of our own religion.
This, indeed, is the traditional view of Protestant Theology. Notice how it came
about. In the Middle Ages theology was an attempt to combine into a single system all
that was known, or could from any quarter be discerned, about God and the things of the
soul. Two sources of knowledge were recognised –speculative philosophy and the
Christian revelation. The Reformers tended, in varying degrees, to minimise; the
contribution of speculative philosophy ( = natural theology); so that the Protestant textbooks of theology were simply attempts to give an account of the Christian revelation,
i.e. to state in orderly and systematic form the doctrines of the Christian religion. So for
instance Melanchthon’s book was called Loci communes rerum theologicarum and
Calvin’s Intitutio religionis christianae; later books being called ‘Dogmatics’ or
1
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‘Systematic Theology’. This ‘theology’ took no notice of any non-Christian faith, and it
was supposed to cover the whole field of theological study.
Schleiermacher
was the first Protestant theologian who realised the unsatisfactory nature of this
view. He follows the Protestant tradition in believing that a separate science of theology
“must be formed in connection with every determinate mode of faith”. But he is
remarkable as having thought out the implications of this position as none of his
predecessors had done. For the question arises as to what variety of the Christian faith
the theologian is to set forth? The Christianity of what sect? And of what epoch?
Schleiermacher’s answer is that the theologian’s business must be with the Christianity of
his own sect and his own time, his aim being faithful to report the type of Christianity
there represented.
“Theology is the science which systematises the doctrine prevalent in a Christian
Church at a given time.”
What he conceives himself to be doing is to be presenting an orderly exposition of
the faith actually operative within German Protestantism in his own day, i.e. a century or
so ago.
One result of Schleiermacher’s influence has been that what the Middle Ages
called Theology and the Reformers Christian Theology, is now commonly (on the
Continent) called ‘Protestant Dogmatics’.
Ritschl
follows Schleiermacher in insisting that the theologian must take his stand within
his community’s faith and that he must never allow his attention to wonder outside the
bounds of his community’s faith. He excludes even Judaism. Where he differs from
Schleiermacher is in not thinking it necessary to limit his attention to “a particular
Christian Church at a given time”. That is, Ritschl limits the theologian to his own
‘religion’, but not to his own age or sect. His reason for this is that he believes
Christianity to be essentially one thing, at heart always and everywhere the same: based
on a common experience.
Which is right, Schleiermacher or Ritschl?
Schleiermacher was more consistent, but Ritschl was nearer the truth. The trouble
with Ritschl is that he did not go far enough in his departure from Schleiermacher’s
position. The Ritschlians make much lighter than did Schleiermacher of the spiritual
fissures which divide the different sects and ages of Xnity; but of the fissures that divide
Xnity of every age and sect from all other religion, they make as much as can be made.
The former, they say, are mere surface cracks; the latter goes clear down to the bottom.
This latter judgment, however, is entirely unhistorical.
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(a) This is clearly seen as to Judaism. The present-day theologian will want to
include Hebrew, as well as distinctively Christian religion, with the purview
of his study.
(b) But he cannot stop there. If he includes Hebrew religion, he must include
Greek religion too: for just as he as a part in the one, so he has a part in the
other: and just as the one has made an integral contribution to his Christian
faith, so also has the other. The Christian religion which we now possess and
preach is not, as we used to believe, the result of a unilinear development.
“Our civilization is a tree which has its roots in Greece, or, to borrow a
more appropriate metaphor from Clement of Alexandria, it is a river which has
received affluents [?] from every side; but its head waters are Greek. The
continuity of Greek thought and practice in religion and religious philosophy is
especially important.” The religion of Hellenism “passes into Christian theology
and cultus without any real break.”—Dean Inge in Legacy of Greece, pp. 28, 27.
Nor has this new family connection been forced on us by historical science
against our will. We like to think, do we not, that not only Moses and Daniel and
Jeremiah, but also Socrates and Plato and Plotinus, Zeno and Seneca and Marcus
Aurelius, belong in a large [Page 3] sense, to some spirited fellowship as ourselves?
(c) Next, it is as arbitrary and as difficult to stop with the Greeks as it was with
the Hebrews. Indeed we cannot stop anywhere short of the whole religious
experience of our race. Schleiermacher was right in his contention that once it
advances beyond its safe entrenchment in the purely historiographic
presentation of the doctrine current in a given ecclesiastical organisation at a
given time, theological science can call no halt until it has reached the widest
[?] limits of our human traffic with the Eternal World.
So what the theologian has to study is no one variety of religion but religion itself:
for after all, deeply regarded, human religion is but a single phenomenon. It has always
stood for the same thing—for the same great outgoing of the finite towards the Eternal,
for the same burning light of conviction about the hidden meaning of life. We may
indeed say that in the last analysis all the faiths in the world are but one faith. It is always
possible to penetrate behind all the vast and various divergences of the religions of the
world to a deep-seated something which they all have in common, and which may serve
as a basis for the adjustment of the differences between them.
It is quite true that at first sight we do seem to be confronted with a large number
of different “religions”, each standing for a fundamentally different view as to the
meaning of life. But there is no doubt that deeper knowledge dissipates this impression.
“If one persists in the study of the science of religion, one does find at last order
coming out of chaos. One finds it possible, and then necessary, to classify the religions
in certain ways, and, finally, a clear connection resulting that there is one great motive
running through them all”.—D.S. Cairns, Reasonableness of the Christian Faith, p. 20.
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And it is time: sympathetic historical study of the other religions is more and
more enabling us to realise the elements of identity in world religion, and the fact that it
is the same impulse that has led all men everywhere to seek God and the same kind of
insight that has led them, in varying degrees, to find Him.
Various lines of study have converged with this result.
A. There is the discovery of the remarkable resemblance of the religious beliefs
and practices of the various primitive races all over the world. It is now
almost universally agreed that primitive religion should be treated as a single
phenomenon; [Page 4] and that the points of identity are more notable than the
points of divergence.
“Recent researches into the early history of man have revealed the
essential similarity with which, under many superficial differences, the
human mind has elaborated its first crude philosophy of life”.—J.S. Frazer
[?], Golden Bough, Abridged Ed. p. 2.
“Religion in the lower culture takes many forms, but, speaking broadly,
they rest upon a common interpretation of the world”.—J. Estin Carfeki
[?], Comparative Religion, p. 101.
EXAMPLES.
B. Historical study has more and more tended to blur the sharp lines that used to
divide the more advanced religions from one another. It is now impossible to
mention and ‘religion’ that is regarded as a self-contained unit by the
historian. Every known religion is a complex phenomenon, a synthesis of
previous historical entities, many or all of which have entered also as elements
into these partially different combinations which we call the other ‘religions’.
“There have been and may yet be new religious institutions; but there has
not been a never can be a new religion, any more than a new language.
Each is a bifurcation of some branch that is itself a bifurcation; and all can
trace their origin to a common stem that has grown out of a root idea—the
idea of religion”.—Tyrrell, Christianity at the Cross-Roads, p. 252.
In the vocabulary of the modern historian Christianity is the name of a long
development which took its rise in a new synthesis and incarnation of elements that
themselves were not new.
We have recently come to feel that the significance of Christianity lies even more
in its inclusiveness than in its uniqueness.
“The Gospel of Christ is not a religion, but religion itself, in its most universal
and deepest significance”.—Outspoken Essays, 1st Series, p. 229.
Do we ever get from the Gospels the impression that Jesus came to teach a new religion?
And did Buddha come to teach a new religion?

APPENDIX B
Baillie’s 1930 Letter to David Cairns

The following excerpt is taken from a personal letter John Baillie wrote to David
Cairns on October 14, 1930.1
The excerpt has been transcribed from a hand-written document and an effort has
been made to retain the original format, including spelling, paragraphing, capitalizing,
abbreviating, and underlining. Where portions of this and other hand-written documents
have been quoted within the body of this dissertation, the underlined words have been
changed to italicized words in order to maintain a uniform style throughout the
dissertation.

I am sure that a great deal of what you say in criticism is justified. As I have
stated in the Preface, the last words of the book were written 5 ½ years ago in March
1925: so that although the book did not appear until the end of 1928, it really represents
the thinking of my first years in Auburn. My thought has moved on since then, and I feel
(it is no doubt a feeling which most authors have) that I could make the book very much
better, were I to begin to write it now afresh. Yet I think the difference would be more in
method of approach and in presentation than in fundamental view—though many
emphases would not doubt be changed. But what I feel is that by using a different
method of approach, and avoiding certain false emphases, and bringing out certain
aspects of truth which I had previously rather neglected, I could make my central position
and contention (to which I still fully adhere) much more acceptable than I have actually
succeeded in making it.
Your first doubt is whether I am right in making “our consciousness of moral
obligation the one spring of religion”—whether in the constellation of faith there are not
other elements, especially “that immediate awareness of God and of Christ of which the
story of Christian biography is so full.”
Well, I have never for a moment held that morality was the whole of religion, as
you well know. My point rather is that, when a corroding unbelief threatens to destroy
the religious outlook in which we have grown up, it is always upon our moral certainties
that we are thrown back, as upon our spirit’s last entrenchment. Our moral certainty we
cannot doubt, even if we doubt all else. This is really why I begin from our
consciousness of moral obligation—because, as a matter of fact it is the only point where
many of my students will let me begin, the only thing they will accept as a prime and
1
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initial certainty on which further certainties may be built. There are many senses in
which it would be false to speak of morality as the one spring of religion. In the deepest
sense—in the ordo essendi--rather is religion the one spring of morality. That is, it is
only because God is in our hearts that we have a moral consciousness. But the main
sense in which it would be true to say that morality is the one spring of religion, is that it
is the one unshaken πού στω from which , upon which, a disturbed faith may be rebuilt.
To me, morality is not a thing separate from religion, but a part of it.
And my contention would be that “the consciousness of moral obligation” is not a
“merely moral” but is a deep religious experience, indeed the very type of deep religious
experience. There are indeed some moralists who, by robbing it of its depth and richness
and reducing it to its barest elements or equating it with mere “desire”, present it in what
appears a quite non-religious form. But I have never been able to accept these reduced
accounts of it. To me (as I put it on p. 462 of my book) “In the experience of moral
obligation there is contained and given a knowledge, not only of a Beyond, but of a
Beyond that is in some sort actively striving to make itself known to us and to claim us
for its own.” Of course the experience of obligation is not the only moral experience in
which I find the direct impingement of the Spirit of God upon my own spirit. There is
the sense of vocation—of being sent, of being called to do a particular job—a sense
which your colleague Robertson has finely analysed in Part III of his book on the subject.
There is the sense of guilt. There is the strong impulse, when one has sinned to repent
and to confess (as to one whom we have offended). And deeper and lovelier than the
mere sense of obligation is the strong attraction which goodness and purity and
honourable dealing and even self-sacrificing help of others have for us: and what is that
but gratia irresistibilis dei making itself felt within our souls? Now all these are in a
sense typical moral experiences, treated of (in a bare and barren way!) in every text-book
of ethics. But I believe that in all these experiences we are in direct touch with the Spirit
that orders the universe. These, to me, are all personal experiences. And when you ask
whether besides the moral experiences there are not in the constellation of faith other
elements, notably “an immediate awareness” of God, I reply that the awareness which I
have here, and the touch with God which I have here, is to me as immediate and direct
and even personal as any that can be conceived. If you want an awareness of God more
immediate than this one, you are (I should feel) doing less than justice to the immediacy
of this one.
I admit that in my book I have sometimes expressed myself in too Kantian a way
as if we merely reached God at the end of an argument which started from our moral
experiences. My growing freedom from this error is due to my brother, who long
“strafed” me for it. But my real position has always been rather that God is actually and
immediately present to us in our moral experience: and in many places in my book I
insist on that, as on the last page: “For it is not merely that through our values we reach
God or that from them we infer Him, but rather that in them we find Him. Love is not
merely an outward mark and symbol of this presence, but is His very self in action in our
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world” (p. 470). It is well-known that Kant himself, in his opus postumum tended to
modify his original view tin this direction. And the same point is insisted on in that good
little book of H.H. Farmer’s—Experience of God—e.g. p. 76: “Unless the conviction of
God is given in and through the moral life, it cannot be reacted by logical inference from
the fact of that moral life.”
If therefore the words “our moral experience” be used in the widest and largest
(which is, to be sure, the only proper) sense, I should say that our moral experience is but
a name for the presence of God in our souls and the touch of God in our lives. And for
the whole presence, and all the touch. God does not come to us except in the context of
duty and the pure love of goodness. There is no kind of seeing of Him that is not
conditioned by purity of heart. Only the pure in heart can know him. There is no part of
religion that is separate from the attrait of goodness, or that has (as it were) a separate
door of entrance into our souls.
But although no part of religion is independent of morality, of course religion
goes beyond morality. The moral outlook, or what is usually called such, is not enough.
Heart’s desire is not satisfied until we are lifted out of that coil of rights and duties, of
commandments and prohibitions, of continual striving to be that which we are not.
Perhaps in my book I have (in my anxiety to get the other point home) not sufficiently
stressed the all-important respects in which religion goes beyond morality—though that
is really nearer to my own heart. Still I have stressed it—e.g. pp. 331 foot – 332. There
is a deep sense in which religion carries us beyond the opposition of good and evil (which
is the heart of morality) and a sense in which it is this release that is the secret of religious
joy and peace. We escape from the continual straining after what ought to be to a
satisfied resting in what eternally is. The “merely moral” point of view is transcended
and all its categories left behind. Now this can only be true, if the presence of God in our
souls is from the beginning something ampler and larger than a mere “consciousness of
obligation”. The “consciousness of obligation” is rather the plainly-visible fringe (though
to many secular moralists the only reality) of a far richer and more mysterious
cohabitation of the Divine Person with our own human personalities. Yet what I feel so
strongly is that there is no presence of God in the soul which is alongside our sense of
obligation as something separate from it, and independent of it.
As for the sense of Beauty being a separate source of religious experience, I deny
that; because I cannot follow the moderns in their easy parallelism of the true, the
beautiful and the good as three different classes of value. The good is either everything
(as Plato thought) or nothing. But I have said this on pp. 305-307 of my book, and my
brother on pp. 177-182 of his.
You write: “Is not the point that religions advance is always through prior moral
development overstressed? It seems to me that if communion with God is real, God must
be able immediately to communicate new and creative moral and religious ideals in a
human spirit. I would hesitate to say that the road here is closed.” Well, the only road I
close is the road by which (for example) a race of men could receive the insight that God
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was fatherly before they had received the insight that fatherliness is a high, the highest,
value in the interrelationship of persons—a view which, it seems to me would be contrary
to all our experience of the way in which insights come and of the self-impartation of the
Divine Spirit to the spirit of man. Of course the source of all human insights is God.
When we realise the appeal and charm and claim of any high good, it is because the
goodness of God is pressing in upon our souls. But this pressure is first consciously
realised by us as a demand made upon us, consequently as a moral insight in that sense.
The conscious realization that the demand comes from God and is thus revelatory of
God’s nature, so that our existing ideas of God must be revised in the light of it—that
seems to me usually to come somewhat later. What my view amounts to then is simply
that it is in the context of human interrelationships (and not abstractly and out of context
with such relationships) that God more and more reveals himself to us. Our new
discoveries of the Eternal Goodness are made by us, not apropos de rien, but through our
human loves—as the greatest of all new discoveries about the Eternal Love was mad
through the human love of Jesus Christ our Lord.

APPENDIX C
Baillie’s Unpublished Book Proposal

The following outline introduces a manuscript Baillie had prepared for possible
publication.1 Attached to the typed manuscript (available at the Edinburgh University
Library’s Special Collections Department), is a note asking his brother, Donald Baillie,
and H.R. Mackintosh to review the project and help him assess its warrant for
publication. The outline of the manuscript and the note are included in this appendix to
illustrate the process Baillie undoubtedly went through numerous times in the publication
of his many books. This manuscript, like many of Baillie’s published works, relies
heavily on material prepared for his course lectures, and though it was clearly a subject
valued by Baillie, it was evidently not one he was advised to pursue for publication.
The personal note following the manuscript outline has been transcribed from a
hand-written document and an effort has been made to retain the original format,
including spelling, paragraphing, capitalizing, abbreviating, and underlining.

Introduction
Part I—Revelation
1. The Pre-Critical Theory of Religion, p. 1
2. The Pre-Critical Theory among the Indo-Germanic Peoples, p. 8
3. The Pre-Critical Theory among the Semites, p. 13
Part II—Nature
Chapter I—The Rise of the Theology of Nature Among the Pre-Socratic Thinkers
4. The Rise of the Critical Attitude, p. 1
5. The Search for Physis, p. 3
6. Xenophanes and his Predecessors, p. 9
7. Heraclitaus, p. 15
8. Theology in the Final Period of Pre-Socratic Science, p. 22
Chapter II—The Influence of the Sophists on the Development of Theology
9. The Antithesis of Nature and Law, p. 1
10. The Theology of the Sophists, p. 15
Chapter III—Socrates and the Socratic Dialogues of Plato
11. The General Teaching and Method of Socrates, p. 1
12. The Doctrine of Forms, p. 9
13. The Theology of Socrates, p. 13

1

John Baillie, Edinburgh University Library, Special Collections Department, BAI 1/13/1.
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14. Theology and the Doctrine of Forms, p. 22
Chapter IV—The Theology of Plato’s Later Dialogues
15. The Later Dialogues, p. 1
16. The Tenth Book of the Laws, p. 5
17. The Cosmogony of the Timaeus, p. 23
18. Summary of Plato’s Theory of Religion, p. 27
Chapter V—The “Theological Science” of Aristotle
19. Aristotle and Plato, p. 1
20. The Province of Theological Science, p. 4
21. The Method and Results of Theological Science, p. 13
22. The Relation of Aristotle’s Theological Science to Actual Religion, p. 27
Chapter VI—Theology in the Painted Porch
23. A New Age in Athens, p. 1
24. The Cynics: their Theology and their Influence on Zeno, p. 4
25. The Stoic Rule of Life, p. 7
26. The Stoic Creed: Physis is Logos, p. 11
27. The Relation of Law to Nature, p. 17
28. Law and Nature in Religion, p. 24
29. The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p. 32
30. The Source of Religious Knowledge, p. 34
The following chapters trace the history of theological theory from its beginnings up to,
and including, the earlier Stoics. They are, in the first instance, notes made for a course
of lectures on “Theology in Ancient Greece” which I delivered last year, and am
repeating this year, to an advanced class. I threw my notes into book form, rather than
lecture form, however, in the first instance, because I thought it possible that I should one
day publish them as part of a larger work, viz “A General Sketch of the History of
Theological Theory”—from its beginning until, say, 1850, Ritschlianism etc. There have
been good histories of Ethical Theory written for the guidance of students of Moral
Philosophy: why should there not be a History of Theological Theory for the guidance of
students of Theology?
If I do decide to complete the work, it would be divided into five books as follows:
Part I—Revelation
Part II—Nature (up to Neo-Platonism and Marcus Aurelius)
Part III-Nature and Revelation in Harmony (Philo and St. Paul up to the 15th and 16th
centuries)
Part IV—Nature and Revelation in Conflict (the beginning of Modern Rationalism in the
16th cent. up to and including the Aufklarung)
Part V—The Antithesis of Nature and Revelation Transcended (modern theology since
Kant and Schleiermacher)
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…Only Part I and about three-quarters of Part II of the above scheme are included in the
present MSS. I have, however, delivered a course of lectures covering Part IV, and have
that material in the form of rougher notes (which, however, would have to be completely
rewritten on the basis of some further study of the period). I have a fair degree of
familiarity with the thinkers to be covered in Part V, and the writing of it would not be
very arduous.
The matters on which I would like an opinion are these:-1. Do you think there is need for a work of this kind? My own feeling is that there is
no more important part of a student’s theological training than an exact
knowledge of the history of his subject: and that there is no commoner cause of
weakness in our current theological literature than an ignorance of our theological
past.
2. Do you feel that there is justification for a book on the scale I suggest? It would
of course be far less detailed than the big histories of Christian dogma, covering a
much larger period as well as casting its glance over a much broader historical
area.
3. Does the sample I herewith offer seem sufficiently fresh, in its material or in its
mode of presentation or in its point of view to justify publication? Don’t hesitate
to say it doesn’t, if you don’t think so: because what I have written was primarily
for my lectures.
4. What criticisms of detail have you to make?

APPENDIX D
John Baillie: A Brief Biographical Timeline
1886: March 26: Born to Reverend John and Annie (Macpherson) Baillie in Gairloch,
Ross-shire, Scotland.
1890: Father John Baillie died. Annie Baillie, mother, moved the family to Inverness,
where John, Donald, and Peter Baillie studied at the Royal Academy.
1904-1908: Studied at Edinburgh University.
1905: Annie Baillie moved to Edinburgh when brother Donald started at the university.
1908-1912: Studied at New College, Edinburgh.
1909: Summer study in Jena, Germany.
1911: Summer study in Marburg, Germany.
1912: Assistant minister at Broughton Place Church in Edinburgh.
1913: Assistant to the Professor of Moral Philosophy in Edinburgh.
1914: Brother Peter died in India.
1914-1919: Joined the YMCA and was stationed with British armies in France.
1916: Met Jewel Fowler in Boulogne, France.
1919: Married Jewel Fowler.
1919-1927: Chair of Christian Theology at Auburn Theological Seminary, New York.
1921: Baillie’s son, Ian, born.
1926: Published The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul.
1927-1930: Chair of Systematic Theology at Emmanuel College, Toronto.
1928: Published The Interpretation of Religion.
1929: Published The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern Christianity.
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1930-1934: Roosevelt Chair of Systematic Theology at Union Theological Seminary,
New York.
1933: Annie Baillie died.
1933: Published And the Life Everlasting.
1934: Honorary Doctor of Divinity Degree conferred on Baillie by Yale.
1934-1956: Chair of Divinity in University of Edinburgh.
1936: Published A Diary of Private Prayer.
1939-1940: Served with YMCA, going to France to take charge of educational and
religious work for the troops.
1939: Published Our Knowledge of God.
1940-1945: Served as convener of a commission of the Church of Scotland to interpret
God’s will in the crisis of WWII: “Commission for the Interpretation of God’s
Will in the Present Crisis.”
1942: Published Invitation to Pilgrimage.
1943-1944: Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.
1948: Visited New Zealand as representative of Church of Scotland, then lectured in the
United States.
1950: Appointed Principle of New College and Dean of the Faculty of Divinity.
1950: Published The Belief in Progress.
1954: Appointed one of the six World Presidents of the World Council of Churches at
Evanston.
1956: Published The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. Retired from the Chair of
Divinity at Edinburgh.
1957: Appointed Companion of Honor to the Queen. Served on the joint Committee of
Anglicans and Presbyterians which produced the controversial “Bishop’s Report.”
1959: Lectured in the United States.
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1960: Died September 29 in Edinburgh, Scotland.
1962: Postmortem publication of The Sense of the Presence of God, Baillie’s undelivered
Gifford Lectures, and Christian Devotion.
1963: Postmortem publication of A Reasoned Faith.

APPENDIX E
Theses
Theses Related to Dissertation
1. John Baillie’s unique contribution to the theology of revelation in the idea of the
mediated immediacy of God’s presence plays a formative role in the rest of his
theology and is valuable for a Reformed theological engagement of twenty-first
century thought.
2. We see in Our Knowledge of God that the Barth-Brunner debate concerning
nature and grace occasioned Baillie’s articulation of the insights that have come to
be celebrated and criticized as Baillie’s theological legacy.
3. There are at least four major points in Baillie’s thought which can be identified
and traced through his early writing and teaching prior to the publication of Our
Knowledge of God: 1) the revelatory presence of God, 2) the universal human
moral experience as the context for faith, 3) the defensible logic of faith, and 4)
the revelation of God in, with, and under human experience of the world and
others.
4. Baillie’s observation of the influence of humanism on the western worldview and
the crisis of the Second World War drove him to articulate his theology in a more
transparently pastoral way in the twenty-five years of his scholarship following
the publication of Our Knowledge of God.
5. Many of the key characteristics of Reformed epistemology, especially as
expressed by Alvin Plantinga, parallel John Baillie’s own thought. The
demonstration of this parallel validates the relevance of Baillie’s thought for
today’s theology as his perspective can provide a good starting point for a
contemporary discussion of the theological application of Reformed
epistemology.
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Theses Related to Course Work
6. Friedrich Schleiermacher’s treatment of the divine attributes of God in The
Christian Faith is consistent with his epistemological ground established by the
feeling of absolute dependence.
7. John Baillie’s theology of the image of God provides a solid basis for thinking
about the Anknüpfungspunkt and the continuity of nature and grace.
8. The soundest conclusions to be made regarding theological epistemology and
language can only be yielded from a soteriological context that recognizes the
epistemological bondage left in the wake of sin and the resulting need of the
direct and personal work of the Holy Spirit.
9. The inauguration of the eschaton marked by the advent of Christ and the Spirit
has created an existential tension prompting Christians to ask ethical questions.
10. Augustine’s Confessions can be viewed as a cohesive whole when his chapter on
memory is used as an interpretive key to the organization of its content.

Theses Related to Personal Interest
11. Abraham Kuyper’s theology of the Holy Spirit’s work in the church needs to be
re-articulated for a contemporary Reformed pneumatology.
12. The covenant of works is essential to answering the question why God became a
human being.
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